Conscience, moral motivation, and self-deception by Blaustein, Ian
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2015




 BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
 




















IAN MATTHEW BLAUSTEIN 
 









Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
 
requirements for the degree of 
 







































 IAN MATTHEW BLAUSTEIN 
      All rights reserved  

  iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
It’s been a pretty long road to get here. There are a lot of people, and a few 
institutions, that have helped me along the way. I owe the institutions thanks and 
acknowledgment. I owe the people more than that, but since thanks and 
acknowledgement are all I can give here, I’ll start with those for whom that might be 
adequate. Thanks to the Boston University Department of Philosophy for the patience 
and material support and, more so, for the home it’s provided me through these years. 
Thanks to the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen for funding the time during 
which I first clarified this project. Thanks to St. John’s College for getting me onto this 
path in the first place. Thanks to the Pacific Division of the APA, the IWM in Vienna, 
and the philosophy departments at CUNY, the University of Toronto, and Wheaton 
College for inviting me to present work related to this project, and thanks to everyone 
who attended those sessions for their questions and suggestions.  
Thanks to Aaron Garrett for the education he’s given me in philosophy, politics, 
film, and dan dan noodles. His ideas, suggestions, and indeed his own philosophical 
concerns have helped shape this project, and his willingness to bear with my disparate 
ideas and concerns have helped allow me to shape it. Thanks to Daniel Star for his 
constantly friendly and critically incisive responses to everything I’ve shown him. 
Thanks to Manfred Kuehn as much for his friendship as for his teaching and guidance. 
  v 
Thanks to the rest of my teachers, at BU and elsewhere, especially Sam Fleischacker, 
Walter Hopp, Joe Macfarland, David Roochnik, Amélie Rorty, and Susanne Sreedhar. 
Thanks to my friends and colleagues, who I should also call my teachers: Maren 
Behrensen, Candice Delmas, John Grey, Carolyn Dicey Jennings, Wesley Erdelack, 
Sarah Farkas, Stacey Goguen, Nolan Little, David Jennings, Shaadi Khoury, Gal Kober, 
Vera Koshkina, Kenny Lackey, Karolina Lewestam, Brian Marrin, John McHugh, Irina 
Mikhalevich, Lynn Niizawa, Ashley Norwood, Bryan Norwood, Mihaela Pacurar, Mark 
Pickering, Erick Rabin, Orla Richardson, Elizabeth Robinson, Ben Roth, Ben Sherman, 
Sarah Tobin, Josh Wood.  
Thanks most of all to Erin Seeba for helping me pull through, and for making 
meaning with me. 
Thanks to my family: my aunts, cousins, grandparents, uncles, and all the old 
friends who are as good as family by now. Thanks to my sister, Mara Blaustein Garcia, 
and to my parents, Lawrence and Marilyn Blaustein, for the seemingly bottomless well 
of love, support, and trust.  
Finally, thanks and apologies to all those I forgot to acknowledge here. I hope my 
forgetting you was unmotivated. 
  
  vi 
CONSCIENCE, MORAL MOTIVATION, AND SELF-DECEPTION 
(Order No.           ) 
IAN MATTHEW BLAUSTEIN 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2015 




It is a serious problem for some well-known accounts of moral motivation, that is, 
accounts of what ought to motivate us, that what is supposed to provide motivation to 
act well instead provides motivation to self-deceive. I term this the Self-Deception 
Problem. Any theorist who offers an account of moral motivation that has the Self-
Deception Problem has reason for concern with our tendency to self-deceive. 
In this dissertation, I create a taxonomy of accounts of moral motivation, which 
provides a structural explanation for which accounts of moral motivation are liable to 
the Self-Deception Problem. Using this taxonomy, I am able explain why Thomas Reid, 
Adam Smith, and Joseph Butler are concerned with self-deception as a moral problem in 
a way that Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Francis Hutcheson are not. But the 
application of my taxonomy is not limited to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. I 
also show how it fits the work of the contemporary psychologist Augusto Blasi and the 
contemporary philosopher Christine Korsgaard. Neither Blasi nor Korsgaard discusses 
  vii 
self-deception in any thoroughgoing way but, as I argue, since both their accounts have 
the Self-Deception Problem, both of them have reason to do so. 
The most interesting theorist of moral motivation and self-deception, though, is 
Joseph Butler. Through a close reading of his arguments for the authority of conscience, 
I show how his account gives rise to the Self-Deception Problem, and how his sermons 
on self-deception serve as explanations of and responses to that problem. But the link is 
even tighter than that: on my novel interpretation of Butler’s arguments in favor of the 
authority of conscience, what he is in fact arguing for is an appropriate degree of self-
trust. His discussion of self-deception can accordingly be understood as seeking a proper 
degree of self-suspicion. On Butler’s view, moral agency is not just a matter of 
recognizing our divinely set proper ends. Nor is it just a matter of acting as a self-
legislating agent. It is primarily a matter of correctly modulating self-trust and self-
suspicion. 
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 Joseph Butler claims that self-deception is so ubiquitous that “those who have 
never had any suspicion of, who have never made allowances for, this weakness in 
themselves, who have never . . . caught themselves in it, may almost take for granted 
that they themselves have been very much misled by it.”1 Following Butler, I like to tell 
my students that if they’re not familiar with the experience of deceiving themselves, it 
just means they’re really good at it. But even supposing that the possibility of self-
deception is ubiquitous, that is to say, supposing that everyone, or almost everyone, has 
the ability to deceive themselves, why would we think that self-deception actually is 
ubiquitous? What is it that makes it reasonable to expect that everyone, or almost 
everyone, actually does frequently deceive themselves? Pascal answers: 
The nature of self-love and of this human self is to love only self and consider 
only self. But what is it to do? It cannot prevent the object of its love from being 
full of faults and wretchedness: it wants to be great and sees that it is small; it 
wants to be happy and sees that it is wretched . . . The predicament in which it 
thus finds itself arouses in it the most unjust and criminal passion that could 
possibly be imagined, for it conceives a deadly hatred for the truth which rebukes 
it and convinces it of its faults. It would like to do away with this truth, and not 
being able to destroy it as such, it destroys it, as best it can, in the consciousness 
                                         
1 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons, Sermon X.15 
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of itself and others; that is, it takes every care to hide its faults both from itself 
and others.2 
 
Pascal claims that the desire to think well of oneself is more or less ubiquitous, and that 
equally ubiquitous is the possession of major faults, flaws, and shortcomings of the sort 
that, if recognized, would endanger one’s ability to continue thinking well of oneself. 
Given that ‘predicament,’ if we all have the ability to self-deceive, then we all 
have the motive to do so as well. Furthermore, since we are primarily motivated to 
deceive ourselves about things that might affect our good view of ourselves, the more 
those faults, flaws, and shortcomings matter to us, the stronger that motive to deceive 
ourselves about them is. Things we’re proud of, things on which our self-respect depends: 
that’s what we tend to deceive ourselves about. Since I don’t think of myself as much of 
a swimmer, since my own good view of myself doesn’t depend at all on my relative 
excellence in swimming, I have little motive to deceive myself about how fast or far I can 
swim. But since I do think of myself as funny, since my own good view of myself does in 
part depend on my relative cleverness in making jokes, the possibility that I’m not any 
funnier than most of my friends does threaten my good view of myself. So I’m motivated 
to think my jokes went over a little better than they did. I’m motivated to think that 
someone else’s excellent quip was a little closer to the tip of my tongue than it was. And 
what counteracts this tendency? What motive do we have to set against the motivation 
                                         




to self-deceive? Perhaps there is the love of truth, but, as Harry Frankfurt puts it, 
“Surely the faintest human passion—both the least salient and the least robust—is our 
love of the truth about ourselves.”3 
We may think Pascal and Frankfurt are wrong—though of course their views 
predict that we would want to think so. The love of the truth about ourselves may be 
stronger than Frankfurt thinks. And we might have other reasons, aside from simple love 
of truth, to favor honest self-scrutiny over self-deception. After all, as Pascal says, it’s 
not just ourselves we want to deceive, and it isn’t just our own favor that we seek: we 
also care about what other people think. Plausibly, making yourself actually be a certain 
way is often a more reliable strategy for convincing people that you are that way than 
trying to deceive them would be. If that’s right—and even Pascal would have to admit 
that it is, since he would expect everyone else to be just as keen to uncover your flaws 
and shortcomings as you are to find theirs—then we can have motives aside from the 
love of truth that favor honest self-scrutiny. But even if Pascal is wrong about the 
relative prominence of our motives for and against self-deception, his central insight 
seems to be sound: the more essential something is to our good view of ourselves, the 
more motivation we have to deceive ourselves about it. 
This insight can be very easily carried over to answer a question Stephen Darwall 
asks: “Why is it that self-deception has seemed a matter of fundamental concern to some 
                                         
3 Harry Frankfurt, “The Faintest Passion,” p. 5. 
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moral philosophers while others have given it only scant attention?”4 He notes that for 
some moral philosophers, including Kant, Adam Smith, and Butler, self-deception seems 
to be of paramount moral concern. Smith calls it “the source of half the disorders of 
human life.”5 Butler goes further, claiming that self-deception “undermines the whole 
principle of good.”6 Kant agrees, calling sincerity with self “the formal condition of all 
virtues.”7 So, at least for Butler and Kant, self-deception ruins the possibility of virtue. If, 
as Butler says, self-deception is more or less ubiquitous, and, as Kant says, true self-
knowledge is almost never attained, then virtue is, to put it mildly, difficult, and the 
overcoming of self-deception, and the attainment of self-knowledge is, to put it equally 
mildly, important. Of course, not all moral philosophers are so concerned with self-
deception: as Darwall notes, Bentham, Mill,8 Sidgwick, Moore, and Ross ‘hardly mention’ 
it. What makes the difference? I propose that Pascal’s insight tells us: the more essential 
something like self-directed moral judgment is to a philosopher’s account of virtue, the 
more danger self-deception poses to virtue on that account, so the more reason that 
philosopher has to treat self-deception as of ‘fundamental concern.’ 
                                         
4 Stephen Darwall, “Self-Deception, Autonomy, and Moral Constitution,” p. 407. 
5 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, III.4.6 
6 Sermons X.16 
7 Immanuel Kant, Handschrifter Nachlass, vol. 23, Akademie p. 400. Quoted in Darwall, 
“Self-Deception, Autonomy, and Moral Constitution.” 
8 Though Mill is not entirely unconcerned with the moral problems of self-deception. See 
Utilitarianism, p. 71. 
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Indeed, as we look more carefully at, in particular, the work of Kant, Smith, 
Butler, and Thomas Reid, we can see the problem very pointedly. All four of those 
philosophers offer accounts of proper, or virtuous, or, as I’ll term it, moral motivation 
that have what I’ll call the Self-Deception Problem. They all say, in various forms, that 
moral motivation is provided by the desire for self-approval. We have an interest in 
regarding ourselves as morally worthy, or in being the subject of approving self-directed 
moral judgments. That interest can create a motive to self-deceive about moral matters. 
It’s often hard work to live up to your own ideals; it’s often easier to deceive yourself 
about your goodness than it is to be good. So if the desire for self-approval is supposed 
to provide moral motivation, the Self-Deception Problem lurks: the very thing that’s 




Chapter 1 of this dissertation will provide framework and grounding for the Self-
Deception Problem. As I’ve put it, the place to look to understand why self-deception is 
or isn’t a moral problem for a given philosopher is that philosopher’s account of moral 
motivation. I create a taxonomy of accounts of moral motivation according to the 
incentive-object they propose. Accounts of moral motivation are Immediate if the 
incentive-object is supposed to be identical with the object of moral treatment, that is, if 
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the thing that’s supposed to provide you with motivation to act a particular way in a 
given situation is merely direct appreciation of that situation. Benevolence-based ethics 
work this way: if you act for the right motives only when benevolence drives you, you 
act for the right motives only when you act from a direct affective response to your 
appraisal of a situation. There is no third party through whom your response is mediated.  
On the other hand, accounts of moral motivation are Mediated if the incentive 
object is not supposed to be identical with the object of moral treatment, that is, if the 
thing that’s supposed to provide you with moral motivation to act in a particular way is 
something other than direct appreciation of that situation. Divine approval-based ethics 
works this way: if you act for the right motives only when your search for God’s 
approval drives you, you act for the right motives only when you act from your response 
to your appraisal of what God’s appraisal of a situation might be. Your response to a 
situation is mediated by the response of a third party. 
In the case of a divine approval-based ethics, the ‘third party’ whose judgment 
mediates my responses, God, is a person other than, and outside of me. If the observer of 
my actions whose judgment, or approval, I am motivated to seek is conceived of as being 
outside me, we have a Mediated External account of moral motivation. But Mediated 
accounts of moral motivation do not require that the mediation be done by an observer 
who I conceive of as being outside me. If, rather than God’s approval, the desire for self-
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approval is what ought to drive my actions, then we have a Mediated Internal account 
of moral motivation. 
As should already seem clear, the Self-Deception Problem outlined above is one 
that befalls theorists who offer Mediated Internal accounts of moral motivation. If the 
desire for self-approval is what ought to drive my actions if I am to act from virtuous 
motives, then so-called virtuous motives are liable to drive me to self-deceive rather than 
act virtuously. Those who offer Mediated External accounts of moral motivation have a 
very nearly related problem: a simple Deception Problem. If the desire for some other 
person’s (or group’s) approval is what ought to drive my actions if I am to act from 
virtuous motives, then so-called virtuous motives are liable to drive me to deceive them 
rather than act virtuously. Immediate accounts of moral motivation, by contrast, have 
no analogous problem.  
Chapter 2 of this dissertation tests these hypotheses by considering, in turn, the 
accounts of moral motivation of Thomas Reid, Adam Smith, Thomas Hobbes, John 
Locke, and Francis Hutcheson. Reid and Smith, I show, have Mediated Internal accounts 
of moral motivation. Hobbes and Locke, I show, have Mediated External accounts, while 
Hutcheson has an Immediate account. My argument from Chapter 1 holds that, 
accordingly, Reid and Smith will have a Self-Deception Problem, Hobbes and Locke will 
have a simple Deception Problem, while Hutcheson will have no such deception problem. 
I show that this is indeed the case. My taxonomy of accounts of moral motivation might 
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seem to be oversimple, but this result lends it significant credibility: my taxonomy 
allows us to explain why some philosophers are, and others aren’t, seriously concerned 
with our tendency to self-deception as a moral problem. 
One complication to that picture is the fact that not all philosophers have 
monistic accounts of moral motivation. Hutcheson may hold that the only approvable 
motive to action is benevolence. Kant may hold that the only approvable motive to 
action is respect for the moral law. In these cases, they offer monistic accounts of moral 
motivation. Smith, on the other hand, holds that there can be many different approvable 
motives to action. Sometimes benevolence is approvable. Sometimes, particularly in cases 
where the right thing might not be the most benevolent thing, the motive of duty is 
more approvable. Sometimes even anger can be approvable, such as in responses to great 
or consciously-chosen wrongs: the true villain calls for angry, and not just dutiful or 
benevolent, responses. So Smith has a pluralistic account of moral motivation. 
Furthermore, some of those moral motives, like anger or benevolence, have an Immediate 
character, while others, most importantly, the desire for self-approval, have a Mediated 
character. 
In Chapter 3, I offer an account of conscience as the desire to do the morally 
right thing, where ‘the morally right thing’ is read de dicto. This thin, desire-based 
account helps conscience to find a place within a pluralistic picture of moral motivation. 
I’m interested in pressing this view of conscience first because I believe that any sensible 
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account of moral motivation must both be pluralistic in general and include room among 
its many approvable motivations for a Kant-style motive of duty, which this does. 
Second, it seems to me that this sensible pluralism defangs an influential metaethical 
argument of Michael Smith’s against motivational judgment externalism: the ‘moral 
fetishism’ argument.9 Smith argues that a motivational judgment externalist can only 
explain the reliable connection between moral judgment and motivation, the reliable 
connection between judging that you ought to p and being motivated to p, by reference 
to a standing desire to do the morally right thing, where ‘the morally right thing’ is read 
de dicto. But such a standing desire is, he claims, moral fetishism, rather than virtuous 
moral concern. The idea is that we ought to be, for example, saving drowning children 
for their sake, not for the sake of doing the morally right thing. Notice: Smith’s picture 
of what would count as virtuous moral concern looks very much like what I termed 
above an Immediate moral motivation. 
Smith’s claim about the de dicto desire externalism needs to posit should look 
familiar here, because what he calls ‘moral fetishism’ is exactly what I call ‘having a 
conscience.’ It might be right to think of such a desire as some kind of fetishism only if 
that desire were the whole of moral or virtuous motivation, if it were the single moral 
motivation in a monistic account. But a pluralistic account has the resources to claim 
that it would be less than ideally virtuous to act from conscience only, or to act from 
                                         
9 Michael Smith, The Moral Problem, Chapter 3. 
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conscience all the time, while maintaining that it’s good to have a conscience. It can be 
good to have a conscience if only as a prop or backup to virtuous action: we aren’t 
always thrilled to do what we believe morality requires, so it’s helpful to have a 
conscience prodding us to do it anyway. But it can also be good to have a conscience in 
cases in which morality requires us to do things we’d rather not have direct dispositions 
towards doing. The world can be difficult: situations can be such that what you believe 
you have to do is something unpleasant, is not something you’d ever want to do. In such 
situations, it seems better, more virtuous, to be motivated by conscience, by the sense 
that, despite anything else, this is what you ought to do, than by any direct desire to do 
that unpleasant thing. 
Nonetheless, my desire-based account of conscience may be too thin. Motivated 
by a Butlerian counterexample, I turn in Chapter 4 to a thorough investigation of Butler 
on conscience, both its form and, crucially, the arguments for its supreme authority 
within us. Butler offers four different lines of argument for the supremacy of conscience. 
The first, which I understand as merely preparatory, and not indeed a positive argument 
for the authority of conscience at all, is the eudaimonistic argument. Butler does not 
indeed argue that the demands of conscience and the demands of self-interest directly 
coincide, as any positive eudaimonistic argument would. Rather, he argues that the 
demands of conscience are no more prejudicial to my self-interest or general happiness 
than are the demands of the other interests—my love of oysters, my love of basketball, 
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my love of wristwatches—that seem to jointly compose that self-interest. If that’s right, 
it effectively removes major grounds for skepticism of conscience, since it tells me that I 
should not have any particular worry that I’ll lose out on my own good by following 
virtue. 
Butler’s first positive argument is what I call the phenomenological argument, 
which claims that conscience is authoritative because it feels authoritative. His second is 
the naturalistic argument, which claims that conscience is authoritative because a 
correct understanding of our nature recognizes its superintendency over our other 
internal principles. His third argument is the agential argument, which claims that we do 
not act as proper agents, as laws unto ourselves, unless we follow conscience. My 
ecumenical reading shows how these three arguments are much more closely linked than 
has been recognized in the Butler literature. I do so by using each of those three 
arguments, in turn, to clarify my own, fairly deflationary reading. On my view, Butler 
does not intend to prove that conscience is the bearer of justified authority. He is rather 
showing that conscience is a natural constituent of our mental economies, and “plainly 
bears upon it marks of authority over all the rest.”10 This is not sufficient to prove its 
claims of authority, but it is sufficient, absent any reasons to doubt our natures, to trust 
it.  
                                         
10 Sermons P.24 
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If my reading is right, then Butler has provided us with good reasons to trust our 
conscience, which is to say, good reasons to trust our moral responses. But that self-trust 
surely cannot be absolute. Conscience is, after all, a motivating force within us, not just 
a reasoning faculty, so when Butler claims that we should follow it, he’s claiming that it 
provides moral motivation. But Butler recognizes that self-partiality can lead to a self-
deceptive corrupt conscience,11 in which the desire to satisfy conscience motivates self-
deception instead: this is the Self-Deception Problem. But Butler recognizes two 
different versions of the Self-Deception Problem in his sermons on Balaam (Sermon VII) 
and King David (Sermon X). In the same way that his arguments for the authority of 
conscience are well understood as arguments in favor of self-trust, his arguments in favor 
of vigilance against our tendency to self-deceive are arguments in favor of self-suspicion. 
Moral agency in Butler is not just a matter of recognizing our divinely-set proper ends, 
nor is it just a matter of acting as a self-legislating agent. It is also a matter of correctly 
modulating self-trust and self-suspicion. 
Finally, in my concluding Chapter 5, I show the generality and usefulness of the 
taxonomy developed in Chapter 1, and pave the way for future work, by applying it to 
more contemporary theorists. In just the same way that Reid, Smith, and Butler can be 
understood as propounding Mediated Internal accounts of moral motivation, so can the 
moral psychologist Augusto Blasi in his Self model of moral motivation, and Christine 
                                         
11 Sermons X.16 
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Korsgaard in her identity-based account of moral obligation. Reid, Smith, and Butler’s 
accounts are liable to the Self-Deception Problem just in virtue of their structure, so this 
liability explains their concerns with self-deception in general. Since Korsgaard and 
Blasi’s accounts have that same structure, they are, I show, equally liable to the Self-
Deception Problem. For both of them, we ought to be motivated to do certain things, 
and refrain from others in order to protect and sustain our moral self-image. But, clearly, 
the protection and sustenance of a moral self-image is something we can and do 
accomplish by means of self-deception. Insofar as we feel the need to regard ourselves as 
moral beings, we feel the need to rationalize all our behavior as morally acceptable, 
whether it is or not. Neither Blasi nor Korsgaard has discussed self-deception in any 
sustained or serious way but, I believe, they have reason to.  
If my readings of Blasi and Korsgaard are fruitful, it means that my taxonomy is 
broadly applicable: not just to the history of philosophy, but to its present, and even to 
current empirical psychology. It means further that that taxonomy is broadly helpful, 
explaining why Reid, Smith, and Butler were interested in self-deception, and why Blasi 






Moral Motivation and Self-Deception 
 
§1: Introduction 
Some moral theorists, and some moral theories, show a great deal of concern 
about self-deception. Others don’t. Not a lot of work has been done on giving a general 
view on what makes the difference. That is, not a lot of work has been done to try to 
explain what kinds of moral theorists, and what kinds of moral theories, are such that 
self-deception presents a serious problem for them, and what kinds are such that it 
doesn’t. Stephen Darwall, in his attempt to explain the difference between theories that 
are and aren’t concerned with self-deception, points to Joseph Butler, Adam Smith, and 
Immanuel Kant as exemplars of self-deception-concerned theorists.12 He points out that, 
by contrast, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill,13 Henry Sidgwick, and G.E. Moore are 
unconcerned with questions of self-deception. Lest we think that, for whatever reason, 
deontic theories face the specter of self-deception, while consequentialist theories range 
free of it, Darwall points out that W.D. Ross, a professedly deontic thinker, seems 
similarly untroubled. In this and the next chapter, I’ll mostly be using the same 
exemplars of self-deception-concerned theorists as Darwall, but, rather than moving 
                                         
12 Darwall, “Self-Deception, Autonomy, and Moral Constitution.” 
13 Though Mill is not entirely unconcerned with the moral problems of self-deception. 
See footnote 8 above. 
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forward in time from them to find my contrast class, I’ll move back (and across). I think 
that by comparing, in one particular way, Butler, Smith, and Thomas Reid on the one 
hand to Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Francis Hutcheson on the other, much light 
can be shed on the question of the relation between self-deception and moral theory. But 
there’s a lot of work to do to get there. 
The first thing to point out is also noted by Darwall: the close connection in 
Butler, Smith, and Kant between self-deception and conscience. Butler, in his Fifteen 
Sermons of 1726, spends the same amount of time on conscience and on self-deception: 
each topic earns two sermons.14 Smith, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments of 1759, 
follows his chapter, “Of the Influence and Authority of Conscience,” with a chapter, “Of 
the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the Origin and Use of general Rules.”15 And Kant, in 
The Metaphysics of Morals of 1797 follows his section on the Court of Conscience with 
the claim that the “First Command of all Duties to Oneself” is “know (scrutinize, fathom) 
yourself.” 16  Butler, Smith, and Kant all immediately followed their accounts of 
conscience with concerns about our tendency to avoid self-knowledge. Reid goes the 
                                         
14 Sermons II and III, “Upon the Natural Supremacy of Conscience” and Sermons VII 
and X, “Upon the Character of Balaam,” and “Upon Self-Deceit,” respectively. 
15 Part IV, Chapters III and IV, respectively. 
16 6:438-442 in Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals. 
  
16 
opposite direction, though the proximity is maintained. His discussion of self-deception is 
in the chapter preceding his chapter on conscience.17  
 A natural thought as to the connection between conscience and our tendency to 
avoid self-knowledge, or to self-deceive, is that conscience is supposed to be the source of 
moral judgment. And if the conscience is the source of moral judgment, then a tendency 
to self-deceive could be a tendency that would impeach or invert moral judgment: you 
could not be a good moral judge unless your moral view was unmuddied, and, insofar as 
we self-deceive, we muddy our moral view. This would not be entirely on the wrong 
track; indeed, something close to this is both Darwall’s explanation and Mike W. 
Martin’s.18 But there are difficulties: Kant, first of all, does not treat conscience as the 
source of moral judgment, but as the motive for moral self-examination.19 And though 
Smith does regard something like conscience as the source of moral judgment, he also 
regards it as a font of motivation. But it is not upon finishing his chapter on moral 
judgment that Smith discusses self-deceit; it follows his discussion of conscience’s 
influence, not its form. Despite Darwall and Martin’s views, it looks like something 
                                         
17 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind, Essay III, Chapters 7 
and 8. 
18 In Self-Deception and Morality. I said above that not a lot of work has been done on 
explaining the connection between self-deception and moral theory, at least in the way 
I’m interested in. Darwall’s essay and Martin’s book are the major sources. 
19 The Metaphysics of Morals, 6:400-401. See also Dean Moyar’s discussion of Kantian 




about conscience as a motive is what introduces Kant and Smith’s concerns with self-
deceit.  
I think the key to understanding Butler, Smith, Kant, and Reid’s interest in self-
deception is in their accounts of moral motivation. Specifically, all four of them have 
what I’ll term Mediated Internal accounts of moral motivation, and accounts of that 
type are liable to what I term the Self-Deception Problem. These terms will be explained 
at some length, but in brief, given certain standards, the desire for self-approval can be 
satisfied by doing and being such as to be a proper object for your own approval, that is, 
by living up to the standards by which you judge yourself. But it can also be satisfied 
without actually living up to those standards, if only you can deceive yourself about that 
fact. There is no reason to think that it will always be easier to live up to your standards 
than it is to deceive yourself, or that it will always be easier to deceive yourself than to 
live up to your standards, so you, and I, insofar as we are motivated by the desire for 
self-approval, can be expected sometimes to do one, and sometimes the other. So if the 
desire for self-approval is focused on self-approving moral judgments, it can be expected 
sometimes to provide motivation to act morally, and sometimes to provide motivation to 
self-deceive instead. So an account of moral motivation that places it in the desire for 
self-approving moral judgments is liable to cases in which it fails to serve as a spur to 
moral action because it serves as a motive to self-deceive instead. This is what I mean by 
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saying that Mediated Internal accounts of moral motivation are liable to the Self-
Deception Problem. 
In the next chapter, I’ll explain and then show how Reid, Smith, Hobbes, Locke, 
and Hutcheson exemplify my taxonomy of different accounts of moral motivation.20 
Doing so should make clear fairly immediately why some accounts of moral motivation 
lead to concern with self-deception and why others don’t. It should also become clear 
that, though my examples are all drawn from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
the categorization those examples helped me make applies more broadly, and can tell us 
which of our contemporary theorists of moral motivation should be concerned with self-
deception—whether they presently are or not.  
But before I do that, I need to explain what I’m talking about when I say ‘moral 
motivation’ and ‘self-deception.’ Then I’ll provide a categorization of possible accounts of 
moral motivation. That taxonomy will enable me to explain the Self-Deception Problem 
more clearly. Once I’ve done that, I’ll also discuss in what sense the ‘Self-Deception 
Problem’ is a problem at all. That will be the work of this chapter.  
 
§2: Moral Motivation and the Ethics of Character 
When most contemporary philosophers discuss moral motivation, they mean 
something like, the motivation that is concomitant with a moral judgment. This will not 
                                         
20 Kant will be left for another day. 
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be the primary way in which I’ll be using this term, but explaining it should help outline 
some of my general terrain, and feed into the explanation of my primary uses of it. If I 
judge that I ought morally to give 10% of my income to the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, we presume that, in virtue of that judgment, I am motivated to tithe 
to the Mormons. Plato and, closer to our day, R.M. Hare,21 have argued that moral 
motivation is absolute, that is, that if I judge that I ought to tithe to the Mormons, then 
I will (at least) try to tithe to the Mormons. That I will (at least) try to tithe to the 
Mormons means that I will do so unless some external impediment prevents me. The 
thought is that if I have earnestly and unconfusedly judged that I ought to tithe, the 
concomitant motivation swamps all internal impediments to doing so, such as my desire 
to use the money to buy a jet ski. On these lines, if I’m not trying to tithe to the 
Mormons, then you know that I have not earnestly and unconfusedly judged that I 
ought to. This of course brings up significant questions about the possibility of akrasia or 
weakness of will, and the plausibility of the ‘guise of the good’ thesis. If it’s possible for 
me to earnestly and unconfusedly judge that I ought morally to tithe to the Mormons, 
but then to go and buy a jet ski instead, then the Plato and Hare view is in trouble. 
How, after all, could I go and spend thousands on something even I regard as frivolous, 
like a jet ski, when I believe there are better things to do with my money? 
                                         
21 See R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, Part I. 
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The possibility of something like akrasia or weakness of will can be admitted by a 
weaker view about moral motivation. This is the view that if I judge that I ought to 
tithe to the Mormons, then I have some motivation to tithe to the Mormons. It may be 
understood as at least a pro tanto motivation, or an all-else-equal motivation, or 
something else. It does not imply that my desire to spend the money on a jet ski won’t 
win out over my desire to do what I think is right. But if I’m not in any way motivated 
to tithe to the Mormons, then, on this view, you know that I have not earnestly and 
unconfusedly judged that I ought to. This view, known as motivational judgment 
internalism, has many contemporary defenders, including Darwall22 and, more directly 
for my discussion here, Michael Smith.23 Even this weaker view of course brings up 
significant questions about the relation between, on the one hand, judgment or belief, 
and, on the other hand, motivation. It’s difficult to square with so-called Humean 
psychology, the idea that beliefs alone cannot motivate. This question has been one of 
the primary motors of metaethics in the last 60 or so years. If beliefs alone cannot 
motivate, and yet, moral judgments do motivate, then moral judgments are not 
expressions of mere beliefs, or do not, perhaps, imply beliefs at all: hence the 
expressivism of C.L. Stevenson, Allan Gibbard, and Simon Blackburn.24 If rather moral 
                                         
22 See Stephen Darwall, “Internalism and Agency.” 
23 See Michael Smith, The Moral Problem, Chapter 3. 
24 See C.L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, 
and Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions. 
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judgments are expressions of beliefs, and moral judgments alone do motivate, then 
perhaps beliefs can motivate: hence the neo-Aristotelianism of John McDowell.25 
But if beliefs alone cannot motivate, and moral judgments are expressions of 
beliefs, then, perhaps, moral judgments alone do not motivate: hence the externalism of 
David Brink and Russ Shafer-Landau.26 This would be a yet weaker view about moral 
motivation, denying that it is the case that if I judge I ought morally to tithe to the 
Mormons, then I am motivated to tithe to the Mormons. On this view, there is only a 
psychological, and no rational (that is, necessary, logical, or conceptual) connection 
between moral judgments and motivation. Smith and externalists like Brink and Nick 
Zangwill 27  have argued as to whether moral motivation is best explained on an 
internalist or externalist picture, that is, whether the existence of moral motivation is 
best understood in, on the one hand, rational (necessary, logical, or conceptual) terms, or, 
on the other hand, in merely psychological terms. One move made by some externalists, 
such as Sigrun Svavarsdottir,28 though it’s embraced by Smith in favor of his internalism, 
is to suggest that a good person is motivated by her moral judgments. On externalist 
lines, this would be to say that it is perfectly possible to judge, earnestly and 
unconfusedly that, say, it would be morally wrong to drive over children with my jet ski, 
                                         
25 See John McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality, Part II. 
26 See David O. Brink, “Moral Motivation” and Moral Realism and the Foundation of 
Ethics, Chapter 3, and Russ Shafer-Landau, “A Defense of Motivational Externalism” 
and Moral Realism: A Defense, Part III. 
27 See Nick Zangwill, “Externalist Moral Motivation” and “The indifference argument.” 
28 See Sigrun Svavarsdottir, “Moral Cognition and Motivation.” 
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and yet have no concomitant motivation to avoid doing so. This, the externalists say, is 
the kind of thing that psychopaths do. They don’t do it because they’re irrational, or 
confused about the meaning of a moral judgment; they do it because they just don’t care. 
The existence, or even the conceivability, of psychopaths of this kind is much 
argued in the literature of the internalist/externalist debate. But more interesting to me 
here is the idea that part of what it means to be a good person is to be such that your 
judgments about moral rightness motivate. Whether or not we think that’s right—and it 
seems awfully plausible to me—what that certainly is is a normative claim, indeed a 
moral claim, not about what you should do, and not about what a good person does, but 
about how you should be, about how a good person is. It does not belong to an ethics of 
action, but rather to an ethics of character. 
This introduces another sense of ‘moral motivation.’ That is, moral motivation as 
a direct counterpart to moral action. Just as an ethics of action tells you what you 
should and shouldn’t do, with those things you should do being what we might call 
‘moral actions,’ so an ethics of character tells you how you should and shouldn’t be, with 
those ways you should be motivated being what we might call ‘moral motivations.’ This 
is the primary sense in which I’m using the term ‘moral motivation,’ particularly in 
terms of the accounts of moral motivation that I said above I’d be categorizing. They are 
different accounts of what way of being motivated is the right one, of how we ought to 
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be motivated. This is the realm of virtue theory,29 particularly that outlined by Robert 
Adams or Thomas Hurka: in a direct parallel to the way in which an ethics of action can 
seek to explain, or even to give necessary and sufficient conditions for, what makes right 
acts right, so can an ethics of character seek to explain, or even to give necessary and 
sufficient conditions for, what makes a character trait a virtue.30 Character traits, in this 
discussion, involve things like patterns of motivation and response. Plausibly, as above, a 
constituent of good character is a disposition to be motivated by one’s moral judgments. 
We might even use this line of thinking to revive a version of the Plato-Hare view, via 
the claim that a constituent of good character is a disposition to be more strongly 
motivated by one’s moral judgments than by anything else. 
Interestingly, perhaps a bit curiously, it seems to me that lots of supposedly 
abstract philosophical debates, such as the metaethics discussed above, invoke, rely on, 
and even can help to clarify straightforwardly normative claims about character. I say 
this despite the common hope that metaethics will be neutral to, and compatible with, a 
range of plausible normative views.31 Both Smith and Svavarsdottir, in the course of 
                                         
29 I’m using a very broad conception of ‘virtue theory’ when I understand it as an ethics 
of character. Many virtue theorists, like Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, intend 
for the ethics of character to ground the ethics of action. Actions are right because they 
are the kinds of things a good person would do. On my conception of virtue theory that 
is certainly possible, but not necessary. Thanks to Daniel Star for clarifying this. 
30 See Robert Adams, A Theory of Virtue and Thomas Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and Value, 
as well as Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics. 
31 A.J. Ayer makes something like this neutrality claim in Language, Truth and Logic, 
Chapter VI. J.L. Mackie is more explicit about it, claiming that ‘first-order,’ that is, 
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arguing whether or not there is a rational connection between moral judgment and 
motivation, rely on the claim that a good person is motivated by her moral judgments. 
Smith goes on to sharpen this claim considerably, saying that the good person is 
motivated by her moral judgments just because she’s motivated by the reasons that both 
drive and rationalize those judgments. That is to say, the mere fact that it would be 
right to x does not motivate the good person, according to Smith; rather, those things in 
virtue of which it would be right to x must instead. In yet other words, on Smith’s view, 
a good person is motivated to do the right thing, but is not motivated to do the right 
thing because it’s the right thing. Someone motivated in the latter way is not a good 
person, but rather a ‘moral fetishist.’ This is not a totally implausible thought; but it is 
a straightforward normative claim about character. It is a constituent of Smith’s ideal of 
human virtue. And so his discussion of moral motivation in the former, metaethical, 
sense is beholden to his views of moral motivation in the latter, virtue ethical, one. 
That connection in Michael Smith becomes even clearer when we notice that the 
situation is quite inverted in Kant. Kant holds that an action only has moral worth if 
it’s done for the sake of duty. This is as good as to say that a good person is motivated 
to do the right thing because it’s the right thing. We might then say that Kant just is 
                                                                                                                         
normative ethical views, and ‘second-order,’ that is, metaethical views, are “completely 
independent,” Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, p. 16. So is Gibbard, in Wise Choices, 
Apt Feelings, Chapter I, insisting on this neutrality as an important desideratum for his 
account, as does Blackburn in Ruling Passions, Chapter 3. Alan Gewirth, on the other 




Michael Smith’s moral fetishist—he has after all been accused of similar since at least 
Friedrich Schiller.32 But I think we’d do better to simply note that Kant, too, offers 
metaethical discussions that are beholden to normative claims about character, that 
depend on his ideal of human virtue. 
One more. McDowell, as mentioned above, argues for the interconnectedness of 
belief (or judgment) and motivation. For McDowell, moral facts are secondary qualities, 
so making a moral judgment is a form of seeing what is the case, so moral judgments are 
cognitive, or belief-like. But seeing what is the case morally just includes seeing what one 
must do, so moral judgments give immediate rise to motivation. In this discussion, 
McDowell claims that in this seeing of what one must do, other considerations, other 
ways of seeing, are simply ‘silenced.’33 At least, they are if you’re a good person. So we 
see, in McDowell’s discussion of moral judgment, a version of the Plato-Hare view that 
moral motivation is absolute, reflected through his ideal of human character. 
All of this is to say that the straightforward normative claims about character 
that appear to be the province of virtue ethics are to be found, and even to be found in 
interesting, useful, and clear forms, all over the metaethical landscape.34 That’s why, 
                                         
32 Though see Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason 
Ch. XII, §11 for a broader picture of Schiller’s views on Kantian morality. 
33 See John McDowell, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?” 
34 A much less sanguine version of this thought can be found in Nietzsche. Consider his 
famous quotation: “Gradually, it has become clear to me what every great philosophy so 
far has been: namely, the personal confession of its author and a kind of involuntary and 
unconscious memoir,” Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §6. 
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even though my main interest is moral motivation in the virtue ethical sense, I spent so 
much time talking about moral motivation in the metaethical sense in the foregoing, and 
why I will continue to do so in the forthcoming. 
There are a few more distinctions I’d like to make about moral motivation taken 
as a part of the ethics of character. The first is between monistic and pluralistic 
conceptions of the right way to be motivated. Just like we might think that there’s just 
one rule in virtue of which a right act is right, so we might think that there’s just one 
rule in virtue of which a right motive is right. Kant of the Groundwork is the moral 
motivation monist par excellence. As just mentioned above, he holds that actions have 
moral worth only when done from the motive of duty. The motive of duty, that I do x 
only because I believe x to be the right thing to do, is the only properly moral 
motivation. But Kant is certainly not the only moral motivation monist. Almost as 
infamous as Kant’s moral motivation monism is that of William Godwin, who seems to 
hold that the only properly moral motivation is the desire to maximize utility, in his 
famous example of the archbishop and the chambermaid.35 Less austerely than Kant or 
Godwin, Hutcheson, who I’ll discuss in the next chapter, holds that the only properly 
moral motivation is benevolence: for Hutcheson, the only motive to action that deserves 
our disinterested, and thereby moral, approbation is benevolence. 
                                         
35 See William Godwin An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Book II, Chapter II, pp. 
81 – 85. 
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On the other hand, just like Ross, who has a pluralistic conception of duty (for 
actions), we might, like most avowed virtue ethicists, hold a pluralistic conception of 
moral motivation, according to which there’s more than one way to be properly 
motivated. 36  The mere fact that different virtues are discussed, are referred to as 
appropriate for different kinds of situations, and are not assumed to be commensurable, 
strongly suggests pluralism. We should be careful, though: the unity of the virtues thesis, 
according to which one cannot really possess any one of the virtues without possessing 
them all, suggests a lurking monism in those who follow Aristotle in holding it. All the 
same, I regard both pluralism in both an ethics of action and an ethics of character to be 
at least coherent—and probably correct. 
The second distinction is between the specification of an action and its evaluation. 
And the third is between a philosophy of action that holds actions to be specifiable 
independent of their motives and one that holds actions to be in part constituted by 
their motives and, similarly, an ethics that holds actions to be evaluable independent of 
their motives and an ethics that doesn’t. Pretty much everything I’ve said so far has 
proceeded on the assumption that we can both specify and evaluate actions apart from 
their motives.  
I’ve flagged these latter distinctions, and the sides of them I’ve assumed, for 
three reasons. First, I’m not sure that the philosophy of action claim I’ve assumed is 
                                         
36 Adams is an exception, holding that all the individual virtues flow from a basic virtue, 
that of ‘being for the good.’ See Robert Adams, A Theory of Virtue, Chapter 2. 
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right. Lots of action descriptions, such as lying, seem to be inclusive of intention. 
Whether or not I lied depends in part on the misleadingness of what I said, and in part 
on my intention in so speaking. So what act I’ve performed can depend on what my 
intentions were, and, so, subsequently, does the moral evaluation I deserve. Perhaps the 
situation is the same with motives; perhaps what act I’ve performed when I go through a 
certain set of motions depends in part on what was motivating me. If that’s right, it 
might be difficult, or even impossible, to separate an ethics of action from an ethics of 
character in the clean way I’ve supposed. But I’ll continue to assume that it isn’t. 
Second, I’m not at all sure that the ethics claim I’ve been assuming is right. It is 
typical, though not, I think, necessary, for consequentialist ethics to treat actions as 
evaluable apart from their motives. And it is typical, though not, I think, necessary, for 
deontic ethics to treat actions as not evaluable apart from their motives.  
Utilitarians have commonly shown some uncertainty about the relation between 
act- and motive-evaluation. Bentham, not to mention Godwin, seems to hold that to be 
motivated by the desire to maximize utility is better than to be motivated in other ways. 
This seems to me mostly to have been a confusion on their part, grounded in a failure to 
recognize that acting on a desire to maximize utility, even if done carefully and 
intelligently, does not necessarily maximize utility. One response since Sidgwick has been, 
in one way or another, at various levels of absoluteness, to deny that utilitarianism 
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provides grounds for motive-evaluation.37 At the most absolute, we might, like Eugene 
Bales, say that utilitarianism is merely a theory of what makes right acts right, and 
nothing more.38  
 We might open the door a little bit, though, and give a form of motive 
utilitarianism:39 utilitarianism approves whatever motives the possession of which lead to 
the best consequences. As Derek Parfit puts it, “The best possible motives are those of 
which it is true that, if we have them, the outcomes will be best.”40 So if consistent 
benevolence leads to the best overall consequences, utilitarianism approves it as the 
proper kind of motive. If instead self-centered greed or unalloyed tribalism does, then 
those are what utilitarianism approves. We might think this grounds utilitarian motive-
evaluation on act-evaluation. Insofar as motives drive actions, and actions affect the 
world, the right motives might tend to be the ones that drive the right actions. But 
motives can have effects on the world other than what actions they drive their possessors 
to perform; as Philip Pettit and Michael Smith point out, “Your clear benevolence 
towards me, and mine towards you, can provide each of us with a sense of warmth and 
                                         
37 See Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics especially Book III, Chapter 12, Book IV, 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
38 See R. Eugene Bales, “Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or 
Decision-Making Procedure?” 
39 This is different from Adams’s motive utilitarianism, where the question is what 
motives cause the most pleasure and least pain to their possessors. See Robert Adams, 
“Motive Utilitarianism.” 




reassurance independently of any acts that it occasions.”41 Consequentialist evaluation of 
motives, accordingly, need not end in action-evaluation; it can simply end in 
consequences. If that’s right, then worries about how to understand the relation between 
utilitarian act- and motive-evaluation are ill-founded. Both acts and motives are directly 
evaluable in terms of their consequences in the world. 42  So a utilitarian ethics of 
character can have the same shape as a utilitarian ethics of action. In that case, the 
question of whether particular motive types, like bloodthirstiness, should be regarded as 
wrong as a type would be in principle no different than the question of whether 
particular action types, like murder, should be.  
 And the third reason I flagged the distinction between an ethics that evaluates 
actions independent of motives and one that doesn’t is because, even if we can talk 
about an ethics of action entirely distinct from motives, and an ethics of character, 
including an ethics of motivation, entirely distinct from action, it’s plausible to think 
there ought to be a certain congruence between the two. This point will be important for 
me later. The idea is that there’s something fishy going on, in one way or another, if the 
right kinds of motivation consistently lead to the wrong kinds of actions, or if the right 
kinds of actions consistently require the wrong kinds of motivations. If there is a 
consistent mismatch between what we think are the right actions and the right 
                                         
41 Pettit and Smith, “Global Consequentialism,” p. 122. 
42 Thanks to Daniel Star for clarifying this for me. 
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motivations, we might reasonably think that there must be something wrong with one or 
the other of the accounts (or with both). 
 But of course that is not necessarily a problem with our accounts: it could just be 
an unfortunate feature of our world that there tends to be a mismatch between right 
motive and right action. Consider Bernard Mandeville, who held that it is our vices, our 
lust, envy, and greed in particular, rather than our virtues that are to thank for what 
excellences our social world contains. “Private vices, public benefits” as he subtitles his 
Fable of the Bees. If Mandeville’s right about how the world works, then there would be 
a consistent mismatch between a reasonably utilitarian account of right action and a 
traditional, or at least Christian, account of right motive. Of course, Mandeville goes on 
to impeach that Christian account, at least in part, on the grounds that the realization 
of a virtuously-motivated society would bring bad outcomes. So even Mandeville doesn’t 
think that motive-evaluation is so independent of act-evaluation that we can be 
comfortable with how we evaluate motives totally irrespective of how we think the 
actions driven by those motives will turn out. Mandeville in fact leans towards a motive 
utilitarianism similar to that described just above, in which motive-evaluation is 
grounded on act-evaluation: even if lust isn’t quite good, chastity is definitely bad. And, 
though he certainly has other reasons for impeaching Christian virtues, it seems to me 





§3: Moral Motivation and Self-Deception 
Earlier I said that the Self-Deception Problem was one to which Mediated 
Internal accounts of moral motivation were liable. I think I’m now in a position to 
explain those terms. Recall that by accounts of moral motivation I mean accounts of the 
right way to be motivated. It seems to me that one perspicuous way to categorize 
accounts of moral motivation is by the object that provides the incentive for the moral 
motivation. Different accounts will claim different incentive-objects for properly moral 
motivation. 
Of course, if you are motivated to act in some way, you are the one who has the 
motivation; if the motivation weren’t in some sense in you, it couldn’t be your 
motivation. That trivial fact about motivation might be taken to authorize an egoistic 
account of motivation, according to which we necessarily always act for the sake of our 
own pleasure, or happiness, or subjective well-being, or whatever. If that were correct, 
then all theories of moral motivation, since they are theories of motivation, would have 
to take the agent’s own pleasure as the object that provides their incentive. If that were 
the case, that is, if all motivation were necessarily egoistic, then we certainly could not 
categorize different accounts of moral motivation by their incentive-objects, since they 
would all have to have the same one. All of our particular desires—for cake, or death, or 
sex, or money—would be merely instrumental. We would desire these things only for the 
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sake of the pleasure that arises from them. The objects of our particular desires would 
thus be absolutely fungible: what they were would not matter to us a whit. 
But, as Butler famously argued, “all particular appetites and passions are towards 
external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from them.”43 This is clear 
because, “there could not be this pleasure, were it not for that prior suitableness between 
the object and the passion: there could be no enjoyment or delight from one thing more 
than another, from eating food more than from swallowing a stone, if there were not an 
affection or appetite to one thing more than another.”44 Elliott Sober points out that not 
all our desires are directed towards external things, that we can and do in fact have 
desires directed towards our own pleasure, but that is none to the point here.45 If the 
trivial fact that all our desires are our desires means that all motivation is necessarily 
egoistic, then all our desires are in fact for the same thing. But if only it is possible that 
we could have a desire for cake that is indeed a desire for cake, and not for the pleasure 
of cake-eating, then it is at least possible to distinguish motivations by their incentive-
objects. And as Butler (and C.D. Broad, following him46) might tell us, people with a 
strong desire for cake will tend to keep eating cake even after eating it has ceased to be 
pleasurable for them, which makes it hard to see how their desire for cake could only be 
instrumental towards a desire for the pleasure eating it brings. 
                                         
43 Butler, Sermons XI.6. 
44 ibid. 
45 See Elliott Sober, “Hedonism and Butler’s Stone.” 
46 C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory Chapter 3. 
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What Sober’s point does mean is that Butler’s argument against egoism does not 
rule out the possibility of egoistic motivation.47 Butler’s argument has merely shown that 
our desires can have all kinds of different objects; it hasn’t told us what they are. So it 
still might be that moral motivation is basically egoistic. It just isn’t the case that it 
must be. 
It being established that variability in the object of motivation is possible, I 
think we can distinguish between accounts of moral motivation that are Immediate and 
those that are Mediated. An Immediate account of moral motivation is one according to 
which the object of moral treatment, or a state of affairs centering on that object, is the 
incentive-object. A Mediated account is one according to which the object of moral 
treatment, or a state of affairs centering on that object, is not the incentive-object.48 In 
non-moral terms, if I’m motivated to buy a chainsaw because I want it, my chainsaw-
buying motivation is Immediate: it’s just between me and the chainsaw. If, on the other 
hand, I’m motivated to buy a chainsaw because I think you want it, my chainsaw-
buying motivation is Mediated: it’s not just between me and the chainsaw, it’s between 
me and you and the chainsaw. In moral terms, if I’m motivated to help an old lady 
                                         
47 Butler is clearly aware of this. Not only does his picture allow the possibility of pure 
egoistic motivation, he names it: Self-Interest. And not only does he name it, he actually 
regards it as more rational, and more authoritative, and, indeed, higher than particular 
appetites and pleasures. See Chapter 4 below. 
48 I’ll be proceeding making reference only to things as incentive-objects, not states of 




across the street because when I see an old lady in need of help, I’m directly motivated 
to help her, then my old lady-helping motivation is Immediate. If I’m motivated to help 
an old lady across the street because I want to look good for a nearby young lady, then 
my old lady-helping motivation is Mediated. And in more general terms, an account 
according to which the thing that is supposed to provide incentive for moral treatment is 
the object of that treatment is an Immediate account. An account according to which 
the thing that is supposed to provide incentive for moral treatment is not the object of 
that treatment is a Mediated account. That incentive-object mediates between the agent 
and the object of treatment. 
But there might be trouble for the Mediated-Immediate distinction. That trivial 
fact about about motivation referred to earlier, namely, that if the motivation weren’t in 
some sense in you, it couldn’t be your motivation might yet authorize what I’ll call a 
representationalist view of motivation, that is, that the incentive-object that drives your 
motivations is always a mental representation, rather than ever being an actual external 
object. It seems easy enough to suppose that I might be motivated to help an ailing fawn, 
for the fawn’s own sake, only to discover that I am in fact hallucinating, or only to wake 
up and realize that I have in fact been dreaming; there is no fawn. We might then think 
that in such cases, it’s my representation of the fawn that drives my motivation to 
engage in helping activities. We might further think that, since those situations are 
phenomenally indistinguishable from situations in which I am facing a real ailing fawn, 
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in fact it’s always just my representation of the fawn that drives my motivations. If 
that’s so, then the Mediated-Immediate distinction might collapse. Since the object that 
provides incentive for moral treatment is always just a representation in me, and so 
never identical with the object of moral treatment, there could never be an Immediate 
motivation. It’s tempting to reply to this argument with arguments against 
representationalism in perception from philosophy of mind, but I don’t think it’s 
necessary to take that stand in order to sustain my distinction within motivation. 
If the representationalist view of motivation is correct, then an Immediate 
account of moral motivation is just an account in which that which is represented as 
being the incentive-object is that which is represented as being the object of moral 
treatment. A Mediated account of moral motivation, then, is an account in which that 
which is represented as being the incentive-object is represented as being other than the 
object of moral treatment. Nothing important about the distinction actually changes: the 
Immediate account remains one according to which my motivation to act a certain way 
towards x is not mediated through some third party, and the Mediated account remains 
one according to which it is.49 
Within Mediated accounts, we can distinguish between those that are Mediated 
External accounts and those that are Mediated Internal accounts. A Mediated External 
account of moral motivation is one according to which the agent’s incentive-object is 
                                         
49 Thanks to Daniel Star for pushing me on this question. I’m not entirely certain that 
this response is decisive, but for now it’s the best I’ve got. 
  
37 
outside of herself. A Mediated Internal account is one according to which the agent’s 
incentive-object is inside or part of herself. In non-moral terms, if I’m motivated to buy 
a chainsaw because I think you want it, my chainsaw-buying motivation is Mediated and 
External: it’s between me and you and the chainsaw. If I’m motivated to buy a chainsaw 
because I promised myself I would, my chainsaw-buying motivation is Mediated and 
Internal: it’s between me and myself and the chainsaw. In moral terms, if I’m motivated 
to help an old lady across the street because I want to look good for a nearby young lady, 
my old lady-helping motivation is Mediated and External. If I’m motivated to help an 
old lady across the street because I want to look good in my own eyes, my old lady-
helping motivation is Mediated and Internal. And in more general terms, an account 
according to which the thing that is supposed to provide incentive for moral treatment is 
something outside of me, like my city or my god, is an External account. An account 
according to which the thing that is supposed to provide incentive for moral treatment is 
something inside of me, like my conscience, is an Internal account.  
As with the Mediated-Immediate distinction, if we maintain a representationalist 
view of motivation, this distinction can be rewritten without loss. On that line, a 
Mediated External account is one according to which the agent represents the incentive-
object as being outside herself, and a Mediated Internal account is one according to 
which the agent represents the incentive-object as being inside or part of herself. It 
seems possible to me that we could want a non-representational version of the Mediated-
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Immediate distinction, and yet a representational version of the Internal-External 
distinction. We might not be convinced by the representational account of motivation in 
general, and so comfortable with the non-representational version of the former 
distinction. But we might yet be skeptical of the existence of some of the gods whose 
approval is supposed to motivate those who believe in them. In that case, we might 
prefer to say that the objects that drive External accounts of moral motivation are 
merely those that the agent represents as being outside herself.  
Insofar as an account of moral motivation is monistic, it is, I believe, necessarily 
either Immediate or Mediated, and, if Mediated, either External or Internal. So this 
taxonomy, though it is certainly not the only one we could use, is exhaustive of monistic 
accounts. Of course, pluralistic accounts can, and often will, involve some mixture of 
Mediated and Immediate moral motivations. This is as it should be. I’ve already said 
that I find pluralism more plausible than monism generally, and its ability to move 
across the Mediated/Immediate divide is one of the reasons. We might think that the 
kind of treatment our morality calls for in a given instance should affect the kind of 
motivation appropriate to that action. So we might think that when we ought to help 
someone in need, we ought to have Immediate motivation to do so. We ought to look at 
the hungry person and just want to help her. But we might also think that when we 
ought to punish someone who had done wrong, we ought to have Mediated motivation 
to do so. We ought not look at the guilty person and want to punish her, but rather 
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punish her for the sake of something else, say our care for the community, or our belief 
in justice. So there are kinds of moral treatment for which an Immediate motivation is 
appropriate, and others for which a Mediated motivation is appropriate. That particular 
example might not stand in the end,50 but I think it at least shows the kinds of 
considerations that might favor pluralism about moral motivation. 
The variety and particularities of Immediate, Mediated External, and Mediated 
Internal accounts of moral motivation will be explained further by example in Chapter 2. 
But with these categories in hand, even to the slender extent they’ve been explained so 
far, the Self-Deception Problem can be clarified. Recall, the idea is that some accounts of 
moral motivation will be liable to providing a particular additional motive to self-deceive 
rather than to act morally. Characterizing different accounts of moral motivation by 
their incentive objects shows us which ones will be so liable: those whose incentive object 
can be gained through self-deception rather than through moral action. As above, if I’m 
motivated to help an old lady across the street to look good in my own eyes, the 
incentive object—self-approval—is something I can gain through not only moral action, 
but also, sometimes if not, hopefully, always, through self-deception. So Mediated 
Internal accounts of moral motivation are liable to the Self-Deception Problem. 
                                         
50 Indeed, Butler disagrees. In Sermons VIII and IX, he argues, radically for a preacher 
of Christian Gospel, that there’s nothing wrong with acting out of resentment. That is, 
it’s not necessarily wrong, and not at odds with Christian charity, to punish a wrongdoer 
out of anger at him for his wrongdoing. 
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Mediated External accounts of moral motivation are not liable to the Self-
Deception Problem. If I’m motivated to help an old lady across the street to look good in 
the eyes of my community, the incentive object—community approval—is not something 
I can gain through self-deception. That isn’t to say that self-deceit might not be helpful 
for gaining community approval. Nor is it to say that I might not deceive myself into 
believing I have the community’s approval. Indeed, it might even be the case that I am 
as a matter of fact more prone to morally-related self-deception if I think I ought to act 
for the sake of the community’s approval than for my own. But the amount of self-
deception is not the point here, but the kind. I do not immediately or straightforwardly 
gain the community’s approval by deceiving myself about my own virtue, whereas I 
obviously do immediately and straightforwardly gain my own approval by deceiving 
myself about my own virtue, so Mediated External accounts are not straightforwardly 
satisfied by self-deception the way Mediated Internal ones are. 
Mediated External accounts are not liable to the Self-Deception problem, but 
they are liable to a Deception Problem. If community approval is what is supposed to 
motivate me to act morally, the obvious problem arises that I can, and people very 
frequently do, deceive my community into giving approval rather than actually doing 
what the community approves. 
In this way, the Self-Deception Problem is revealed to be a variety of Deception 
Problem. We have a Deception Problem, then, in any account of moral motivation in 
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which the incentive object of the putative moral motivation can be gained through 
deception rather than through moral action. When that’s the case, the same thing 
supposed to provide motivation to act in a particular way—a morally praiseworthy 
way—can serve instead to provide motivation to deceive. It won’t always: if it’s easier to 
do the right thing than it is to trick my community, or myself, into thinking that I’m 
doing the right thing, I will, presumably, do the right thing. So the harder it is, in 
general, to deceive in the requisite way, the less vital the Deception Problem is. 
This provides a straightforward way of responding to the Deception Problem, 
given an account of moral motivation that would seemingly be liable to it: make 
deception impossible. In a Mediated External account of moral motivation that takes the 
incentive object to be the approval of some judging agent, if the judging agent cannot be 
fooled, the Deception Problem dissolves. So if the approval of one’s father is supposed to 
provide moral motivation there is, presumably, a serious Deception Problem, since 
fathers can be fooled. But if the approval of an omniscient god is supposed to do the 
trick, there isn’t, since God cannot be fooled. This, as we will see, is Locke’s solution. 
Similarly, in a Mediated Internal account of moral motivation, there is a serious 
Self-Deception Problem insofar as we are capable of self-deceit, or at least, are often 
opaque to ourselves. But insofar as we are incapable of self-deceit, because, perhaps, we 
are perfectly transparent to ourselves, the problem dissolves. Something close to this, we 
will see, appears to be Reid’s solution. 
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An Immediate account of moral motivation, on the other hand, does not invite 
these particular deception problems. If moral motivation is supposed to arise directly 
from appreciation of the situation that calls for moral action, there’s no immediate way 
in which I can satisfy, say, my desire to help an ailing fawn without at least trying to 
help the ailing fawn. That is not to say that I cannot somehow be deceiving myself in 
judging that the fawn is in need of help, or in judging that I have at least tried to help it. 
But both of those judgments are also involved in any Mediated account of moral 
motivation, and are equally liable or not liable to self-deception. So invoking an 
Immediate account of moral motivation of course doesn’t free us from liability to self-
deception, or other failures of self-knowledge. The point is that invoking that account 
does not create any new ones. All the ways in which we might deceive ourselves given an 
Immediate account are still at play in Mediated accounts.  
Since Immediate accounts do not claim that what drives me is a search for my 
own satisfaction, they would have to treat a case of deceiving myself into believing that 
I’ve done all I can to help the fawn as not a way of acting for the right motive. On the 
other hand, Mediated accounts do appear to admit self-deception in this way, insofar as 
they hang on the approval of some judge of my actions, and that approval can actually 
be gained through deception. So, to use the same example for a Mediated Internal 
account, when I deceive myself into approving my half-hearted efforts to find a game 
warden to help the ailing fawn, that self-deception actually has been driven by what the 
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account claims is the right kind of motive, since something like my own satisfaction is 
supposed to be the goal. So there’s an additional way in which Mediated accounts do, 
and Immediate accounts do not, invite us to deceive ourselves (or others) rather than act 
morally. 
I’m not sure, though, that freedom from these deception problems necessarily 
counts as a reason to favor Immediate over Mediated accounts of moral motivation. I’ll 
discuss what kind of a problem the Self-Deception Problem is in §5. 
 
§4: Self-Deception 
But there’s an elephant in the room: self-deception. Self-deception is a 
notoriously difficult concept. Its difficulties are straightforward: if I deceive myself about, 
say, the fact that I’m stealing from my employer to feed my gambling addiction, 
“borrowing” money from petty cash at the close of day with the plan of returning it by 
morning, do I know that I’m stealing from my employer or don’t I? If I don’t know that 
I’m stealing from my employer, then how could I be in a position to deceive anyone, 
including myself, about it? And if I know that I’m stealing from my employer, then I 
would appear to be beyond being deceived about it. This difficulty provides the fulcrum 
for much of the discussion of self-deception. 
 First there’s the question of identification and culpability. In cases of self-
deception, I am both the deceiver—and therefore, apparently, aware of what I’m doing 
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and responsible for it—and the deceived—and therefore, apparently, unaware of what’s 
going on and not responsible for it. And so the question arises as to whether to 
understand self-deceivers as culpable or not culpable,51 or, perhaps, whether we should 
understand them more as the ones who perform the deception or more as the ones who 
are duped. Though the questions are of course related, I think we need to distinguish the 
culpability question from the identification question. It may be plausible to think that 
when self-deceivers ought to be more closely identified with deceiver than with deceived, 
then their self-deception is culpable. But even then, the implication does not go both 
ways: it’s also plausible to think that self-deception can be culpable even when self-
deceivers ought to be more closely identified with deceived than with deceiver. 
 It seems clear to me that there’s no general answer to the question of whether 
self-deception is culpable or not. Sometimes it is and sometimes it isn’t; the best we can 
do is get a sense of when it’s one and when the other. And there isn’t, I think, any 
general answer to the question of whether self-deceivers ought to be more directly 
identified as deceiver or as deceived.52  But it might be that certain kinds of self-
deception lean one way or the other. Moral motivational self-deception of the kind I 
described above, in which I deceive myself into self-approval, would appear to be a case 
in which I’m more directly identified as deceiver than deceived. I try to undermine my 
                                         
51 See E.A. Linehan, “Ignorance, self-deception, and moral accountability.” 
52 Richard Holton argues that self-deception is better understood as being deceived about 




judge, even though my judge is myself. As will be seen in Chapter 4, Butler certainly 
seems to treat it that way. And as will be seen in Chapter 2, Smith, in his discussion of 
moral motivational self-deception, strongly identifies the self-deceiver as deceiver. He 
treats the situation as something like a division into acting self and judging self, in which 
the acting self deceives, or at least sometimes manages to deceive, the judging self.53 
Next there’s the question, related to the identification and culpability question, 
of whether self-deception is intentional or not. If we focus on the fact that the self-
deceiver is persistently unaware of, say, the fact that he’s stealing from his employer, it 
looks obviously unintentional. After all, he probably does lots of things he isn’t aware of, 
so the simple fact that he’s acting and not aware of his actions doesn’t imply that he’s 
self-deceived at all. But the self-deceiver isn’t just unaware of the fact that he’s stealing 
from his employer the way that he’s unaware of the fact that, say, he still cares about 
his ex-wife. He also, typically, engages in all sorts of covering activities, activities that 
appear to be well-chosen to prevent himself from recognizing his own larceny. These 
activities can look rather more intentional. 
Further, those covering activities must, if the self-deception is to remain in place, 
be effective, and in order for them to be effective, they have to be chosen in a way well-
tuned to the particular tendencies and susceptibilities of the deceived party. So you 
generally have to know yourself pretty well to effectively deceive yourself. Even more 
                                         
53 Kant’s discussion of the court of conscience in the Metaphysics of Morals is strikingly 
similar to Smith’s. 
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confusingly, not only must the self-deceiver engage in covering activities that prevent 
himself from becoming aware of the fact that he’s stealing from his employer, he must 
also somehow cover those activities.54 After all, if he recognized that he was intentionally 
refraining from recording the petty cash at the end of the workday in order to allow 
himself to take from it, he’d recognize that he was taking from it in the first place. So 
the covering activities must themselves be covered for the self-deception to remain in 
place. This threatens a vicious regress according to which self-deception would always 
have to be covered by some prior self-deception. If there is such a regress, then self-
deception, at least as it’s described here, would be impossible. Fortunately—or rather, 
unfortunately—we not only can but do stop somewhere. There would only have to be an 
infinity of covering actions if there were an infinity of possible self-awarenesses of those 
actions’ imports. As a matter of fact it’s very easy to give your action no interpretation 
at all: I just do it that way, you say. So he might end up having to create covering 
actions for his covering action of not counting the petty cash, but he might, as a matter 
of fact, just not have to create any covering action for those. 
There is, relatedly, the question of whether we even ought to understand self-
deception along the same lines we do deception of others. It is relatively simple to 
understand how one person deceives another: she tells him the thing that is not, and he 
takes her on her word. Self-deception is clearly much more complicated than that; 
                                         




perhaps it’s a mistake to even think of the sorts of phenomena we refer to as ‘self-
deception’ as forms of deception at all.55  I’m not fully convinced that an adequate 
understanding of self-deception would treat it as completely parallel to other-deception. 
Nonetheless, as is obvious from my treatment above, in which I described the Self-
Deception Problem as a form of Deception Problem, I’ll be treating self-deception as, 
more or less straightforwardly, deception. Whether or not self-deception is truly like 
other-deception, I think their motivation can be sufficiently similar. I may engage in 
deception of my community to maintain and further their approval of me; similarly, I 
may engage in self-deception to maintain and further my approval of myself. So since 
I’m focusing in particular on the motivation for certain instances of self-deception, and 
those instances are sufficiently similarly motivated to other-deception, I’m comfortable 
treating the former as parallel to the latter. 
There’s also the question of a divided or unified self. On the most straightforward 
understanding of self-deception, it would seem to imply a divided self. One part of 
myself deceives another part. Some find this an unacceptable, unacceptably radical 
conclusion.56 Others, such as Amélie Rorty, find it congenial: Rorty thinks we should 
                                         
55 See, for example, Tamar Szabo Gendler, “Self-Deception as Pretense.” 
56 See Mark Johnson, “Self-Deception and the Nature of the Mind.” 
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already be conceiving of ourselves as divided, as a bundle of modules. The idea that one 
module might interact deceptively with another is not strange for her.57 
Even if we do not go so far as to claim independent, interacting modules, as does 
Rorty, I think the idea of a divided self in self-deception—one part of the self being the 
part deceiving, another part being deceived—is not so radical as we might think. And it 
isn’t an idea that comes about just to explain self-deception: it’s already at work in 
many accounts of moral motivation. Even better, it’s already at work in some of the 
accounts of moral motivation I claim are liable to the Self-Deception problem. Notice 
that in my brief description of Smith’s account of moral motivational self-deception 
above, I referred to his division of us into ‘acting self’ and ‘judging self.’ This is an 
extremely crude description, but it clearly does suggest multiple selves. In fact, in any 
kind of reflective account of moral judgment or moral motivation, like Smith’s and 
Butler’s, in which we are said to look at, consider, or judge ourselves, it is already 
presumed that we can be divided into both observer and observed. And, though both the 
observer and observed are us, they are, nonetheless, easy to distinguish and difficult to 
reconcile. This, notoriously, and of course over-broadly, is the problem of ‘Western’ or 
‘Modern’ selfhood or subjectivity: we are houses divided against ourselves.58 
                                         
57 See Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, “Self-deception, akrasia, and irrationality,” and especially, 
“User-Friendly Self-Deception.”  
58  For sweeping discussions of this issue, see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self, 
especially Part II and Part IV, and Jerrold Seigel, The Idea of the Self, especially Part II. 
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So it isn’t just that self-deception might require a conception of the self as 
divided, but also that Mediated Internal accounts of moral motivation equally require a 
conception of the self as divided. And, crucially, both require the same kind of division: 
between something like the acting self and judging self. It is ironic that several 
contemporary advocates of reflective selves such as Harry Frankfurt, Thomas Hill, and 
Christine Korsgaard, according to whom we must reflect upon ourselves in order, even, 
to be selves, put so much emphasis on the idea of being a unified self.59 That is, they 
hope that, through agreement between the judging and acting self, through self-
identification by, for example, reflective endorsement of our motivating desires, we can 
realize ourselves as whole, or unified, or integrated selves. But I think that what they’re 
describing is not so much a unified self as a state of concord between the different parts 
of a divided self. The reflection, the dividing of self into subject and object, observer and 
observed, continues; it merely goes on with a sense of complacency rather than concern. 
For what it’s worth, I conceive self-deception as a form of motivated 
irrationality.60 It is in this way related to, and even at times overlapping with, wishful 
thinking and rationalization.61 There are other, notorious paradoxes of self-deception, 
but I don’t think they need to detain us. As above, I’m not interested in the grounds of 
                                         
59 See Harry Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, Thomas E. Hill, Jr., 
Human Welfare and Moral Worth, and Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity. 
60 See David Pears, Motivated Irrationality, Chapter III. Notice that if self-deception is 
just a form of motivated irrationality, it need not imply any form of divided self. 
61  Though this characterization sits uncomfortably with the idea of ‘twisted self-
deception.’ See Alfred R. Mele, Self-Deception Unmasked, Chapter 5. 
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self-deception but in its motivation. I am, like Eduardo Giannetti, looking “not at the 
how, but at the why of self-deception.”62 Not how is it possible, and by what means could 
one manage to deceive oneself, but why would one even try to do so? What motivates 
this form of motivated irrationality? 
Well, one thing that can motivate it is the desire to appear good in your own 
eyes. So the desire to appear good in your own eyes, the hope to, as in Hume, bear your 
own survey, can not only motivate you to do what you think you ought to do; it can 
also motivate self-deception, whether about what you’ve done, what your options were, 
why you acted the way you did, or whether your actions are consistent with good 
character. So if something like the desire to appear good in your own eyes is claimed to 
be the proper moral motivation, the right kind of reason for which to act, then the Self-
Deception Problem arises. 
 
§5: What’s the problem? 
 But what kind of problem is the Self-Deception Problem? Usually when a 
philosopher claims that there’s a problem with a particular philosophical account, she 
means that problem to be a possible reason to reject that account. If she says that self-
deception creates a problem for your account of moral motivation, she can usually be 
taken to mean something like self-deception presents something incompatible with your 
                                         
62 Eduardo Giannetti, Lies We Live By: The Art of Self-Deception, p. 103. 
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account. She’s asking you then to do something like deny that your account is 
incompatible with self-deception, or amend your account so that it can accommodate 
self-deception, or bite the bullet and deny that self-deception, at least as it’s taken to be 
such that it’s incompatible with your account, exists. Absent any of that, she’s asking 
you to give up your account of moral motivation. But clearly I am not saying that the 
existence of self-deception in the vicinity of Smith’s or Kant’s accounts of moral 
motivation is a reason to deny those accounts. 
 In a word, the Self-Deception Problem is not a problem for some accounts of 
moral motivation, it is a problem that arises from some accounts of moral motivation. 
And it isn’t so much a theoretical problem, isn’t so much that, given a Mediated 
Internal account of moral motivation, you are required to give further account of the 
notoriously thorny idea of self-deception. It’s more of a practical problem: if your view of 
moral motivation is one that invited the Self-Deception Problem, you have reason to 
concern yourself with how to identify and avoid it. Indeed, I don’t even think there’s any 
reason to regard accounts of moral motivation that avoid the Self-Deception Problem as 
in that way preferable to those that invite it. It may be that the latter more adequately 
recognize the complexity and vexations of our internal relations than do the former. 
 Recall that the question that began this chapter was why some moral 
philosophers concern themselves with self-deception as a moral problem, and others 
don’t. My proposal to explain this difference is that we can see a concern about self-
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deception in the work of those philosophers whose accounts of moral motivation are such 
as to invite self-deception. In the next chapter, I’ll show how a series of philosophers’ 
accounts of moral motivation fit into my schema and accordingly do or don’t invite self-
deception. That should lend plausibility to the schema, and to my claim that the Self-
Deception Problem can explain why Butler, Smith, and Reid worry about self-deception 
in a way that Hutcheson, Locke, and Hobbes don’t. 
 It’s worth noticing that mine is not an exhaustive explanation. It does not imply 
that there couldn’t be other reasons for, or other places at which, say, Locke should be 
concerned with self-deception. And I’ll say little that would rule out something like 
Darwall’s view that the philosophers most concerned with self-deception are those who 
would ground right action on right character or the view suggested by Martin that it’s 
those who make moral judgment autonomous. But the Self-Deception Problem is one 
that I claim is not only recognizable across the philosophers in question, but one that 





Moral Motivation and Self-Deception from Hobbes to Reid 
 
§1: Introduction 
 In this chapter I’ll outline several major philosophical accounts of moral 
motivation, showing how they fit the categorization I gave in the previous chapter, and 
how they do or don’t have Deception problems as a consequence. This should help flesh 
out and clarify my taxonomy since it was, after all, reflection on these philosophers’ 
accounts that gave birth to it. It should also lend additional plausibility to my taxonomy, 
and to the claims I’ve made about it, as we see not only that but why and how self-
deception concerns Butler, Smith, and Reid in a way it does not Hutcheson, Locke, and 
Hobbes.  
The presentation will be in what I think is the most perspicuous conceptual 
order: Reid63 and Smith will be first and second, showing, in their Mediated Internal 
accounts, what it looks like for an account of moral motivation to have the Self-
Deception problem. Next comes Hobbes, showing how a Mediated External account can 
have, on similar lines to the Self-Deception problem, an other-deception problem. Locke 
is fourth, representing one way that a Mediated account can eliminate moral motivation-
                                         




driven deception problems. Hutcheson will come fifth, showing how an Immediate 
account can sidestep deception problems altogether. I’ll forgo discussion of Butler, as he 
will be the subject of Chapter 4, but he, too, has a Mediated Internal account liable to 
the Self-Deception Problem.  
 
§2: A brief history of the idea of Mediated Internal moral motivation 
 As the order of presentation described just above should make clear, I am not 
tracing an origins story here: there is nothing that started with Hutcheson, went on to 
Locke, from Locke to Hobbes, and from Hobbes on to its full flowering in Smith and 
Reid. That is not to say that there isn’t an historical story to tell.64 The Mediated 
Internal account of moral motivation is one that began, or at least began to be common, 
in the eighteenth century, and, particularly in its Kantian strain, has been nigh 
dominant ever since. The story of its development would focus first on the distinction 
between Immediate and Mediated accounts, between on the one hand the idea that 
people do what’s right because of direct and proper concern for their world and their 
fellows, and on the other hand the idea that people do what’s right because of properly 
modulated self-concern. 
                                         
64 This would almost be a companion piece, or alternative, to J.B. Schneewind’s The 
Invention of Autonomy and Michael B. Gill’s The British Moralists on Human Nature 
and the Birth of Secular Ethics. 
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 In Christian ethics, Immediate accounts of moral motivation can be associated 
with Pelagianism—the idea that the human will, despite Original Sin, is not necessarily 
depraved, is still capable of direct goodness. Mediated accounts, on the other hand, can 
be equally associated with Augustinianism—the idea that the human will is tainted by 
Original Sin, and is therefore incapable of direct goodness without the intervention of 
God’s grace. Though Augustinianism was Catholic Church doctrine, and Pelagianism a 
heresy, since the year 431, strains of Pelagian thought remained, and were of continual 
controversy. The simple idea here, though, is that Pelagian-influenced Christian ethical 
thought, with its belief that the earthly human will can be good, is alive and at work in 
any account that claims that what should move us to act morally is direct concern for 
the objects of our moral treatment. This can be seen at work in Godfrey of Fontaines 
and Thomas Aquinas. On the other side, Augustinian-influenced Christian ethical 
thought, with its belief that the earthly human will cannot be good, is alive and at work 
in any account that claims that what should move us to act morally is concern for our 
souls, desire for elevation and fear of damnation, or submission to the greater will of God. 
This can be seen at work in Duns Scotus and, later, Martin Luther and John Calvin.65 
 What is interesting here is that both sides seem to hold the same view of what 
makes a truly good will: direct, or immediate, concern for others and for your world. 
                                         
65 This developmental story echoes, and is beholden to, that told by A.O. Lovejoy in 
Reflections on Human Nature. I also owe at least as much to Terence Irwin’s The 




They sometimes refer to it merely as ‘love.’ What they disagree about is whether such a 
loving will is possible for humans. And so, apparently driven by the idea that ought 
implies can, Augustinian-influenced accounts of moral motivation hold that it is not the 
case that we ought to strive to have a properly good will, since it is not possible for us. 
What we must strive for is submission of our will to the will of God, or, for those like 
Luther who regard us as sufficiently depraved that even such submission is beyond us, 
merely to do what we are told God demands. Locke, following this line, gives an account 
of moral motivation according to which the proper basis of motivation is the desire for 
God’s approval, and the fear of God’s disapproval. 
 But Luther, and, relatedly on the Catholic side, the Jansenist (or at least 
Jansenist-influenced) French Moralists, Pascal, La Bruyere, and La Rochefoucauld, 
insisted on not only the depravity, but, as a sort of sign and proof of that depravity, the 
inscrutability of human motivation. The idea, at least in part, is that it certainly might 
seem as if we sometimes act from direct good will: it often appears that we really are 
just motivated by altruistic concern for the plight of another to help him. But that 
appearance is no evidence of the true goodness of our will, since we are, or at least may 
be, driven by hidden, and less salubrious, motivations. So something like the thesis of 
the inscrutability of human motivation, aside from whatever independent plausibility we 
might think it has, was a necessary claim for Augustinian Christian moralists, and is 
indeed a necessary claim for anyone committed to denying the reality of altruistic 
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motives. It should be noted that this inscrutability of human motivation at least paves 
the way for, and could even be identical with, the idea that we are liable to self-
deception.66 
 The Lutherans and Jansenists did not, however, merely insist on the 
inscrutability of human motivation. They tried to plumb its depths.67 They did not 
merely claim that we are, or at least may be, driven by hidden motivations, about which, 
being hidden, little can be said. They held that pride, sinful and inappropriate, 
underpinned most of our apparently altruistic acts. As La Rochefoucauld, perhaps the 
most astute, and definitely the pithiest of these moralists put it, “Our virtues are, most 
often, only vices disguised.”68 La Rochefoucauld focused on vanity and amour-propre as 
the motives that drive most of our virtuous action, as well as most of our self-deception 
about that action. Fifty years later, Mandeville extended the Lutheran and Jansenist 
picture into more political territory, even arguing that avarice, vanity, and self-deception 
provide most of the basis for social and economic progress. 
 At this point, we have in hand a view that what drives people to act virtuously is 
some combination of, or some alternation between, the vain desire to be thought well of 
by their neighbors, and the vain desire to think well of themselves. So the Lutherans and 
Jansenists, or, to be more specific, La Rochefoucauld and Mandeville, offer a mixed 
                                         
66 In this connection, see Daniel Dyke, The Mystery of Selfe-Deceiving. 
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account, including both Mediated External, and Mediated Internal motives for virtue. 
But they are not thereby accounts of moral motivation as I’ve been understanding it. 
That is, they are not necessarily accounts of how people ought properly be motivated. If 
the claim is merely that people are motivated this way, that it merely is the case that 
what drives us to act virtuously are the desires to be thought well of by others and to 
think well of ourselves, then it is a psychological account. Some, including Nietzsche in 
Human, All Too Human, seem to read La Rochefoucauld that way. My reading of La 
Rochefoucauld is that his account is rather a negative normative account: what drives us 
to act virtuously are the vain, that is, unvirtuous, desires to be thought well of by others 
and to think well of ourselves. But on neither reading are these Mediated External and 
Mediated Internal motives moral motivations.  
Shaftesbury turns the tables on the Lutheran and Jansenist views by claiming 
that one of the primary signs of a truly virtuous character is self-approval.69 He does not 
go so far as to make the desire for self-approval the direct motive for which the virtuous 
person acts. But Shaftesbury takes the fact that virtuous action connects with pride in 
oneself, which had previously been taken as a sign of unvirtuous motivation, as one of 
virtue’s great advantages. That is, the Lutheran and Jansenist view treats the 
connection between virtuous action and pride in oneself as a point of suspicion: if there’s 
self-regarding pleasure to be found in helping others, perhaps that pleasure is indeed the 
                                         
69 To see just how thoroughly and effectively Shaftesbury did turn the tables, see Isabel 
Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment, Vol. II: Shaftesbury to Hume, Chapter 3. 
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entire motive for that action. And if self-regarding pleasure is the entire motive, then 
virtuous deeds are done for the same reason selfish ones are. But in Shaftesbury’s 
Aristotelian eudaimonistic project of arguing that, “Virtue is the Good, and Vice the Ill 
of every-one,”70 part of what he uses to make his case is the claim that the virtuous 
person gets pleasure out of observing and judging of himself, whereas the unvirtuous 
person gets displeasure out of it.  
Self-regarding pleasure, or, rather, pleasure in regarding oneself, is a mark of 
virtue in a self-conscious being such as a human. We might call such self-regarding 
pleasure justified pride, as opposed to the vain pride of La Rochefoucauld. Surely, a 
Shaftesburian would say, there’s nothing inappropriate or sinful about feeling pride in 
one’s own real good deeds; such pride would simply be justified.71  
Of course, as I said above, Shaftesbury does not claim that the desire for pleasure 
in one’s own survey is or should be the only motive on which the virtuous person acts. 
He is a pluralist about moral motivation. But he still regards that desire as a perfectly 
laudable one. And so, by claiming that the desire for self-approval is a normatively-
appropriate motive for moral action, Shaftesbury endorses a Mediated Internal account 
of moral motivation. In that way, Shaftesbury appropriates the pessimistic Lutheran and 
Jansenist views about how we are motivated into his more optimistic framework. 
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71 Hume also argues for the possibility of pride as a virtue. See Jacqueline Taylor, “Hume 
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At this point, though, Shaftesbury has only fully appropriated the idea that we 
act virtuously out of the desire for self-approval. It is for Smith to do the same with the 
idea that we act virtuously out of the desire for approval from our neighbors. Smith’s 
move is a bit more complicated than Shaftesbury’s. He does not merely take the idea 
that we act for our neighbors’ approval and claim that, rather than a sign of vanity, it is 
a sign of virtue. He rather internalizes that Mediated External motivation. Smith does 
this by claiming that a proper sign of virtue is the approval of disinterested third parties. 
This might have been enough: if a proper sign of virtue is the approval of disinterested 
others, perhaps a properly virtuous motive is the desire to obtain the approval of 
disinterested others. But Smith goes so far as to claim that the properly virtuous motive, 
or, rather, one essential virtuous motive, is the desire to obtain the approval of imagined 
disinterested others.  
So the idea that we act virtuously to obtain others’ approval is both internalized 
and stripped of its sense of weakness or vanity, leaving instead only the idea of our 
essentially social nature: how we would appear to others is essential to how we 
understand and judge ourselves, even if there doesn’t happen to be anyone else about.72 
This is the, or at least one, way to explain the genesis of Mediated Internal accounts of 
moral motivation, insofar as they reach the point of Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. 
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§3: Thomas Reid 
 But before I discuss Smith’s complex account, I’ll explain Thomas Reid’s rather 
more straightforward and, as he would certainly have it, commonsensical account of 
moral motivation from the Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind.73 Reid has, 
I claim, a Mediated Internal account of moral motivation. So it should be, as I’ve 
outlined in the previous chapter, liable to the Self-Deception Problem. Reid openly 
recognizes that it is, though he is somewhat surprisingly sanguine about that fact.  
 One distinction that will help make sense of the differences between Reid and 
Smith is between two different accounts of judgment: affect-based and non-affect based. 
According to an affect-based account of judgment, your judgments are determined by 
your affects. So when it comes to making any particular judgment, including any moral 
judgment, the determining grounds of that judgment are your sentiments, interests, 
desires, preferences, and so on: your affects. We might well call the affect-based account 
of judgment the Humean account; it was indeed Hume’s view, and Smith, quite self-
consciously, followed Hume in holding it. On the other hand, a non-affect based account 
of judgment holds that your affects are not determinative of your judgments, that, given 
certain circumstances of judgment, and a full set of sentiments, interests, desires, 
preferences, and so on, more than one judgment is yet possible. A non-affect-based 
account of judgment will often be, but need not be, a rationalist account, according to 
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which reason, not inclination, is what determines judgment. We might well call a non-
affect-based account of judgment an anti-Humean account; this was Reid’s view, and 
Reid, quite self-consciously, opposed Hume in holding it. Unsurprisingly, affect-based or 
Humean accounts of judgment tend to be associated with a denial of the reality of 
libertarian free will, while non-affect-based or anti-Humean accounts tend to be 
associated with its assertion, as it is in Reid.74 
 Moral judgment, on Reid’s non-affect-based account, is accomplished by means of 
“the sense of duty,” “an original power or faculty in man, which [others] call the moral 
sense, the moral faculty, conscience.”75 That sense of duty, like, for Reid, our external 
senses, provides ‘immediate’ testimony; what it provides testimony of “are the first 
principles of all moral reasoning, from which all our knowledge of our duty must be 
deduced.”76 From those first principles proceeds moral reasoning, from which reasoning 
“the conclusion always is, that something in the conduct of moral agents is good or bad 
in a greater or a less degree, or indifferent.”77 So Reid holds that moral judgments are 
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cognitive and reason-based judgments, dependent on either immediately perceived moral 
first principles, or on moral reasoning that rests upon those first principles.78 
 Reid’s account of moral motivation builds from that picture of moral judgment. 
He is a sort of motivational judgment internalist, holding that affective responses arise 
directly from moral judgment. As he says, “Our moral judgments are not, like those we 
form in speculative matters, dry and unaffecting, but from their nature, are necessarily 
accompanied with affections and feelings.”79 Namely, approving and disapproving moral 
judgments include, “some affection, favourable or unfavourable,” respectively.80 But it is 
not just a bit of favorable or unfavorable affection that moral judgments produce. He 
says, “Nor can we conceive a greater depravity in the heart of man, than it would be to 
see and acknowledge worth without feeling any respect to it; or to see and acknowledge 
the highest worthlessness without any degree of dislike and indignation.”81 
 Now those moral judgments, which give rise to such feelings, cause us to find 
pleasure in the contemplation of good characters, and good actions, and displeasure in 
the contemplation of bad characters, and bad actions. But in making moral judgments, 
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we do not only look at other people’s characters and actions. Indeed, “the highest 
pleasure of all is, when we are conscious of good conduct in ourselves,”82 which pleasure 
Reid calls “self-esteem” and “pride.”83 Conversely, when we have made a disapproving 
moral judgment upon ourselves, “there is a sense of dishonor and worthlessness arising 
from guilt,” that “depresses and humbles [the] spirit, and makes [the] countenance to 
fall.”84 This sense of depression, dishonor, and worthlessness Reid calls a lessening of self-
esteem. These are clearly powerful motives. 
But they are not just powerful motives: they are approvable motives, which is to 
say, they are, at the least, a part of Reid’s account of moral motivation. Reid calls the 
pleasure of moral self-approval, or pride, “the purest, the most noble and valuable of all 
human enjoyments,” and says that it should “most justly claim the preference to all other 
enjoyments the human mind is capable of.”85 Notice how far we have come from La 
Rochefoucauld: where pride was, for La Rochefoucauld, a sign of the absence of true 
virtue, Reid takes it almost entirely uncritically as a sign of virtue’s presence. So for 
Reid, this motive, what we might call the motive of pride, is an approvable or virtuous 
motive. 
If what I’ve just said is correct, then Reid’s account of moral motivation is, 
straightforwardly, a Mediated Internal account. The morally approvable motive, the 
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motive of pride, is, first of all, a Mediated motivation: it motivates us to act rightly not 
just because we recognize the rightness of a given action, but because we seek the 
pleasure that redounds to us from an approving judgment of our actions and character. 
And it is, further, a Mediated Internal motivation: the approving judgment of our 
actions and character that leads to that pleasure is a judgment we make upon ourselves.  
It might yet be claimed that I’ve misidentified the moral motive for Reid. 
Though the pleasure that follows self-approval for moral action is a positive inducement 
to moral action, he surely does not hold that we engage in moral action for the sake of 
that pleasure. It is not the desire for the pleasures of pride, but “a regard to duty, to 
rectitude, to propriety of conduct,”86 that is Reid’s account of the right way to be 
motivated; it is what Kant calls ‘the motive of duty.’ As Reid also says, “every man of 
real honor feels an abhorrence of certain actions, because they are in themselves base, 
because they are in themselves what honor requires, and this, independently of any 
consideration of interest or reputation,”87 which we might presume includes interest in 
the pleasures of self-esteem. Indeed, he even calls this “an immediate moral obligation,”88 
so it’s certainly not a mediated one. 
 But Reid does not regard these two motives, the motive of duty and the motive 
of pride, as so far distant; indeed, he even appears to directly identify them. What I’ve 
                                         





called ‘the motive of duty,’ direct or immediate response to a recognition of obligation, 
Reid calls the “principle of honor.”89 He says that a “man of honor” needs “no other 
inducement . . . but the principle of honor,”90 to act according to his perceived duty. 
Reid then identifies that inducement with “a principle in man, which, when he acts 
according to it, gives him a consciousness of worth, and when he acts contrary to it, a 
sense of demerit.”91 But that is just to say that the principle of honor is the motive of 
pride. For Reid, there is no more direct sense of acting directly for the sake of duty than 
acting from the motive of pride; the latter is a further analysis of the former. 
 So Reid holds that if your motivation to perform a certain action, say, returning 
found money to its rightful owner, is your hope to feel proud of yourself for doing so, 
this is not merely consonant with, but a direct consequence of, your perception of that 
action as obligatory. Why would that be? Because Reid thinks that the reason you’d feel 
proud of yourself for returning the money is that you think it’s your duty to do so. 
Similarly, avoiding keeping the money because you fear feeling shame for keeping it is 
simply a consequence of your perception that doing so is forbidden, because the only 
reason you’d feel shame for keeping found money is that you think it would be wrong to 
do so. 
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 Even if there are yet circumstances in which Reid might separate the motive of 
honor from the motive of pride, this common identification of, or at least tight 
connection between, the two, is sufficient to recognize the motive of pride as a proper 
part of his account of moral motivation. So it is safe to identify at least one important 
part of Reid’s account of moral motivation as a Mediated Internal account. 
 As I claimed in the first chapter, a Mediated Internal account of moral 
motivation ought to be liable to the Self-Deception Problem. Reid’s account is, and he 
recognizes it as such. Let’s see how. 
 As quoted above, the highest pleasure, according to Reid, is recognition of one’s 
own virtue. Similarly, the greatest displeasure is recognition of one’s own vice. As Reid 
puts it, rather dramatically, “no man can bear the thought of being absolutely destitute 
of all worth. The consciousness of this would make him detest himself, hate the light of 
the sun, and fly, if possible, out of existence.”92 We might hope that this extreme 
displeasure at recognizing oneself as worthless, and the connection between acting 
contrary to what one perceives as duty and the feeling of such worthlessness, serves as 
an extreme inducement to act in accord with duty. Reid intends it to be just such an 
inducement, and, at least partially in accord with that intention, recognizes it as a 
proper moral motivation. But it is also “on account of the uneasiness of this feeling, that 
bad men take so much pains to get rid of it, and to hide, even from their own eyes, as 
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much as possible, the pravity of their conduct. Hence arise all the arts of self-deceit, by 
which men varnish their crimes, or endeavour to wash out the stain of guilt.”93 The Self-
Deception Problem could scarcely be expressed more succinctly: the very same thing 
that Reid regards as moral motivation also serves as motivation to self-deception instead. 
 Remarkably, Reid says no more. As we will see, both Smith and Butler (though 
Butler to a yet greater degree than Smith), engage seriously and systematically with self-
deception, when they, led by their structurally similar accounts of moral motivation, 
come across the same problem I’ve just described. But Reid does not. I can only 
speculate on Reid’s lack of concern, but it seems important that he attributes this 
motivated self-deception to “bad men,” “the criminal,” and “men of bad hearts.”94 As I 
said in the first chapter, the Self-Deception Problem is a practical problem: if your view 
of moral motivation is one that invites the Self-Deception Problem, you have reason to 
concern yourself with how to identify and avoid it. So how seriously you take that 
problem, if it has arisen, will in fact depend on how difficult you think it is to identify 
and avoid self-deception. So I’d speculate that Reid’s relative indifference to the Self-
Deception Problem, combined with his attribution of it to “men of bad hearts,” indicates 
that he just doesn’t think many, or most people have any serious difficulty in identifying 
and avoiding self-deception. It’s only a problem for obvious villains, villains who, 
nonetheless, still want to think of themselves as decent people. This would seem to be a 
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surprisingly rosy view of human nature for a Calvinist like Reid, who was even a 
Minister of the Church of Scotland. It was not, I believe, a view shared even by his 
generally rather optimistic predecessor in the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the 
University of Glasgow, Adam Smith. 
 
§4: Adam Smith 
 Whereas Reid began from an avowedly anti-Humean, non-affect-based account of 
moral judgment, Smith begins from an avowedly Humean, affect-based account. So since 
Smith follows Hume in the belief that judgment is based on affect, his account of moral 
judgment is an account of the sentiments through which those judgments are properly 
accomplished, hence: A Theory of Moral Sentiments. The proper objects of moral 
judgment are the actions, sentiments, and characters of moral agents, and, what it 
means to morally judge, in brief, is to have particular kinds of approving and 
disapproving sentiments towards those agents, and their actions, sentiments, and 
characters. Since moral judgment for Smith is already sentimentalist, that is, affective, 
his account of what the connection might be between proper moral judgment and proper 
motivation will be, in one sense, very simple, but in another sense, somewhat 
complicated. It will be simple because there’s no judgment-motivation gap his account 
will need to cover, since, for Smith, judgment arises directly from sentiments, which are 
already intrinsically motivational. On the other hand, it will be somewhat complicated, 
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because of a difficult-to-systematize level of pluralism. Reid’s account of moral 
motivation was at least plausibly read as monistic: the right way to be motivated is to 
be motivated by one’s moral judgments. But obviously that account isn’t available to 
Smith, since he treats motivation as prior to judgment. But Smith also does not take 
Hume’s way out by grounding approving moral judgments in utility.95 I’ll begin by 
looking first at how Smith explains moral judgments of others, then, moral judgment of 
oneself. 
In Part II the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith argues that we rightly judge of 
the actions and sentiments of other people by considering their case, and seeing whether 
or not we sympathize with the sentiments they felt and the actions they accordingly 
performed. We sympathize with those sentiments when we enter into them, when we feel 
the same; if we fail to so sympathize, it means we maintain a feeling of distance from 
them. The idea is to try to perform an act of imaginative identification with another. If 
it succeeds, we sympathize with them and so approve their actions. If it fails, we do not 
sympathize with them, and so disapprove their actions. This is sentimental moral 
judgment.  
In Part III of that work, Smith claims that “the principle by which we naturally 
either approve or disapprove of our own conduct, seems to be altogether the same with 
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that by which we exercise the like judgments concerning the conduct of other people.”96 
This is perhaps a slight overstatement on Smith’s part. Self-directed moral judgment on 
his account involves a more complicated imaginative act than does other-directed moral 
judgment. But it uses the same materials: sentiments and imaginative identification. 
And it aims at the same goal: to banish or circumvent partiality in judgment of moral 
matters.  
In the case of judgment about others’ sentiments and conduct, we are frequently 
already impartial observers: we are observers of how A acts towards B, and, if we have 
no particular connection to either A or B, and so no interest in the case, we are 
naturally impartial observers of that action. How well we feel that we can identify with 
or sympathize with or enter into A’s way of approaching B determines whether or not 
we approve it. But we are not primarily observers of how we ourselves act. We are, 
rather, agents. And we are not impartial with regard to our own actions; we are, 
naturally, interested in the case. Smith’s idea is for us to approach our own actions as if 
we were an impartial observer of them. We do this by imagining an impartial observer of 
our own actions, and seeing whether he identifies with or sympathizes with or enters into 
our way of approaching B.97 
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If our imagined impartial observer feels anger and resentment when considering 
our actions, then we must conclude that impartial observers of our actions would feel 
anger and resentment towards us. Accordingly, for Smith, we must conclude that anger 
and resentment towards us is justified, that, in other words, we have done wrong. 
As I said above, this is a complicated imaginative act. We do not merely imagine an 
impartial observer of some person’s action; we imagine ourselves as impartial observers 
of our own actions, actions in which we are partial, not impartial, and agents, not 
observers. That impartial observer really is supposed to be oneself, and not just for the 
obvious reason that each of us is to be doing the imaging herself. For, what kind of 
impartial observer are we to imagine the sentiments and responses of? An impartial 
observer of our or another country, of more or less irascible temper than our own, of 
more or less keen judgment? The answer, simply enough, is that we are to imagine 
ourselves, making the kinds of judgments we would make of someone else, performing 
the actions that we’ve performed, assuming we had no stake in the matter. So Smith’s 
account of self-directed moral judgment, unlike his account of other-directed moral 
judgment, involves something like a divided self: an acting self and a judging self. As 
Smith says, “when I endeavor to examine my own conduct . . . I divide myself, as it were, 
into two persons . . . I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that 
other I, the person whose conduct is examined into and judged of.”98 
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 The point of this whole self-directed imaginative sentimental procedure is: an 
action or sentiment that passes the impartial observer test is thereby taken to be a 
morally acceptable one. If that’s the case, then any sentiment, or, we might say, any 
motivation that a person has that he finds that he sympathizes with when imagining 
himself as an impartial observer of, is a moral motivation. Benevolent motivations, for 
instance, are the sorts that we might well expect to pass the test of the impartial 
observer, at least in many instances. So, at least in those instances, benevolence is a 
moral motivation, or a virtue, so we can say that Smith’s pluralistic account of moral 
motivation includes benevolence. As Smith puts it, “All those graceful and admired 
actions, to which the benevolent affections would prompt us, ought to proceed as much 
from the passions themselves, as from any regard to the general rules of conduct.”99 
But notice Smith’s qualifier in that sentence. Perhaps surprisingly, it is not 
sufficient for a motivation to be moral or virtuous that it merely be of the sort that 
would pass the impartial observer test, if it were so tested. Smith says, “No action can 
properly be called virtuous, which is not accompanied with the sentiment of self-
approbation.” 100  Since the sentiment of self-approbation just is what follows from 
successful application of the impartial observer test, Smith is here claiming that, for an 
action to be virtuous, it must actually pass the test. We might, in a Rawlsian vein, say 
that Smith has a pure procedural conception of virtue: there is no external standard for 
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the virtue of an action that precedes the application of the procedure for its judgment.101 
There is no reason to doubt that Smith puts sentiments, virtues, and character in the 
same boat as actions. If all that’s correct, then his account of moral motivation cannot 
just be a list of the motivations that would pass the impartial observer test. The test 
itself, and so moral judgment, and so the sentiment of self-approbation, has to play a 
central role. But, as above, the impartial observer test and moral judgment in general 
cannot alone be what ought to motivate, since all they do is certify certain of our other 
motivations as themselves moral. 
Smith is clear, however, in claiming that we in fact desire that certification, 
saying that it’s “a stronger power, a more forcible motive,” 102 than our benevolent 
motivations are. That is, assuming a situation in which benevolence would be called for, 
Smith thinks that, even stronger than our motivation to act benevolently is our 
motivation to be able to approve our own actions. Equally strong in the other direction 
is our motivation to avoid self-disapproval: we “dread the inward disgrace,”103 that would 
result from a failure of our actions or sentiments to pass the impartial observer test. 
Smith has it that the conviction that the impartial observer is the basis of right 
sentiments is so clear, and the desire to have right sentiments so strong, that at his best, 
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when he becomes “the man of real constancy and firmness, the wise and just man,”104 a 
person reaches the point “of modeling, or of endeavouring to model, not only his outward 
conduct and behavior, but, as much as he can, even his inward sentiments and feelings, 
according to those of this awful and respectable judge. He does not merely affect the 
sentiments of the impartial spectator. He really adopts them. He almost identifies 
himself with, he almost becomes himself that impartial spectator, and scarce even feels 
but as that great arbiter of his conduct directs him to feel.”105  
The Self-Deception Problem is clearly on the horizon. Though Smith’s account of 
moral motivation is highly pluralistic, one central part of it is the desire for the approval 
of the impartial spectator within. Even if, in particular circumstances of action, that 
desire for moral self-approval can be expected to take a back seat to sentiments like 
benevolence or justice, the desire for moral self-approval would seem to be Smith’s 
primary spur to moral self-cultivation and improvement. That desire for moral self-
approval is a Mediated Internal motivation: Mediated because it works through a desire 
for an approving judgment to be made upon us, and Internal because we make that 
judgment upon ourselves. As I’ve noted, Smith has a pluralistic understanding of moral 
motivation. I am only claiming that this important strand of moral motivation is 
Mediated and Internal. Other strands may be different. Insofar as direct benevolence is 
what I’d term an Immediate motivation, and Smith’s impartial observer approves direct 
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benevolence, there are also Immediate strands of Smith’s account of moral motivation. 
So the discussion that follows, to be clear, applies only to Smith’s claim that the desire 
for moral self-approval is a moral motivation. 
Insofar as I’m motivated to seek self-approval, and self-approval comes through 
the approval of the impartial spectator, and my sentiments are not all directly identical 
with those of the impartial spectator, self-deception is a problem. If it’s easier for me to 
deceive the impartial spectator about my sentiments than it is to adopt those he’d 
properly approve, or to abandon those he’d properly disapprove, I can be expected to so 
deceive. As Smith puts it, “It is so disagreeable to think ill of ourselves, that we often 
purposely turn away our view from those circumstances which might render that 
judgment unfavourable.”106 Furthermore, as quoted in the previous paragraph, Smith 
thinks that, at best, the virtuous person almost becomes the impartial spectator. 
Becoming more virtuous is, in a sense, narrowing the distance between your own active 
sentiments and those of your impartial observer, but the gap can never be entirely closed, 
so there is always some failure of identification between oneself and one’s moral judge. 
And so long as there is some failure of identification between oneself and one’s moral 
judge, the desire to gain that judge’s approval is one that can in principle be satisfied by 
deceiving him. So if Smith’s account of the moral motivation for cultivation of virtue is 
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the desire for the approval of the impartial spectator, we are, on Smith’s account, always 
liable to the Self-Deception Problem. 
But what does it actually mean to deceive ourselves by way of deceiving the 
impartial spectator? When Smith discusses self-deception, he emphasizes our partiality. 
He distinguishes between self-deception in cases “when we are about to act” and “after we 
have acted,”107 when we reflect upon ourselves and our completed actions. In the active 
case, “the violent emotions which at that time agitate us, discolour our views of 
things.” 108  And in the reflective case, “rather than see our own behavior under so 
disagreeable an aspect, we . . . endeavour to exasperate anew those unjust passions 
which had formerly misled us.”109  So both kinds of self-deception, both active and 
reflective, are about partiality in judgment, driven by our strong sentiments.  
But, as Smith recognizes and discusses throughout the TMS, it is absolutely 
common and natural for our sentiments to be partial. Partiality, and partiality in the 
way of favoring oneself unfairly over others, may be hard to justify, but it is not 
immediately self-deceptive. The reason partiality “with regard to the propriety of [one’s] 
own conduct”110 is self-deceptive, and not merely partial, is because judgments of one’s 
own conduct are, by hypothesis, judgments from the standpoint of an impartial observer. 
Since self-directed moral judgments just are judgments from the standpoint of an 
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impartial observer, if we engage in such judgment in a partial and unfair manner, and so 
render a partial and unfair moral judgment, we have deceived ourselves. We have made 
a judgment partially and taken it to be impartial. And we have done so because we 
cannot bear “to see our own behavior under so disagreeable an aspect,”111 as our own 
impartial judgment would place it. So the very same thing that Smith regards as moral 
motivation also serves as motivation to self-deception instead. 
This account of Smith’s take on self-deception also explains why his solution to 
the problem is what it is. Most of his chapter on self-deception discusses “the Origin and 
Use of general Rules.” 112  His solution to the problem posed by the Self-Deception 
Problem is that we clearly institute a set of general moral rules for ourselves. Obviously, 
coming up with moral rules doesn’t help us to identify our self-deceptive moments. But 
it can help us to circumvent them.113 We try to do so by coming up with, and insisting 
on the self-application of, a set of general moral rules that we think should apply to all 
people. Such rules will be arrived at by consideration of our impartial responses to 
people’s actions. They really will be impartial rules, because of the fact that we’ll use our 
responses to history, to fiction, to other people’s actions that we’ve observed, in order to 
formulate them. If we then treat those general rules as inflexible rules of conduct, we will 
effectively act so as to satisfy the impartial observer within, without needing to actually 
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unify our sentiments with his, without actually becoming the impartial observer 
ourselves. This is not, of course, real virtue: real virtue is actually unifying our 
sentiments with those of our impartial observer within. It is, rather, a strategy for 
overcoming our tendency to deceive ourselves about the ways in which we fall short.  
 
§5 Thomas Hobbes 
 Hobbes’ theories of moral judgment and motivation from Leviathan are rather 
different from Reid’s or Smith’s. For one thing, Hobbes, contrary to Reid or Smith, 
maintains a directly conventionalist theory of right and wrong: in the natural state, 
“nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there 
no place.”114 With a conventionalist theory of right and wrong, there is less to distinguish 
moral judgment from other types of judgment than in a nonconventialist theory, since 
there are no naturally moral facts or sentiments of which to judge. For another thing, 
Hobbes, again contrary to Reid or Smith, has a directly egoistic and hedonistic account 
of human motivation: “of the voluntary acts of every man the object is some good to 
himself.”115 With an egoistic and hedonistic account of motivation in general, there is 
little to distinguish moral motivation from other types than in more pluralistic accounts 
of motivation. For a third thing, Hobbes denies that there is a distinction between moral 
and political obligations. He says that we more often call men “by the names of righteous 
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and unrighteous, than just and unjust, though the meaning be the same.”116 Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly for my account here, Hobbes, having previously claimed that 
all motivation is egoistic, also claims that judgment is subservient to desire: “For the 
thoughts are to the desires as scouts and spies, to range abroad and find the way to the 
things desired.”117 If judgment is subservient to desire, and desire is egoistic, judgment, 
at least judgment of what is good or bad, or of what ought or ought not to be done, is 
necessarily prudential in nature. And so moral judgment is necessarily prudential in 
nature. So it’s a bit awkward to try to explain Hobbes’ account of moral judgment 
independently of his account of moral motivation, since the two are heavily intertwined. 
I think it will nonetheless be useful to try to take them apart, at least for a moment. 
 I said above that Hobbes has a conventionalist theory of right and wrong. In fact, 
Hobbes goes even further, arguing for a natural subjectivity of good and bad: “But 
whatsoever is the object of any man’s appetite or desire that is it which he for his part 
calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil . . . For these words of good, 
evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them, there 
being nothing simply and absolutely so.”118 Yet, if, again, morality can be conventional, 
and not merely subjective, there will have to be morality of a society, and not just an 
individual. But Hobbes doesn’t claim unrestrictedly that good and evil depend on each 
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person’s subjective preferences. Rather, they depend on those preferences only in a state 
of nature. In a commonwealth, good and evil derive “from the person that representeth it 
[i.e., the sovereign], or from an arbitrator or judge whom men disagreeing shall by 
consent set up, and make his sentence the rule of.”119 If good and evil in civil society just 
depends on the judgment of that society’s instituted authority, then individual moral 
judgment, judgment of what is good or evil to do, of what is or is not duty, is nothing 
more than judgment about whether a given action will meet with the approval or 
disapproval of the civil authority. This judgment will, fortunately and, importantly to 
Hobbes, not be difficult: it will be encoded in law. And law must be “written and 
published [with] manifest signs that it proceedeth from the will of the sovereign,”120 so 
that people know just what it is. 
 Of course, there are limits on what the civil authority can claim to be good, or 
obligatory, or make law. For one thing, the civil authority cannot make it obligatory for 
a person to kill himself, or allow himself to be killed: “If the sovereign command a man 
(though justly condemned) to kill, wound, or maim himself, or not to resist those who 
assault him, . . . or any other thing without which he cannot live, yet hath that man the 
liberty to disobey.”121 This is because the very reason that underlies the individual’s 
agreement to give up his liberty, his ‘Right of Nature,’ and enter civil society is, first of 
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all, “fear of death.”122 He cannot be thought to have agreed to face death to avoid facing 
death.123 Of course, the fear of death is not the only reason. Individuals also enter civil 
society out of “desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope 
by their industry to attain them.”124 And so the list of actions the civil authority cannot 
make obligatory, or cannot forbid, and, in the same way, the list of actions the civil 
authority must make obligatory, or must forbid, is the list of actions, the presence or 
absence of which are necessary to make civil society a place in which its members’ lives 
and industry are protected.  
Hobbes’ nineteen Laws of Nature in Chapters XIV and XV are a part of that list. 
The Laws of Nature are “precepts or general rules, found out by reason, by which a man 
is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of 
preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.”125 
The particular list of laws of nature that Hobbes gives, in favor of, among other things, 
gratitude, complaisance, and equity, and against, among other things, pride, arrogance, 
and false witnessing, is a list of rules that, if followed by everyone in a society, would 
strongly conduce towards making it a place in which their lives and industry would be 
protected. But, though he has named them laws, Hobbes concludes his enumeration of 
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them by saying, “These dictates of reason men use to call by the name of laws, but 
improperly; for they are but conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the 
conservation and defence of themselves.”126 “They are not properly laws, but qualities 
that dispose men to peace and to obedience,”127 unless they are enjoined by a civil 
authority, and backed with appropriate sanctions: “When a commonwealth is once 
settled, then are they actually laws, and not before, as being then the commands of that 
commonwealth, and therefore also civil laws; for it is the sovereign power that obliges 
men to obey them.”128 
Though these ‘Laws of Nature’ are, on Hobbes’ account, necessary parts of civil 
law, they are not, or at least need not be, the whole of civil law. He claims that it 
belongs to the right of the sovereign, “to be judge both of the means of peace and 
defence, and also of the hindrances and disturbances of the same, and to do whatsoever 
he shall think necessary [for it],” 129  and there may be many laws, that is, many 
obligations, that so stem from the sovereign’s will and judgment. All this is to say that 
the rules of good and bad in any civil society, despite the universal and rational nature 
of the Laws of Nature, still depend for their existence on the will and judgment of the 
sovereign. And so, the moral judgment of any individual in a civil society, the judgment 
by which he says what is good and bad, and what ought and ought not to be done, is, as 
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I said above, nothing more than judgment about whether a given action will meet with 
the approval or disapproval of the civil authority. So Hobbes’ account of moral judgment 
in civil society just is the combination of knowledge of the laws with judgment about 
how they apply to particular actions. 
With that reading of Hobbes’ account of moral judgment in hand, I’ll move on to 
moral motivation. As said above, all motivation for Hobbes is egoistic. So the question of 
moral motivation will not, as it is with many other philosophers, be a question of 
overcoming or setting aside self-interest, since that is impossible. Most immediately, 
Hobbes’ holds that the right way to be motivated is careful prudential motivation, that 
is, that one should be motivated by coolly considered rational self-interest, rather than 
by excessive passions, or by ill-considered, dubiously-rational self-interest. The Laws of 
Nature, Hobbes holds, are the general rules of conduct that most cohere with our 
rational self-interest, so we’ll act best, and follow those rules, only if rational self-interest 
is what motivates us.  
But we, and our judgments about our rational self-interest are not the source of 
the laws of civil society; the civil authority is. The civil authority provides the rules of 
good and bad, of what is obligatory and what is forbidden. It will be in our self-interest 
to follow those rules only if we are given reason to expect worse outcomes for ourselves if 
we break them than if we keep them. And so, Hobbes says, “there must be some coercive 
power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of 
  
85 
some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their 
covenant.”130 Fear, even terror of the power of the civil authority is what is supposed to 
motivate us to act according to its dictates. That fear requires, of course, that the civil 
authority be extremely powerful, and that it be willing to punish for breaches of its laws, 
and that the punishments be “great enough to deter men from the action.”131 If it isn’t, it 
is as good as “an invitement to [crime], because when men compare the benefit of their 
injustice with the harm of their punishment, by necessity of nature they choose that 
which appeareth best for themselves.”132 
So Hobbes’ account of moral motivation, of the proper way to be motivated, is 
self-interested fear of the civil authority. This is a Mediated External account of moral 
motivation: it’s Mediated because it works through a desire for an approving judgment 
upon oneself, and it’s External because that judgment comes from without: unlike 
Smith’s impartial observer, Hobbes’ sovereign is an external force. Just as Reid and 
Smith offered versions of Mediated Internal accounts of moral motivation, and so were 
liable to Self-Deception Problems, Hobbes, with his Mediated External account is liable 
to an Other-Deception Problem. It is straightforward: if it’s possible to commit injustices, 
reap benefits from them, and yet deceive the civil authority so that you are not punished, 
obviously, that’s what it will be rational for you to do. So the same thing that’s 
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supposed to provide moral motivation, namely, rational self-interest modulated through 
fear of the civil authority, can provide motivation to deceive the civil authority instead. 
This problem in Hobbes, what I’m calling the Other-Deception Problem, is not 
new; indeed, it may be the most notorious problem in Hobbes, sometimes referred to as 
the problem of the free rider or the defector. Hobbes is clearly aware of it. He famously 
discusses it in the Foole passage in Chapter XV, and has a similar discussion again in 
Chapter XXVII. He says that “the source of every crime is some defect of the 
understanding, or some error in reasoning, or some sudden force of the passions.”133 The 
Other-Deception Problem, as well as the Foole’s defection, are supposed to be 
understood as based on errors in reasoning. But to commit an injustice from which you 
will reap immediate benefits is only based on an error in reasoning if the long term 
expected outcome for you of that injustice is bad.  
The negative side of the expected outcome equation for a given injustice will, of 
course, be a product of how bad the punishment will be, and how likely that punishment 
is. The likeliness of the punishment depends, at least in great part, on how difficult the 
civil authority is to deceive. Hobbes says a lot more about the fixing of appropriately 
strong penalties than he does about making the civil authority appropriately difficult to 
deceive. Of course, ramping up the badness of the punishment can make up for its 
relative unlikelihood. But Hobbes does indeed expect that a properly instituted civil 
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authority will be difficult to deceive. He says, “those that deceive upon hope of not being 
observed do commonly deceive themselves (the darkness in which they believe they lie 
hidden being nothing else but their own blindness), and are no wiser than children, that 
think all hid by hiding their own eyes.”134 He does not explain how, but clearly presumes 
that, the civil authority will be very difficult to deceive, since anyone who thinks he can 
outwit it has “a great and false opinion of their own wisdom.”135 As Hobbes also puts it 
in his response to the Foole, anyone who depends on his ability to deceive his society at 
large depends on it to err, “which errors a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the 
means of his security.”136 So, though he doesn’t talk about strategies for uncovering 
Other-Deception as a way to solving the problem it poses, Hobbes does in fact intend to 
solve the problem by having society be such that Other-Deception can be expected to be 
uncovered.  
On these lines, it’s worth pointing out that Hobbes’ famous opening of the Foole 
passage, “The fool hath said in his heart: ‘there is no such thing as justice,’”137 is a 
reference to the opening of Psalm 14: “The Foole hath said in his heart, There is no 
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God.”138 The Foole asks whether, “injustice, taking away the fear of God . . . may not 
sometimes stand with that reason which dictateth to every man his good.”139 God is 
feared not just for his omnipotence, for his ability to punish, but for his omniscience, for 
the impossibility of deceiving him. It is not really justice that takes the place of God in 
Hobbes’ picture. It is really the civil authority. And the civil authority takes this place 
of God in the fearful hearts of men by taking on God’s qualities, both his omnipotence 
and his omniscience. 
 
§6 John Locke 
 Very far from Hobbes’ conventionalism about morality, Locke, in the Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, is not only a nonconventionalist, he is a rationalist, 
regarding morality as a set of rationally-discoverable natural laws, equally applicable to 
all people. Locke even claims that morality is “capable of Demonstration . . . from self-
evident Propositions, by necessary Consequences, as incontestable as those in 
Mathematicks.”140 It might be thought that, as we have rational capacities to clearly 
recognize the truths of what is right and wrong, and what we ought and ought not do, 
we could be motivated directly by that recognition. But Locke denies any such rational 
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motivation. Recognition of what is right or good does not, for Locke, immediately 
motivate: “I am forced to conclude, that good, the greater good, though apprehended and 
acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will.”141 
Instead, Locke follows Hobbes in claiming an egoistic and hedonistic account of 
human motivation. Locke holds that “we love, desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect 
of Pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve only in respect of Pain ultimately: In fine all these 
Passions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the Causes of Pleasure and 
Pain.”142 So the only thing that moves our passions is expectation of, or direct experience 
of, pleasure or pain. Further, it is only those passions, or, rather, it is only the passion of 
desire that induces us to act: “that which immediately determines the Will . . . to every 
voluntary Action, is the uneasiness of desire.”143 So for Locke, pleasure and pain are the 
only determining grounds of the will, which is equivalent, in my terms, to claiming an 
egoistic and hedonistic account of motivation. Rationalism about morality may sit 
slightly awkwardly with egoism and hedonism about motivation, but Locke’s bridge from 
his account of moral judgment to his account of moral motivation is actually quite 
direct: God. 
Locke is a rationalist about morality itself, and, accordingly, a cognitivist about 
moral judgment. As he argues in the Essays on the Law of Nature, we attain knowledge 
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of the natural moral law and its dictates through our reason.144 It’s worth noting that, 
though Locke does not discuss the rational natural law theory of that earlier work at any 
length in the Essay, he does refer to it, allowing that there is a “Law of Nature,” 
“congruous to the Light of Reason.”145 Unlike in Reid, our knowledge of the moral law is 
not through some peculiar faculty of moral judgment; Locke is, after all, a strident critic 
of faculty psychology.146 We rather know right and wrong through careful use of our 
general reasoning capacities. The comparison to mathematics is apt here. We do not 
know that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles through the 
use of our geometric faculty. We know it through reasoning about geometry. So, for 
Locke, with morals: by reasoning about morals, we can know, for example, that “Where 
there is no Property, there is no Injustice,” with as much certainty as “any 
Demonstration in Euclid.”147 
Despite that certainty of our knowledge of right and wrong, Locke does not think 
it motivates us. As quoted above, we are only motivated through the displeasure of the 
“uneasiness of desire.” 148  And “good, even seen, and confessed to be so, does not 
necessarily move every particular Man’s desire; but only that part, or so much of it, as is 
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consider’d, and taken to make a necessary part of his happiness.”149 So we are only 
motivated to do what’s morally right and avoid what’s morally wrong insofar as we take 
those things to be a part of our happiness. Now, Locke thinks we should construe our 
happiness widely: it need not include only simple physical pleasures. Our conception of 
our own happiness could even include virtue. Locke refers to the possibility that a man, 
“hungers and thirsts after righteousness; [and] feels an uneasiness in the want of it.”150 
But it is not really that direct desire for virtue that Locke argues is the moral 
motivation.151 
Locke claims that “the highest perfection of intellectual nature, lies in a careful 
and constant pursuit of true and solid happiness.”152 By ‘true and solid happiness’ he 
emphatically does not mean happiness in this life, but rather happiness in the afterlife: 
“Were the will determin’d by the views of good . . . I do not see how it could ever get 
loose from the infinite eternal Joys of Heaven, once propos’d and consider’d as 
possible . . . and then we should keep constantly and steadily in our course towards 
Heaven, without ever standing still, or directing our actions to any other end.”153 So, for 
Locke, we are at our best, our most perfect, when we are acting with the goal of getting 
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into Heaven, and avoiding Hell. This is a much different way of acting, and a much 
different way of being motivated, than if we had our earthly happiness in mind:  
“To him, I say, who hath a prospect of the different State of perfect Happiness or 
Misery, that attends all Men after this Life, depending on their Behavior here, 
the measures of Good and Evil, that govern his choice, are mightily changed. For 
since nothing of Pleasure and Pain in this Life, can bear any proportion to 
endless Happiness, or exquisite Misery of an immortal Soul hereafter, Actions in 
his Power will have their preference, not according to the transient Pleasure, or 
Pain that accompanies, or follows them here; but as they serve to secure that 
perfect durable Happiness hereafter.”154  
 
The fact that I might take immediate joy in treating my friends fairly should no more 
affect how I choose to act than the fact that I might take joy in cheating them. The only 
thing I should truly consider, the only thing that should really motivate me, is seeking 
Heaven.155 
So for Locke, the right way to be motivated is by hope for the reward, and fear 
of the punishment, of God. This is a Mediated External account of moral motivation, 
structurally similar to Hobbes’ account. It’s Mediated because it works through a desire 
for an approving judgment upon oneself, and it’s External because that judgment comes 
from without, namely, from God. But Hobbes’ account was liable to an Other-Deception 
Problem that Locke’s account is not liable to. Hobbes’ account was liable to such a 
problem, because, and insofar as, the judging authority can be deceived. His solution to 
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that problem involved arguing that deception of that authority is difficult enough that 
it’s unreasonable to expect that you’ll accomplish it. Locke, on the other hand, has no 
Deception Problem at all, because his judge is omniscient and so, by nature, 
undeceivable. For Locke, God’s judgment is supposed to provide moral motivation. Since 
God cannot be deceived, because his judgment cannot err, the thing that provides moral 
motivation cannot provide motivation to deceive instead.  
 
§7 Francis Hutcheson 
 Hutcheson, in An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 
denies Hobbes’ and Locke’s, and, importantly, Mandeville’s, hedonistic and egoistic 
accounts of motivation. He simply regards them as phenomenologically and empirically 
untenable: we perform, and observe, non-self-interested actions all the time. Accordingly, 
he abjures their Mediated External accounts of moral motivation, mediated through our 
fear of the judgments of an external power. He regards motivation by fear of punishment, 
or desire for reward, as very far indeed from approvable moral motivation. Like the 
Pelagian moralists I referred to in §2, Hutcheson thinks that we can be, and indeed often 
are, motivated by direct love. Motivation by love, or, as he usually terms it, benevolence, 
is truly moral motivation. 
 Of everyone discussed in this chapter, Hutcheson, at least the Hutcheson of the 
Inquiry, has the most straightforward relation between moral judgment and moral 
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motivation.156 Since he regards the primary objects of moral judgment to be motivations, 
the motivations approved by moral judgment just are the moral motivations. So his 
account of moral judgment simply provides his account of moral motivation. Smith also 
regards motivations, or sentiments, to be the primary objects of moral judgment but, 
whereas he has that judgment work through a combination of sympathy and imaginative 
identification, Hutcheson claims a much simpler, or at least much less articulated, 
mechanism: a moral sense. He insists that our approval or disapproval of actions or 
motives or characters just is the taking of direct pleasure or displeasure in recognizing 
them. It really is that basic and that immediate. Hutcheson does not regard the 
connection between the moral sense and the sense of smell as metaphorical; both are just 
among our naturally-occurring senses. 
 The directness and immediacy and pleasurability of the moral sense are not its 
only importantly sense-like qualities. Hutcheson says that it “has this in common with 
our other Senses, that however our Desire of Virtue may be counterballanc’d by Interest, 
our Sentiment or Perception of its Beauty cannot.”157 Though it might be desirable for 
us, or in our interests, to regard, say, our boss as morally good, we can only do so insofar 
as we actually perceive her as having morally good qualities; the fact that it would be in 
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our interests to regard her as good just doesn’t count as a reason to. The only things 
that do excite our moral responses are moral qualities: “as soon as any Action is 
represented to us as flowing from Love, Humanity, Gratitude, Compassion, a Study of 
the good of others, and a Delight in their Happiness, altho it were in the most distant 
Part of the World, or in some past Age, we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, 
and praise its Author. And on the contrary, every Action represented as flowing from 
Hatred, Delight in the Misery of other, or Ingratitude, raises Abhorrence and 
Aversion.”158 Notice also that the moral approval of actions is described as depending on 
the motivations from which those actions flow. And the only motivation that induces 
such approval is benevolence: “If we examine all the Actions which are counted amiable 
any where, and enquire into the Grounds upon which they are approv’d, we shall find, 
that in the Opinion of the person who approves them, they always appear as Benevolent, 
or flowing from Love of others, and a Study of their Happiness . . . Nor shall we find any 
thing amiable in any Action whatsoever, where there is no Benevolence imagin’d.”159 
 So, based on the responses of the moral sense, the only true moral motivation is 
benevolence, “desire of or delight in, the Good of others.”160 It must, further, be impartial 
benevolence: “If there be any Benevolence at all, it must be disinterested; for the most 
useful Action imaginable, loses all appearance of Benevolence, as soon as we discern that 
                                         
158 Inquiry, I.II, p. 91 
159 Inquiry III.I, p. 116 
160 Inquiry II.III, p. 103 
  
96 
it only flowed from Self-Love or Interest.”161 So Hutcheson is a clear monist about moral 
motivation: there is only one motive, benevolence, that is properly moral. And his 
account, contrary to the other figures discussed in this chapter, is an Immediate account: 
when my motivation is just a desire for the good of others, the object of moral treatment, 
those others, is the incentive-object that drives that motivation. I do not act for the 
good of others in order to satisfy God, as in Locke, or to avoid the heavy hand of the 
sovereign, as in Hobbes, or to think well of myself, as in Reid, and, at least to a great 
extent, in Smith. Rather, I act for the good of others in order to satisfy my desire for the 
good of others. It is not for my own sake, or for the satisfaction of my own desire to help, 
or to remove pangs of sympathy that I help those in need. As Hutcheson argues, “If our 
sole Intention, in Compassion or Pity, was the Removal of our Pain, we should run away, 
shut our Eyes, divert our Thoughts from the miserable Object, to avoid the Pain of 
Compassion, which we seldom do.”162 So Hutcheson’s account of moral motivation is not 
liable to the Self-Deception Problem, because the desire for the good of others is only 
satisfied by the good of others. There’s no person, group, or faculty of reflective 
judgment I’m trying to mollify by acting benevolently, so there’s no person, group, or 
faculty of reflective judgment I might be motivated to deceive. 
 Hutcheson does recognize, though, that the moral sense appreciates not only the 
actions of others, but one’s own actions. And he claims that this sense provides us with 
                                         
161 ibid. 
162 Inquiry II.VIII, p. 111 
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great and enduring pleasure. So it would seem that we can, in fact, reflect upon our own 
actions and motives, and take pleasure in that survey. We might be motivated to act 
benevolently because we seek the pleasure of recognizing our own benevolence, so we 
might be motivated to deceive ourselves into judging ourselves as benevolent. So might 
that make Hutcheson’s account liable to the Self-Deception Problem? It does not. Recall 
that he’s claimed that the only motive approved by the moral sense is benevolence. Only 
benevolent motives are moral motives. So, pleasurable and helpful to virtue as it might 
be, the desire to think well of oneself, even to think well of oneself for one’s benevolence, 
is not itself benevolence. So the desire to approve of oneself is not approved of by the 
moral sense, so it is not a part of Hutcheson’s account of moral motivation.163 So even if 
we do tend to deceive ourselves about our own virtue, we don’t do it out of what 
Hutcheson has claimed are approvable motives. Self-deception is not motivated by 
Hutcheson’s account of moral motivation. 
 
§8 Conclusion 
 But can’t I deceive myself into believing that I’m helping others, just because I 
desire to help others? That is, can’t even a simple and direct desire of the sort I’ve 
                                         
163 Bishop points this out, though he thinks it more a weakness of Hutcheson’s account 
than a strength. For further discussion of the problem of taking pleasure in one’s own 
virtue in Hutcheson, also see Stephen Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal 
‘Ought’ Chapter 8, with whose reading mine is in strong accord, James Harris, “Religion 
in Hutcheson’s Moral Philosophy,” and Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, “Love and Benevolence in 
Hutcheson’s and Hume’s Theories of the Passions.” 
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attributed to Hutcheson’s account motivate self-deception? It would seem that I could 
satisfy my desire for the good of others by deceiving myself into the belief that I’d done 
things to help them. Now, the content of that desire, that I do good for others, is of 
course not satisfied if I don’t actually do good for others. But surely I can satisfy myself, 
and so discharge my desire to do good for others, without actually doing good for others, 
if only I deceive myself into the belief that I have. If that’s right, then seemingly any 
account of moral motivation would be equally liable to the Self-Deception Problem, since 
seemingly anything that motivates me to act could motivate me to deceive myself 
instead.  
This objection will help me to clarify a bit what I’ve been arguing for. The idea is 
that we can explain why some philosophers are, and others are not, particularly 
concerned with the identification and overcoming of self-deception as a moral goal. My 
claim has been that those philosophers who are particularly concerned with identifying 
and overcoming self-deception are so concerned because the structure of their accounts of 
moral motivation creates a liability to motivating self-deception rather than moral action. 
Given that liability, those philosophers have a practical interest in being able to identify 
and overcome, or, at least in Smith’s case, circumvent, self-deception. My account only 
works if we can actually differentiate between those accounts that are, and those that 
are not, particularly liable to the Self-Deception Problem. All this is not to claim, 
though, that the Self-Deception Problem is the only reason anyone would self-deceive, or 
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that it’s the only reason anyone would be concerned about self-deception. The idea is 
that there’s particular reason for moral concern with self-deception when your particular 
account of the right way to be motivated particularly motivates self-deception, and that 
accounts with a Mediated Internal structure fit the bill. 
I noted in Chapter 1, §4 that the most natural understanding of self-deception 
involves a divided self in which one part of the self interacts deceptively with another. 
This may not be the only way to understand self-deception, and I have not presented 
any serious argument that it is, but I think it’s the most natural way. And, as I noted in 
that section, when a philosopher offers a Mediated Internal account of moral motivation, 
she suggests the kind of divided self that fits divided self accounts of self-deception, and 
she further provides the one part of the self, the acting self, with a motive to deceive the 
other part, the judging self. As I think I’ve shown in this chapter, philosophers according 
to whom there is a lack of identification between the putative moral actor and the moral 
judge create just this kind of situation. Hutchesonian moral agents, who act out of direct 
benevolence, may well be liable to self-deception, but only to the precise degree that 
anyone is liable to self-deception about anything that matters to them.164 The particular 
structure of direct benevolent motivation doesn’t give rise to any additional liability to 
self-deception, the way the desire for self-approbation does. 
                                         
164 See my discussion of Pascal in Introduction, §1. 
  
100 
In Chapter 1, §5, I mentioned that I don’t think accounts that avoid the Self-
Deception Problem are necessarily preferable to those that invite it. I also mentioned in 
§2 of that chapter that I think pluralistic accounts of moral motivation are preferable to 
monistic accounts. In the next chapter, I’ll follow through on those two suggestions, 
offering, by way of an account of conscience, one important part of a pluralistic picture 
of moral motivation. That discussion will lead into my fourth chapter, on Joseph Butler, 
who I believe to be the most illuminating philosopher on the questions of conscience, 






Conscience and what we care about or: How I learned to stop worrying and 





In Chapter 1, I discussed the idea that accounts of moral motivation can be 
monistic or pluralistic: we might hold that there is only one proper way to be motivated, 
but we might rather hold that there are many. I said there that, though some do hold to 
monistic accounts, pluralistic accounts ought to be preferred. This chapter is, in part, an 
argument for that claim. Probably the most historically significant strain of moral 
motivation monism comes through the Protestant tradition of Luther and Calvin, 
reaching particular sharpness with the pietism that many have claimed influenced Kant’s 
moral thought.165 One characteristic of both the Lutheran ethical tradition and Kant’s 
own thought is a strong focus on individual conscience. Despite this strong historical 
connection between monistic moral motivation and individual conscience, I’ll argue that 
conscience is best understood within a pluralistic account of moral motivation, according 
to which sometimes conscientious motivation is proper, and sometimes not. So if even 
conscience fits better in a pluralistic account than it does in a monistic one, there’s very 
little room left for serious accounts of moral motivational monism. 
                                         
165 Pace Manfred Kuehn, Kant: A Biography, p. 40. 
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But what is it to have a conscience? What is it to act conscientiously? My 
proposal is that to have a conscience is to have a standing desire to do the morally right 
thing, where ‘the morally right thing’ is read de dicto. That conception of conscience 
provides my answer to the second question: to act conscientiously is to act on a desire to 
do the morally right thing, where ‘the morally right thing,’ again, is read de dicto. In 
other words, to act conscientiously is to do something because you believe it’s the 
morally right thing to do. It’s important that ‘the morally right thing’ be read de dicto 
and not de re. Say that in a given instance, it’s morally right to help old ladies cross the 
street, but I don’t think that it is. Yet I have a standing desire to help old ladies cross 
the street, because I like the way they smile at me and call me ‘young man.’ That means 
that in old lady circumstances I have a standing desire to do the morally right thing (de 
re). But acting on that desire does not at all seem to me to be acting from conscience, 
since the case involves me acting against, or at least ignoring, my beliefs about the moral 
rightness of helping old ladies.166 
 That’s a very thin and minimal conception of conscience, but I think it just 
might be an adequate one. I’ll say why by discussing some supposed facts about 
conscience, and how my conception explains them. Then I’ll discuss a couple of other 
supposed facts about conscience that appear to conflict with my conception. Next I’ll say 
                                         
166 The same goes, of course, for the case in which I do happen to think that it’s morally 
right to help old ladies cross the street, but in which that belief is irrelevant to why I’m 
helping this old lady right now. 
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what I think conscience can do for us in the realm of metaethics, particularly the debate 
about motivational judgment internalism. I’ll end by discussing why we might think that, 
even if it is on the right track, my conception is inadequate, and say why I think it 
really works. My proposal is that having a conscience is part of what it is to care about 
morality. 
 But first, a few clarifications about what I’m suggesting. First, ‘conscientiousness’ 
and ‘moral virtue’ are not immediately synonymous. There are, in my view, lots of non-
conscientious ways of being virtuous, and at least one conscientious way of being vicious. 
Now, if you’re particularly impressed by Kant’s claims in the first part of the 
Groundwork, you might think that what it is to be a good person is to do the right thing 
because it’s right. In that case, moral virtue would pretty much be constituted by 
conscientiousness. On the other hand, if you’re particularly impressed by Bernard 
Williams’s ‘one thought too many’ claim, or Scanlon-style ‘buck-passing’ accounts of 
goodness, you might think that what it is to be a good person is to do the right thing 
because of the things that make it right.167 Michael Smith, as I’ll discuss in §4, takes this 
stance. In that case, moral virtue would pretty much be incompatible with conscience. I 
think that’s a strike against both the Kant view and the Michael Smith view, but I 
won’t insist on that yet. 
                                         
167 See T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, Chapter II, Section 4. 
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 The Kantian view just described implies monism about moral motivation. But 
it’s worth noticing that the Michael Smith view implies neither monism nor pluralism. If 
the promotion of hedonic value, for example, is what makes things right, then the 
Michael Smith view can be monistic; in that case, it would be the exact moral 
motivation monism I pinned on Godwin in Chapter 1. If, on the other hand, rightness 
rather derives from more than one value, it will be pluralistic. 
 Second, having a conscience clearly does not mean having an in-all-cases 
overriding desire to do what’s right. If it did, nobody I know would have one. The 
strength of the desire to do what’s right seems to vary considerably, both between 
people, and for any one person across time. So my proposal doesn’t imply any particular 
claim about the strength of the desire to do the right thing. 
 And third, having a conscience implies having first-order moral beliefs, but does 
not imply any particular first-order moral beliefs. If having a conscience requires having 
a standing desire to do the morally right thing, you can’t have a conscience without 
having some beliefs about what is morally right. So you can’t be a conscientious person 
without having some first-order moral beliefs, but whether or not you are a conscientious 
person does not depend in any way on what they are. 
 
§2: How my account works 
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 Some conceive conscience to be an infallible guide to right action.168 Surprisingly 
enough, you can find several papers, written by twentieth century philosophers, denying 
the existence of conscience on the grounds that it we could not all have within us an 
infallible guide to morally right conduct.169 Obviously, this conception of conscience is an 
alternative to mind. But it is not one that I think need detain us: we still may regard 
ourselves as having, and acting from, conscience without believing that it is infallible. 
 More interesting is C.D. Broad’s view.170 Broad says that to have a conscience 
has three requirements. To have a conscience is, first, to make moral judgments, second, 
to be disposed to feel negative self-directed emotions when you act against those 
judgments, and positive ones when you act with them, and third, to be disposed to do 
what you judge morally right and not what you judge morally wrong. Broad also argues 
for three requirements to count an action as being conscientious. An action is 
conscientious when, first, it is an action that you have carefully reflected upon in moral 
terms, second, judged it to be right, and third, that judgment is either your only motive 
for performing the action, or a necessary and sufficient condition for performing it. 
 It seems clear to me that Broad includes a couple of requirements that don’t 
belong. As to having a conscience, why the third requirement? Why shouldn’t someone 
                                         
168 Butler is often misread this way, notably by Elizabeth Anscombe, “Modern Moral 
Philosophy,” and, in this precise context, Peter Fuss, “Conscience.” The misreading is 
well corrected by Bela Szabados, “Butler on Corrupt Conscience.” 
169 A representative example is J.F.M. Hunter, “Conscience.” 
170 C.D. Broad, “Conscience and Conscientious Action.” Fuss makes an argument against 
Broad, and in favor of a very similar conception to mine. 
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who is generally disposed to do what he thinks is wrong, and then feel badly about it, 
count as having a conscience? Perhaps more importantly, I think simple dispositions are 
too weak to constitute having a conscience. I can be disposed to feel guilty when I do 
wrong without feeling guilty because I did wrong, and I can be disposed to do what I 
think is right without doing it because I think it’s right.  
And as to acting conscientiously, why the first requirement? Why should an 
action not count as conscientious if it’s one that I’ve judged to be right upon only brief 
reflection? Broad gives having a conscience three aspects: cognitive, affective, and 
conative. But I think he overemphasizes the conative factor. And he gives acting 
conscientiously three aspects: reflective, judgmental, and motivational. But I think he 
overemphasizes the reflective factor. 
 Yet the account I’m suggesting seems to narrow conscience down to just the 
motivational aspect.171 Can such a thin account be sufficient? 
 If my view of conscience is to be sufficient, or even on the right track, it should 
help to make sense of facts about conscience. Here are four commonly supposed facts 
about conscience, all of which I think are true. The last three are phenomenological 
claims: 
                                         
171 A merely motivational account puts conscience at the same level as St. Bonaventure’s 
concept of synderesis. See Douglas Langston, Conscience and Other Virtues, Chapter 2. 
Thanks to Albert Shin for making sure I mentioned this. 
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1. People sometimes act wrongly by following their conscience, and rightly by 
ignoring it. 
2. My conscience comes across to me as authoritative. 
3. My conscience refers only to my actions, not other people’s. 
4. My conscience is generally salient only when I’m doing wrong. 
The first fact is emphasized by Jonathan Bennett.172 Following Bennett’s account, 
Heinrich Himmler, leader of the S.S., regarded it as his moral obligation to carry out the 
final solution to the Jewish problem. Bennett emphasizes that Himmler found this duty 
unpleasant: causing so much suffering and death severely taxed his sympathetic nature. 
But he felt that it was incumbent upon him, and his men, to overcome understandable 
“human weakness” and fulfill their duty to destroy the Jews without “becoming heartless 
ruffians unable any longer to treasure life.”173 Himmler’s desire to do what was right 
overcame his sympathetic nature. So Himmler appears to have done a terrible wrong by 
acting conscientiously. 
And, again following Bennett’s account, Huckleberry Finn, the Mark Twain hero, 
regarded it as his moral obligation to return the runaway slave Jim to his rightful 
                                         
172 Jonathan Bennett, “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn.” This idea is described in 
more detail by Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, Chapter 8. Adam Smith makes 
a similar point, saying, “As a person may act wrong by following a wrong sense of duty, 
so nature may sometimes prevail, and lead him to act right in opposition to it,” (TMS 
III.6.12). 
173 Bennett, “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn,” p. 128. 
  
108 
owners. Huck, unlike Himmler, was not “man enough”174 (Huck’s own words) to do what 
he knew was right; Huck’s sympathetic nature overcame his desire to do what is right. 
So Huck appears to have done what was right by acting against conscience. 
These examples are easy enough to explain on my account of conscience: 
Himmler and Huck made bad moral judgments. The content of the desire to do what is 
right depends entirely on the moral judgments a person makes, so people who make 
moral judgments we think are awful will do awful things when they act from conscience. 
I’ve spent so much time on Bennett’s examples because they make clear something I 
think is important: moral judgments are distinct from sympathetic feelings. We can do 
something because of our sympathetic feelings, not because we think it’s the morally 
right thing to do, even though we do (or would) judge that it is the morally right thing 
to do. And even if we think that our sympathetic feelings are a good guide to what we 
morally ought to do, there is no obviously necessary connection between the two. 
The second fact is emphasized by Butler in his Sermons. Within the economy of 
our nature, Butler distinguishes between faculties that merely have strength and those 
that have authority. Particular desires, like the desire to eat spinach, only have strength 
(which varies between people and within people across time), while conscience has 
strength (which of course varies in the same way) as well as authority. Suppose that I 
desire to eat spinach, but let opposing desires prevail, and don’t. When I think about the 
                                         
174 Bennett, “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn,” p. 126. 
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fact that I acted against my desire to eat spinach, I don’t necessarily feel that I acted in 
a way that, in some sense, I really shouldn’t have. Now suppose that conscience tells me 
to give a dollar to a panhandler, but I let opposing desire prevail, and don’t. When I 
think about the fact that I acted against my conscience by withholding the dollar, I do 
necessarily feel that I acted in a way that, in some sense, I really shouldn’t have. So 
conscience, unlike the desire to eat spinach, comes across to me as authoritative. 
This fact might appear to speak against conceiving conscience as desire. But it, 
also, is actually easy to explain. My conscience-desire is a desire to do the morally right 
thing. But I already regard morality as being authoritative. So the authoritativeness of 
conscience is simply derived from the authority I take morality to have. That means, of 
course, that if I don’t take morality to have any real authority, I won’t take my 
conscience to have any real authority, either: that consequence seems, to me at least, 
quite natural. 
The third fact is emphasized by Gilbert Ryle.175 My conscience doesn’t speak in 
favor of or against just any action; it speaks only in favor of or against my actions. This 
is an important fact about conscience, and one that shows that having a conscience is 
not merely making moral judgments and caring about them. My moral judgments will, 
at least in general, refer equally to my own actions and to others’ actions. It would be 
wrong to shoot a man in Reno, just to watch him die, so it would be wrong for me to do 
                                         
175 Gilbert Ryle, “Conscience and Moral Convictions.” 
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so, and so it would be wrong for John to do so. But I would be acting contrary to my 
conscience if I shot a man in Reno, whereas if John did so, he would not be acting 
contrary to my conscience. At best, it would be contrary to my conscience to let John 
shoot a man in Reno. 
This fact, again, is easily explained. The desire to do the morally right thing only 
refers to my own actions. My conscience isn’t just mine, it’s really about me. Thinking 
about this point might make conscience seem a bit distasteful. If I refrain from shooting 
a man in Reno because of my conscience, it’s not clear that I’m sparing him for his sake. 
I seem to be sparing him for the sake of morality. I think something like this is right. If I 
refrain from shooting a man in Reno because of sympathy, I really am sparing him for 
his sake. Someone whose sympathies and antipathies naturally accorded completely with 
her moral judgments would have no need for a conscience, and might even be better 
without one. But I don’t know anybody like that. 
The fourth fact is emphasized by Iredell Jenkins.176 Conscience tends to have a 
lot more salience when I’m acting against it than when I’m acting in accord with it. 
Jenkins compares it to balance. When I act against conscience, it is often nagging or 
guilty, but when I act with it, it is almost never cheering or proud. A good conscience is 
easy, quiet, or clean; it’s something we don’t concern ourselves with. Generally, only a 
                                         
176 Iredell Jenkins, “The Significance of Conscience.” Mill makes a similar point in calling 
conscience, “the internal sanction of duty,” Utilitarianism, p. 74. 
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bad conscience makes itself known. This is an interesting asymmetry, and one that any 
theory of conscience should be able to explain. 
The explanation isn’t quite as simple as the prior three, but I’ve already laid 
some groundwork for it. In situations like the old lady case discussed above, I do things 
that are morally right because I like getting the approbation that tends to follow them. 
In situations like the shooting a man in Reno case, I refrain from doing things that are 
morally wrong because of my sympathetic tendencies. In such cases, I can act rightly 
without even making a moral judgment about what I should do. Even if I do make the 
judgment that those actions are morally right, my non-conscientious motives were 
already sufficient for me to perform them. So unless someone demands that I justify my 
action of helping an old lady cross the street, or of refraining from shooting a man in 
Reno, just to watch him die, there would seem to be little reason for me to concern 
myself with my moral judgments about these cases, and so little reason for my desire to 
do what is right to become salient. When, on the other hand, acting on my desire for 
approbation or my sympathetic tendencies, I do something that I judge to be morally 
wrong, I am doing something opposed to the morality I take to be authoritative. All I 
need, then, in order to awaken my desire to do what is right, is to be reminded that I 
did something I judge morally wrong. Conscience, in this sense, works exactly like any 
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other bug in your ear does: all you need to do is notice that you haven’t had Indian food 
in a while to make salient the desire to eat Indian food.177 
 
§3: Possible Conflicts 
 Here are two more supposed facts about conscience. These could spell trouble for 
my account. 
5. My conscience speaks in favor of or against actions about which I do not 
make moral judgments. 
6. My conscience speaks. It really is something like a voice within me. 
These two facts, if they are indeed facts, might incline us to prefer Freud’s conception of 
conscience as the superego, the internalized voice of the parental authority.178 Obviously 
it makes sense that, if conscience is an internalized voice, it will speak, and, if that voice 
belongs to the internalized parental authority, then it will not limit itself to issuing 
commands on merely moral matters, unless of course my parents themselves did. 
 As to the fifth: I have it that acting conscientiously is acting on the desire to do 
the morally right thing. I do not judge that eating low-fat potato chips instead of regular 
                                         
177 This is why Butler emphasizes the connection between acting wrongly and self-deceit: 
if you’re doing something you know to be morally wrong, you tend to want to avoid the 
thought that it’s wrong, either by casuistically judging that it’s right, or by not thinking 
morally about it, or similar cases, at all. 
178 Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. Thomas Hill calls this, 
rather tendentiously, the ‘extreme cultural relativist conception,’ “Four Conceptions of 
Conscience,” p. 286. 
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ones is morally relevant. So if eating Baked Lays instead of fried ones really is snacking 
with a clear conscience, then conscience has a broader extent than I have claimed. This 
might be right. Insofar as conscience is the sort of thing I’m claiming, we can have 
conscientious relations to values other than moral value. Unfortunate as it may sound to 
real potato chip lovers, it seems entirely possible to act on a desire to eat the low-fat 
potato chip where “the low-fat potato chip” is read de dicto, that is, to eat the low-fat 
potato chip because it’s the low-fat potato chip. I’ll say more about this in §5 below, but 
for now I can accommodate it simply by calling my view a view of moral conscience. 
 As to the sixth: we do frequently refer to conscience as something like a voice 
inside us. If it is, then my conception of it as little more than a desire doesn’t look right. 
But I think that understanding conscience as a voice only really arises within a broader 
view in which all of our conscious desires are voice-like. The following bit of data is by 
no means conclusive, but look at Mikhail Bakhtin describing how novelists write the 
conflict between conscience and motives opposed to it: “The struggle waged by the voice 
of conscience with other voices that sound in a man, the internal dialogism leading to 
repentance…” [my emphasis].179 When he refers to conscience as a voice, he refers to all 
other motives as voices as well. Conscience may be an angel on your right shoulder, 
whispering into your ear, but only if your other motives are devils on your left. A 
dialogic understanding of how we relate to our desires might be the right one; it might, 
                                         
179 M.M. Bakhtin, “Discourse in the Novel,” p. 350 quoted in Vivienne Brown, “The 
Dialogic Experience of Conscience: Adam Smith and the Voices of Stoicism,” p. 234. 
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at least, be more illuminating than the balance scale metaphor, according to which one 
desire outweighs another. But that question isn’t a question about conscience. 
 
§4: Conscience and the Internalism/Externalism Debate 
 If my conception of conscience, or something close to it, is still standing, I’m now 
in a position to explain what I think conscience can do for us in the realm of 
contemporary metaethics. The doctrine of motivational judgment internalism 
(henceforth, ‘internalism’) is that necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that she ought 
to x motivates A to x. Notice that internalism is a claim about a necessary relation 
between moral judgment and motivation. So its denial, externalism, claims that there 
can only be a contingent relation between moral judgment and motivation. In the 
longstanding debate between internalists and externalists, the externalists tend to focus 
on the figure of the amoralist, a person who makes moral judgments, but doesn’t give a 
fig about them. If internalism is true, then such an amoralist is a conceptual 
impossibility. The internalists, aside from trying to argue that the imagined amoralist 
must not be making sincere moral judgments, tend to focus on the worry that there’s 
something missing if we think that moral judgments are merely contingently related to 
motivation, since action-guidance seems to be somehow intrinsic to moral judgments. 
 I have come to share Sigrun Svavarsdottir’s externalist position, as well as her 
suspicion that “in many instances the internalist intuition reflects not a firm grip on 
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moral concepts, but rather a deep moral commitment.”180 That suspicion of her is clearly 
no argument. But it is an accurate explanation of my initial preference for internalism. 
The trouble for the externalist, of course, is to give an explanation of the relation 
between moral judgments and motivation: if their relation can only be contingent, what 
is its specific nature? 
 Though the possibility of the amoralist seems to be sufficient to deny internalism, 
I think that more familiar phenomena are more helpful in formulating a sensible 
externalist explanation of the relation between moral judgments and motivation. 
Different people are motivated to different degrees by their moral judgments: some 
people can’t sleep at night if they feel they’ve wronged someone that day, and some can. 
And individual people are motivated to different degrees by their moral judgments at 
different times. Now, the fact that how much I am motivated by my moral judgments 
varies would actually speak in favor of internalism if the variation correlated to how 
important or obvious I took the judgments to be. But that is manifestly not the case: I 
am sometimes very strongly motivated by what I know to be a relatively minor moral 
judgment, and I am sometimes very weakly motivated by what I know to be an 
important one. How much I am motivated by my moral judgments depends on all sorts 
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of contingent factors, including Nick Zangwill’s favorite example: whether or not I’ve 
had my morning coffee yet.181 
 These variations are hard to explain if there is supposed to be a necessary 
connection between moral judgment and motivation. But they make perfect sense if 
moral judgments motivate me by means of my desire to do the morally right thing. The 
existence of such a desire in my mental economy is contingent, even if the amoralist is a 
mere figment of the metaethicist’s imagination (which he isn’t). And, like any other 
desire, the desire to do the morally right thing waxes and wanes according to the 
idiosyncrasies of the creature who has it. So there’s no serious difficulty in giving an 
externalist’s explanation of the relation between moral judgment and motivation: it is 
constituted by conscience. 
 Michael Smith gives a weaker, and subtler, version of internalism.182 He admits 
the reality of variable or absent motivation, but classifies these as forms of practical 
irrationality or weakness of will. Smith claims that it is a conceptual truth that if a good 
and strong-willed agent judges that it is morally right to x, then she will be motivated to 
x. If this seems implausible, think of what would deny this connection between ‘the good 
and strong-willed agent’ and motivation: a good and strong-willed agent judging that it 
is right to x without thereby being in any way motivated to x. If that sounds like it must 
somehow express a confusion, Smith’s claim just might be a conceptual truth. 
                                         
181 Nick Zangwill, “The indifference argument.” 
182 Michael Smith, The Moral Problem, Chapter 3.5. 
  
117 
 Assuming that Smith is right, and it is, the question is whether the externalist or 
the internalist is better-situated to explain this truth. Smith holds that the internalist 
can and the externalist cannot adequately do so. Showing true philosophical virtue, he 
tells us exactly what the externalist would have to say to prove him wrong: that the 
reason the good and strong-willed person is motivated by his moral judgments is that he 
has a desire to do what is right, where ‘what is right’ is read de dicto. Smith thinks that 
this is an implausible claim; I have been urging that this is conscience. 
 Leaving aside the ‘strong-willed’ qualification, Smith says that by explaining the 
truth of his weak internalism by reference to a desire to do what is right, the externalist 
is committed to claiming that what it is to be a good person is to have a desire to do 
what is right. But in that case, if I judge that it is wrong to shoot a man in Reno, just to 
watch him die, and so refrain from doing so, then my desire to spare this poor man is a 
merely instrumental desire. It’s not directed towards him. My only non-instrumental 
desire in this case is directed towards morality itself, or perhaps towards my own virtue. 
But that, Smith urges, self-consciously following Williams, is ‘moral fetishism.’ A good 
person’s desire to spare the man should spring from non-instrumental concern for him.183 
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 But the externalist is committed to no such thing. Even if it is a conceptual 
truth that a good and strong-willed person is motivated by her moral judgments, that 
does not imply that all it means to be a good person is to be motivated by your moral 
judgments. A good person might also be a person who thinks that, all things considered, 
she often ought to do what she thinks is morally right, i.e., a person who takes moral 
reasons to be strong normative reasons. A good person might also be a person who 
generally makes good moral judgments. A good person might also be a person who 
exhibits significant non-instrumental concern for those around her. If that last claim is 
true, then a good person might have to be a person who is motivated by sympathy, 
apart from any moral judgments she makes.  
As above with Smith’s claimed conceptual truth, consider the denials of each of 
these claims, and whether it seems that they must somehow express a confusion. Can 
there really be a good person who seldom thinks that she ought to do what is right? Can 
there really be a good person who generally does not make good moral judgments? Can 
there really be a good person who does not care about others? All of those denials strike 
me as dubious, so all of the above claims are plausibly conceptual claims about what it 
means to be a good person. And all of them are perfectly open to an externalist. So even 
if the externalist is committed to saying that the reason the good and strong-willed 
person is motivated by her moral judgments is that she has a conscience, the externalist 
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is not at all committed to saying that what it means to be a good person is to have a 
conscience. 
The mistake here, characterized really broadly, is thinking of moral judgments as 
pervasive in moral life. So long as my non-conscientious sentiments are in line with my 
moral judgment, I have no need to advert to moral judgment at all. It’s only in 
particular circumstances that moral judgment as such comes into play: when I am faced 
with an apparent conflict, or a novel situation, or desires the satisfaction of which would 
harm others. That is, moral judgment comes into play when I don’t know how to act 
right, or am tempted to act wrongly. In these cases, a desire to do the right thing is 
awfully helpful for doing the right thing; outside of them, it need not play any major 
role.  
Morality might also sometimes require that I do things that I would not want to 
build up any particular disposition or independent desire to do. That is, Smith is 
mistaken to think that it’s always more virtuous to act from a de re or direct desire to 
do what is the right thing than from a de dicto desire. If, for instance, morality requires 
that I sacrifice my child, say to save a few dozen strangers, it seems clear that I would 
be more virtuous if I followed through on that sacrifice because I wanted to do the 
morally right thing, whatever it is, than because I wanted to sacrifice my child.184 I 
should have no independent desire to sacrifice my child. Similarly, morality (or the 
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Revolution)185 might require, in particularly difficult times, that I betray people who 
have done many good things in the past, and are thus, in general, owed loyalty. Surely it 
would be more virtuous to perform that betrayal while gritting my teeth, working in the 
face of my strong general dispositions towards loyalty than it would be to develop 
dispositions of disloyalty. 
These examples show the value of having the conscience-desire, since it’s good for 
motivating you to act morally when you wouldn’t otherwise be inclined to. At the same 
time, they also show the general value of a pluralistic account of moral motivation. 
Highly disparate motives—sometimes conscience, sometimes benevolence, sometimes 
anger, sometimes perhaps even fear or resignation—can seem best-suited to motivate 
moral action in the highly disparate situations we find ourselves facing. 
 
§5: Objections 
 Even so, a standing desire to do the right thing might seem to be an inadequate 
characterization of conscience. Recall how I explained the second supposed fact about 
conscience, emphasized by Butler, that conscience comes across as authoritative. It 
doesn’t look like the explanation offered, that I take my conscience to be authoritative 
because I take morality to be authoritative, captures just how much a strong conscience 
says. People who have a really strong conscience don’t just feel that they’ve done 
                                         
185 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Humanism and Terror for a similar example. 
  
121 
something they really shouldn’t have when they act against it; they feel that they’ve 
compromised their integrity. So having a conscience may somehow related to your sense 
of your own integrity as an agent. 
 We might then be tempted to amend the account, Frankfurt-style, by saying that 
having a conscience also requires having a standing second-order desire to do what’s 
right. Unfortunately, even if that would solve the integrity problem, I don’t think it’s 
true to the phenomena. People often act from conscience quite reluctantly, without 
Frankfurtian ‘wholeheartedness.’ In such cases, they act from conscience much as they 
might act from a desire for cake: cursing themselves for their enslavement. 
 So let’s consider the problem another way, leaving behind integrity—which might 
be a red herring. Broad emphasized that having a conscience requires that you “feel 
certain peculiar emotions, such as remorse, feeling of guilt, moral approval, etc., towards 
[yourself].”186 That seems right. I’ve noted that remorse and guilt seem more central to 
having a conscience than self-approval does, but what I’ve said about conscience doesn’t 
really seem to require that it cause you to feel remorse or guilt. 
 One thought would be that since conscience is a desire, and negative affect 
follows from the frustration of desires, acting against conscience will provoke bad 
feelings.187 And it makes sense for those bad feelings to be self-directed, since you 
yourself were the cause of the conscience-desire’s frustration by acting other than as your 
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conscience required. But this same model would apply to choosing not to eat that cake 
you desire, and though such a choice might lead to guilt and remorse, those feelings are 
surely not so characteristic of acting against your cake desires as they are of acting 
against your conscience. 
 I suspect that Broad’s emphasis on guilt feelings and Butler’s emphasis on 
authoritativeness come down in a way to the same thing. If my earlier argument was on 
the right track, my disposition to treat conscience as authoritative depends on a prior 
disposition to treat morality as so. We might say that this is part of what it is to care 
about morality as such. If you care about morality, then you take its claims to be 
authoritative, and you feel guilty or remorseful if you violate those claims. If you care 
about your country or your child, then you take its claims as authoritative, and you feel 
guilty or remorseful if you violate them. And so, I think, if you care about something, 
then you have a desire to act in accord with its claims because they are its claims. In 
this way, we can distinguish the sense of morality’s authoritativeness from the feeling of 
guilt at violating it from the desire to do what it requires, while holding that all three of 
those are part of the constellation of attitudes and responses that are what it is to care 
about morality.188  
This also helps to answer the concern discussed in §4 above that my conscience 
can speak on issues about which I don’t make moral judgments. I suggested that I can 
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indeed have conscientious relations to non-moral values, which might just mean that my 
account of conscience should be called only an account of moral conscience. If part of 
what it is to care about something is to have a desire to act in accord with its claims 
because they are its claims, and if that kind of desire is the conscience desire, then I can 
be expected to have something like a conscience about anything I care about.  
 Now, as I said earlier, caring about morality is different from, and might even be 
thought less admirable than, caring about other people. And caring about morality in 
this way, caring about it as such, is even different from caring about other people’s 
rights or dignity or welfare or happiness. Thinking about this might tempt us back 
towards something like Williams’s ‘one thought too many’ or Smith’s ‘moral fetishism’ 
claim. After all, what would be the good of caring about morality as such? Isn’t the 
point rather to care in the right way about people’s rights or dignity or welfare or 
happiness? But that temptation should be resisted, since none of us actually do always 
care about those things in the right way. As I suggested earlier: caring about morality as 
such provides a motive for us to do what’s right even when we aren’t otherwise inclined 
to. 
 Even so, my response to the question of the source of conscience’s authority 
might be insufficient. My initial suggestion was that the authoritativeness of conscience 
follows from the prior accepted authority of morality. My latter suggestion, a way of 
extending that account, was that the authoritativeness of conscience is a part of what it 
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is to care about morality. But isn’t it possible that somebody who doesn’t previously 
accept the authority of morality, who doesn’t have a prior care for morality as such, 
could suffer pangs of conscience? Consider a character like Lady Macbeth, governed 
wholly by ambition, regarding her husband’s moral scruples as nothing more than 
weakness. Surely she has no prior interest in or care for morality as such. And yet, 
something like the pangs of conscience drive her to mad guilt later in the play; the 
authoritative force of conscience seems to exist for Lady Macbeth prior to, rather than 
posterior to, any conscious recognition of the authority or value of morals. Such an 
experience of conscientious awakening can even serve as a spur towards taking an 
interest in, or recognizing the authority of, morality.189 
If conscientious awakening is possible, and our stories suggest that we think it is, 
then the question of the authoritativeness of conscience appears to be more complicated 
than I’ve suggested. A sense of authoritativeness could attach to conscience directly, 
rather than, as I’ve suggested, through some prior commitment to morality’s value. If it 
can, then it would seem to be a mistake to characterize conscience merely as a desire. 
Desires may ground reasons, but those reasons will have no more weight than do the 
desires. Certainly no desire-based reason will be naturally authoritative over any other. 
So if authoritativeness can belong directly to conscience, the correct analysis of 
conscience will not be merely in terms of desire, as I’ve offered it. The second of my four 
                                         




facts about conscience, that my conscience comes across to me as authoritative, is not 
well-explained by my thin, desire-based account. This fact, as I’ve mentioned, is central 






Butler on Conscience and Self-Deception 
 
§1: Introduction 
 In the last chapter, my thin desire-based account of conscience confronted the 
problem of explaining the authoritativeness of conscience. If all it means to have a 
conscience is to have a desire to do the right thing, then there doesn’t appear to be 
anything particularly special about the conscience-desire. The conscience-desire is just 
one desire among our many others; there doesn’t appear to be anything about it that 
would put it in a different category than the desire for cake, or death, or shiny things. If 
conscience is just one desire among many, it will govern our behavior only if it outweighs 
our other desires. On the one hand, there’s something about this that’s clearly true to 
our experience: we often do desire shiny things more powerfully than we desire to do the 
right thing, and we act accordingly. But on the other hand, there seems to be something 
wrong about acting on that preference. One way of making sense of that wrongness is by 
claiming that my conscience does not merely have power within me, it also has authority. 
Insofar as my conscience is authoritative, it’s a kind of violation, it’s somehow wrong of 
me, to act against it. This is Butler’s view of conscience, that “had it strength, as it has 
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right; had it power, as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the 
world.”190 
 In this chapter I’ll investigate Butler’s view of and arguments for the authority of 
conscience. Conscientious motivation will turn out to be central to, though not 
constitutive of, his pluralistic account of moral motivation. It will become clear that 
conscientious motivation is liable to the Self-Deception Problem in a similar way to Reid 
and Smith as described in Chapter 2. Butler, unlike Reid, takes self-deception very 
seriously, devoting two of his Fifteen Sermons to it.191 His goal is to help us recognize, 
uncover, and overcome our tendencies to self-deceive about moral matters so that we can 
be morally better people.  
 That part Butler’s goal is to help his audience be morally better people is 
important in how we interpret him. His Sermons are not just, indeed they are not 
primarily, philosophical essays on human nature, compassion, self-deceit, forgiveness and 
resentment, and so on. They are primarily sermons, hortatory speeches given from a 
pulpit, pressing the case for virtue to a congregation. A proper reading of them cannot 
ignore this fact. At the same time, they are also quite naturally read as philosophical 
essays, taking other philosophers as both inspiration and target, and providing rational 
argument for his conclusions. Furthermore, those arguments, though they certainly do 
refer comfortably to the existence of God and the truth of Christianity and quote 
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scripture extensively, are not much dependent on theological premises.192 In fact, Butler 
doesn’t just leave aside theological premises, he leaves aside necessary premises about 
“the abstract relations of things,” in favor of proceeding “from a matter of fact, namely, 
what the particular nature of man is, its several parts.”193 He intends his arguments for 
virtue to be driven by empirical considerations, and not necessary or a priori 
considerations. These are not, we might say, your everyday sermons. But they were 
delivered to what was equally not your everyday congregation. 
 The full title of Butler’s work is Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel. 
The Rolls Chapel was named for its function as a repository of records of the Court of 
Chancery. The Court of Chancery was Britain’s primary court of equity—a court of 
equity being a court in which cases are decided just on the basis of equity or fairness, 
rather than on the basis of precedent or common law. The standard of judgment in this 
court, not being prior case law, was conscience—indeed, the office of Lord Chancellor, 
the head of this court, had previously been referred to as the King’s Conscience. And the 
Rolls Chapel “was the official place of worship for those associated with the court.”194 So 
Butler’s congregation consisted of lawyers and judges who particularly specialized in 
arguing and judging according to what they called conscience. It’s no surprise, then, that 
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Butler chose to make his sermons center on tight rational argumentation, and it’s no 
surprise at all that he chose to examine, and to defend the importance of, conscience. 
But what is conscience on Butler’s account, and how do his arguments in favor of 
following it work? At the conclusion of Sermon V, ‘On Compassion,’ Butler says that 
“the proper advice to be given to plain honest men,” is that of Sirach: “In every good 
work trust thy own soul, for this is the keeping of the commandment.”195 My reading is 
that this encapsulates Butler’s primary goal in the Sermons: his arguments are aimed at 
convincing us to trust certain parts of or tendencies in ourselves, and to be suspicious of 
certain others. It is those concepts, self-trust and self-suspicion, that will govern my 
reading of the Sermons. 
In §2 I’ll discuss Butler’s eudaimonistic argument in favor of following conscience, 
in which he argues that virtue is consonant with self-love. Most commentators do not 
think this argument does very much for his case for the obligation to virtue, or the 
authoritativeness of conscience. I’ll argue that it clears an important hurdle for Butler. If 
following conscience, or acting virtuously, puts one at a disadvantage in the world, as 
many immoralists would have it, it might seem reasonable to mistrust your conscience. 
But if, as Butler has it, acting morally is no more prejudicial to your own best interests 
than any other principle of action you might choose in its stead, you’ve lost those 
grounds for mistrust. With the most plausible grounds for mistrust removed, Butler can 
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go on to argue the positive grounds for trust. 
Butler scholars generally recognize three different strands of argument given 
specifically in favor of conscience and its authoritativeness. The first is 
phenomenological: conscience just feels authoritative. I’ll discuss it in §3. The second is 
naturalistic: a correct understanding of our nature would recognize that our proper 
organization is for conscience to be authoritative over particular principles. We might 
also call this a teleological argument, since it’s thought to depend on there being 
recognizable ends for which we were made, that we are ‘fitted for virtue’ as our eyes are 
fitted for seeing. I’ll discuss it in §4. The third is agential: we do not act as proper agents, 
as laws unto ourselves, unless we follow conscience. I’ll discuss it in §5. 
I think these three arguments are much more closely linked than has been 
recognized. I’ll show how by using them, each in turn, to clarify my own, fairly 
deflationary reading. On my view, Butler does not intend to prove that conscience is the 
bearer of justified authority. He is rather showing that conscience is a natural 
constituent of our mental economies, and “plainly bears upon it marks of authority over 
all the rest.”196 This is not sufficient to prove its claims of authority, but it is sufficient, 
absent any reasons to doubt our natures, to trust it. If we recognize the natural place of 
conscience as authoritative within us, we can only reasonably oppose it by giving very 
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specific reasons to mistrust it, and Butler sees no grounds for anyone to claim any such 
reasons. 
If my reading is right, then Butler has provided us with good reasons to trust our 
conscience, which is to say, good reasons to trust our moral responses. But that self-trust 
surely cannot be absolute. Conscience is, after all, a motivating force within us, not just 
a reasoning faculty, so when Butler claims that we should follow it, he’s claiming that it 
provides moral motivation. I’ll discuss how his account of moral motivation works in §6. 
But Butler recognizes that self-partiality can lead to a self-deceptive corrupt 
conscience,197 in which the desire to satisfy conscience motivates self-deception instead. 
I’ll discuss Butler’s Self-Deception Problems, and his responses to them, in §7. I use the 
plural there because, as I’ll argue, Butler takes on subtly different forms of self-deception, 
and offers radically different responses to them, in his sermons on Balaam (Sermon VII) 
and King David (Sermon X). In the same way that his arguments for the authority of 
conscience are well understood as arguments in favor of self-trust, his arguments in favor 
of vigilance against our tendency to self-deceive are arguments in favor of self-suspicion. 
Moral agency in Butler is not just a matter of recognizing our divinely-set proper ends, 
nor is it just a matter of acting as a self-legislating agent. It is also a matter of correctly 
modulating self-trust and self-suspicion.  
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§2: The Eudaimonistic Argument 
 Butler opens the Preface to his Sermons by noting that “it is scarce possible to 
avoid judging, in some way or other, of almost every thing which offers itself to one’s 
thoughts.”198 This of course means that we judge of external objects that pass before us, 
but not just those, for those are not the only things which pass before our minds: we also 
judge of actions that we have performed or are considering performing, and we also 
judge of what Butler calls “the internal principles of [the] heart,”199 which we might refer 
to as motives or desires or interests. We judge of those actions, and those internal 
principles, by means of an inwardly-directed faculty, which can take as its objects other 
parts of the mind. Butler calls it the “principle of reflection or conscience.”200 But judging 
of actions and motives just is moral judgment, so the conscience, or principle of 
reflection, is Butler’s faculty of moral judgment.  
When we looked at Reid, and his faculty of moral judgment in Chapter 2, we saw 
that he was a rationalist, claiming that the faculty of moral judgment, when it made 
judgments, gave rational deliverances. Moral judgments were judgments about what is 
the case morally, about what things ought and ought not be done. On the other hand, 
when we looked at Hutcheson, and his faculty of moral judgment, we saw that he was a 
sentimentalist, claiming that the faculty of moral judgment, the moral sense, gave 
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sentimental deliverances. Moral judgments were, perhaps equally as in Reid, judgments 
about what is the case morally,201 but for Hutcheson the moral judgmental faculty was 
sense like, and what it gave birth to were not so much claims of rightness as feelings of 
approbation. We might naturally ask whether Butler’s conscience is rationalist or 
sentimentalist, but Butler would not approve. He’s quite dismissive of the rationalist-
sentimentalist debate, and says of the moral faculty that it may be “called conscience, 
moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason,” and may be “considered as a sentiment of 
the understanding, or as a perception of the heart; or, which seems the truth, as 
including both.”202 Butler is not just staking the claim here that his moral faculty is both 
rational and sentimental, though it is. He’s making light of the very idea that it might 
be considered one and not the other. The understanding is the perceptive faculty, not 
the sentimental faculty, but Butler refers to ‘a sentiment of the understanding.’ The 
heart is the sentimental faculty, not the perceiving faculty, but Butler refers to ‘a 
perception of the heart.’ He’s intentionally muddling the terms to point out how silly the 
attempt to distinguish them is. 
 This is not to say that Butler denies the distinction between reason and 
sentiment. Far from it. Rather, he’s denying that a proper classification of mental 
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202 Diss 2.8 
  
134 
faculties would depend on those two concepts, that we have on the one hand reasoning 
faculties, and on the other hand, sentimental ones. The most straightforward way he 
denies this is, as in the quotation above, by treating the moral faculty ‘as including both’ 
reason and sentiment. But it’s notable that throughout the Sermons, he refers to the 
moral faculty, or the conscience, as a ‘principle.’ He uses the same unenlightening term 
to designate self-love, benevolence, and even particular passions like greed, envy, love, or 
hunger. ‘Principle’ is Butler’s preferred generic term for all sorts of mental kinds. The 
term is ambiguous between rational and non-rational, sentimental and non-sentimental, 
and I think Butler means it to be. We are full of different principles, principles of action, 
principles of the heart, and, most importantly, the principle of reflection, the conscience. 
The most important distinction to make between principles is, again, not between 
rational principles and sentimental ones, but between authoritative principles and non-
authoritative ones. Every principle has strength, which is to say, every principle has 
some motivational force, but some principles also have authority. If one principle has 
authority over another, then, in cases in which the two conflict, the one should always 
be given priority over the other. That the one should always be given priority over the 
other is quite distinct from any claim about the one having greater motivational force 
than the other.  
 Butler’s main goal in the first three of his Sermons is to argue the claim that 
conscience or the principle of reflection is an authoritative principle. Interestingly, Butler 
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does less work towards the analysis and explication of what conscience is and how it 
speaks and so on than he does on the question why you should follow it, or regard it as 
authoritative. That is, he has a lot more to say about what are our reasons to be 
virtuous than he does about what it is in virtue of which some actions or motives count 
as virtuous. That it would be wrong to kill your neighbor and take his valuables is, for 
Butler’s purposes, not in dispute; that you still shouldn’t do so, even if you want to and 
can get away with it, is. As Butler puts it, “But allowing that mankind hath the rule of 
right within himself, yet it may be asked, ‘What obligations are we under to attend to 
and follow it?’”203 What Butler aims at is the obligation to virtue. So Butler’s argument 
for that obligation is against what I’ll term the moral obligation skeptic: not so much a 
skeptic who denies that there is such a thing as right and wrong, virtue and vice, but 
rather a skeptic who denies that we ought to be concerned with right and wrong, virtue 
and vice.  
 One way of arguing against such a moral obligation skeptic is Shaftesbury’s: that 
you are obligated to virtue because, despite what you might sometimes think, virtue is in 
your best interests. A eudaimonistic argument allows that interest is the basis of 
obligation, and then claims that a life of virtue is the best life, or that virtue is in 
people’s best interests. Such an argument seems well-suited to deal with the challenge of 
a moral obligation skeptic, insofar as that skeptic holds that it’s interest rather than 
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virtue or morality that reasonably motivates. We should, or at least may, worry about 
ourselves, and our own interests, and our own well-being and not other people, or their 
interests, or their well-being, the skeptic says. But, the eudaimonist argues, if we had a 
proper understanding of ourselves, we would realize that acting for the sake of other 
peoples’ interests and well-being is a part of our own. So the moral obligation skeptic is 
right to regard self-interest as the basis of obligation, but wrong about what self-interest 
involves.  
 Butler begins his Sermons by criticizing Shaftesbury for making a eudaimonistic 
argument at all. He agrees that Shaftesbury “has shewn beyond all contradiction, that 
virtue is naturally the interest or happiness, and vice the misery, of such a creature as 
man.”204 This might seem to be quite sufficient, but Butler suggests two related problems. 
The first is that, despite the general overlap between virtue and interest, there could still 
be exceptional cases in which what’s in your interest conflicts with virtue. The second is 
that someone might be skeptical about even the general coincidence of virtue and 
interest. If virtue and interest are in any instance uncoupled, or believed to be uncoupled, 
interest, and not virtue, is obligatory, and “one would be under an obligation to act 
viciously; since interest, one’s own happiness, is a manifest obligation, and there is not 
supposed to be any other obligation in the case.”205 Butler’s criticism is not of the basic 
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correctness of Shaftesbury’s eudaimonistic claim of the coincidence of virtue and interest, 
but of his acceptance of the moral obligation skeptic’s claim that self-interest is the only 
basis of obligation. This is Butler’s general view, despite his later concession that “we 
can neither justify to ourselves [virtue] or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it 
will be for our happiness, or at least not contrary to it.”206 Butler insists that we must 
have some obligation to virtue independent of our obligations on the basis of self-interest. 
Butler’s criticism of Shaftesbury’s eudaimonistic argument doesn’t appear to be 
particular to how Shaftesbury’s argument works, but rather to be a general denial of the 
utility of eudaimonistic arguments for opposing the moral obligation skeptic. We might 
naturally think that this means Butler will not make a eudaimonistic argument for 
virtue. But he does, particularly in Sermons I, III, and XI, though Butler’s primary 
argument is rather weaker than I’ve described the eudaimonistic argument as being. His 
primary argument is not that virtue is in our interests, but that there’s no particular 
conflict between the two. Butler makes this argument by way of the even more 
interesting argument that self-interest, the desire for one’s own good, and benevolence, 
the desire for the good of others, don’t conflict. Butler doesn’t think, as Hutcheson does, 
that benevolence is “the whole of virtue,”207 but he does think, quite naturally, that 
benevolence is central to it. 
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Now, a moral obligation skeptic may suggest that part of the reason we shouldn’t 
care about morality, or part of the reason that it wouldn’t be unreasonable not to care 
about it, is that the demands of virtue often involve doing for others rather than doing 
for yourself. Notice that this argument impugns virtue by way of impugning 
benevolence: whether or not there are aspects of virtue beyond benevolence, it’s the 
benevolent requirements that would seem to conflict with self-interest. It might be easier 
to get the things you want if you don’t worry about making other people happy; if it is, 
it would seem that self-interest and virtue conflict. A eudaimonistic argument claims 
that they don’t, because being virtuous is in our self-interest. Butler claims that virtue 
doesn’t conflict with getting what you want any more than self-interest does. Nobody 
thinks that there’s any particular conflict between self-interest and getting what you 
want, so nobody should think there’s any particular conflict between virtue and getting 
what you want. As he puts it, “there are as real and the same kind of indications in 
human nature, that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures; as 
that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and private good: and that 
the same objections lie against any one of these assertions, as against the other.”208 This 
is an analogical argument. He doesn’t really argue directly that self-interest and virtue 
don’t conflict; he argues that we have as good reason for doubting, and as good reason 
for believing in, the obligatoriness of the one as of the other. 
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Butler distinguishes between what he calls ‘particular principles’ and more 
general principles like self-love and benevolence. Self-love is the principle of seeking one’s 
own good; benevolence is the principle of seeking good for others.209 Particular principles 
are principles that involve desires for, or interests in, particular things, like oysters or 
dancing; 210  ‘getting what you want’ as I put it in the previous paragraph, is the 
satisfaction of particular principles. Butler’s real innovation was distinguishing particular 
principles from the principle of self-interest.211 When I seek oysters, because I want and 
enjoy them, I am not necessarily, and, indeed, not primarily, acting from self-love, or out 
of self-interest. I am not acting for the sake of my own good when I go out looking for 
oysters; I am acting for the sake of getting oysters, since “all particular appetites and 
passions are towards external things themselves, distinct from the pleasure arising from 
them.”212 Now we might of course say that I regard getting oysters as a constituent of my 
own good when I’m seeking them. Butler would not deny it. But still, we can, and 
Butler insists we must, distinguish the desire for my own good from the desire for 
particular things, the having of which I believe constitutes my good. For one thing, there 
is a clear difference of object: it’s just a different thing to seek one’s own good than to 
seek oysters (which are good). For another thing, I might seek oysters compulsively, 
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continuing to seek and eat oysters to the point of digestive illness, mercury poisoning, 
and penury. If I did that, I would ruin my life, make myself desperately unhappy, 
through compulsive and excessive oyster-love. I would show “a manifest negligence [of 
my] real happiness or interest in the present world, when that interest is inconsistent 
with a present gratification.”213 My particular principle of oyster-love can, then, clearly 
conflict with my general principle of self-love. So the satisfaction of a desire, or 
particular principle, cannot simply be regarded as acting in, or for the sake of, self-
interest or self-love, since the former can conflict with the latter. 
On the other hand, Butler does allow that self-interest is constituted by those 
particular desires. Self-love is just the general principle that speaks towards acting for 
one’s own good or happiness.214 But what counts as, or what comprises one’s own good 
or happiness? It is the objects of the particular passions. The notion of one’s own good 
or happiness is, in a sense, empty without some objects or activities one regards as 
goodness- or happiness-making: “Self-love then does not constitute this or that to be our 
interest or good; but, our interest or good being constituted by nature and supposed, 
self-love only puts us upon obtaining and securing it.”215 We generally don’t just act for 
the sake of happiness; we act for the sake of some particular that we think will make us 
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happy: “Happiness or satisfaction consists only in the enjoyment of those objects, which 
are by nature suited to our several particular appetites, passions, and affections.”216 
Indeed, “It is manifest our life would be neglected, were it not for the calls of hunger, 
and thirst, and weariness; notwithstanding that without them reason would assure us, 
that the recruits of food and sleep are the necessary means of our preservation.”217 This 
argument of Butler’s is the basis of what Sidgwick calls ‘the paradox of hedonism,’218 the 
fact that acting for the sake of our own happiness does not particularly well conduce to 
our own happiness, so, “even from self-love we should endeavour to get over all 
inordinate regard to, and consideration of ourselves.” 219  But how do our particular 
principles and passions constitute our good in general? Perhaps our good could be 
identified with the satisfaction of the whole set of our particular passions. Or, supposing, 
plausibly, that such a set could involve some contradictory passions, such that it could 
not be satisfied, perhaps our good would be identified with the satisfaction of some 
suitably cleansed set of particular passions. Butler doesn’t say; what is clear is that 
subjective preferences will do a lot, if not all of the work towards constituting our 
general good or happiness on his account. 
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More importantly here, Butler’s point is that, at once, self-love is empty without 
particular interests or desires, and that particular interests or desires can conflict with 
self-love. The former fact means that we seldom act for the sake of self-interest, since 
what we actually act for the sake of is particular interests or desires. The latter fact 
means that such action, for the sake of a particular interest or desire, can even oppose 
self-interest. So even though your good is constituted, at least in great part, by getting 
what you want, getting what you want can conflict with your self-interest. In this way, 
Butler argues that just as acting according to virtue or benevolence can conflict with 
getting what you want, as the moral obligation skeptic says, so can acting according to 
self-interest. To this extent, doing what you want can equally easily conflict with self-
love and with benevolence. Butler goes so far as to claim that “men in fact as much and 
as often contradict that part of their nature which respects self, and which leads them to 
their own private good and happiness; as they contradict that part of it which respects 
society, and tends to public good.”220 So though there can be conflict between doing what 
you want and acting according to benevolence, there is no particular conflict between 
them, beyond the way any particular principle or passion might conflict with a more 
general principle. This is the first half of Butler’s analogical eudaimonistic argument: we 
have just as much reason for doubting the obligatoriness of self-interest as we do virtue. 
If the reason to doubt the obligatoriness of virtue is that acting benevolently can conflict 
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with getting what you want, then we have just as much reason to doubt the 
obligatoriness of self-interest, because acting according to self-interest can equally easily 
conflict with getting what you want. 
Butler also points out that some of our particular principles are such that their 
satisfaction has a natural tendency to further our own good. He calls these ‘private 
passions.’ So particular passions can conflict with self-interest, but some particular 
passions yet have a natural tendency to further it. For example, “persons without any 
conviction from reason of the desirableness of life, would yet of course preserve it merely 
from the appetite of hunger.”221 But other of our particular principles are such that their 
satisfaction has a natural tendency to further the good of others. Butler’s primary 
examples are “desire of esteem from others,”222  which I discussed in Chapter 2, and 
compassion. He calls these ‘public passions.’ It’s immediately obvious that there are 
numberless private passions, but Butler also seems to think there are an awful lot of 
public passions, since he says that distinguishing and comparing them “would carry us 
too great a length.”223 So a lot of getting what we want leads to our own good, and so 
conduces with self-love, and a lot of getting what we want leads to the good of others, 
and so conduces with benevolence. So to that extent, just acting on your particular 
principles, just doing what you want, neither conflicts with self-love nor benevolence, 
                                         





since many of the things you want are good for you, and many of the things you want 
are good for others. So “it is as manifest, that we were made for society, and to promote 
the happiness of it; as that we were intended to take care of our own life, and health, 
and private good.” 224  This is the second half of Butler’s analogical eudaimonistic 
argument: we have as good reason for believing in the obligatoriness of virtue as we do 
that of self-interest. The fact that we appear to have, commonly, and by nature, private 
passions, the satisfaction of which is consonant with self-interest may give us reason to 
believe in the obligatoriness of self-interest. If it does, then we have just as much reason 
for believing in the obligatoriness of virtue, since we equally appear to have, commonly, 
and by nature, public passions, the satisfaction of which is consonant with benevolence. 
This is Butler’s most serious eudaimonistic argument. Though he has agreed with, 
and at times asserts, Shaftesbury’s claim that acting virtuously itself makes us happier, 
that contention is not Butler’s main claim. He rather claims that when we recognize first 
the distinction between the general principle of self-love, and more particular principles 
like hunger, and second the fact that some of our particular principles most directly tend 
towards our own good, while others most directly tend towards the public good, we’ll 
realize that there’s no greater conflict between those particular passions and benevolence 
than there is between them and self-love. In fact, Butler says “that there are as few 
persons, who attain the greatest satisfaction and enjoyment which they might attain in 
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the present world; as who do the greatest good to others which they might do: nay, that 
there are as few who can be said really and in earnest to aim at the one, as at the 
other.”225  
Butler gives a subsidiary argument that should convince us even further of the 
general lack of conflict between virtue, considered more broadly than as mere 
benevolence, and self-interest. That is that self-interest, properly restrained, is a part of 
virtue. He gives two separate arguments for this claim, one more interesting, the other 
more direct.  
The more interesting argument comes in the Dissertation. Butler claims there 
that “our sense or discernment of action, as morally good or evil, implies in it a sense or 
discernment of them as of good or ill desert.”226 So if we judge that someone has acted in 
accord with virtue, we judge that they deserve some good, or reward, and if we judge 
that someone has acted in opposition to virtue, we judge that they deserve some evil, or 
punishment. Further, if someone is the recipient of some evil, we feel compassion for 
them unless we believe they acted viciously, and so deserved it as punishment. When 
people come to bad ends because of “imprudent neglect and foolish rashness . . . men 
often say; of themselves with remorse, and of others with some indignation, that they 
deserve to suffer such calamities, because they brought them upon themselves.”227 This is 
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in contrast to people who come to the same bad ends by “unavoidable accidents,”228 for 
whom we feel compassion. So, “it appears, that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly 
of vice: meaning by folly . . . a thoughtless want of that regard and attention to our own 
happiness, which we had capacity for.”229 If self-love is a part of virtue, we shouldn’t 
much suspect that a life of virtue will be one opposed to our self-interest. 
The more direct argument is in his discussion of benevolence and self-love in 
Sermon XII. There Butler says that, good as benevolence is, and much as we should be 
more benevolent than we are, virtue does not require unrestricted benevolence. Rather, 
virtue requires a correct proportion between self-love and benevolence: “Love of our 
neighbor then must bear some proportion to self-love, and virtue to be sure consists in 
the due proportion.”230 That correct proportion includes the idea “that each particular 
man should make particular provision for himself.”231 Indeed, Butler even holds that that 
proper proportion should favor self-love over benevolence, claiming that, even if a man 
took an absolutely impartial view between his own happiness (self-love) and that of 
others (benevolence), nonetheless he “ought to be, much more taken up and employed 
about himself, and his own concerns, than about others, and their interests.”232 Since 
                                         
228 ibid. 
229 ibid. 
230 Sermons XII.13. I discuss this claim again near the end of §4. 
231 Sermons XII.14 
232 Sermons XII.15 
  
147 
virtue includes a broad provision for self-interest within it, we have no reason to suspect 
that a life of virtue will be a life that violates self-interest. 
But as interesting and convincing as Butler’s arguments are, they still don’t show 
that self-interest and benevolence cannot conflict. Indeed, it still seems obvious that they 
can: it remains absolutely plausible to deny that those actions which will best conduce to 
public good will also best conduce to my private good. Indeed, Butler admits this, even 
while seeming to deny it. “Self-love,” he says, “though confined to the interest of the 
present world, does in general perfectly coincide with virtue; and leads us to one and the 
same course of life. But, whatever exceptions there are to this, which are much fewer 
than they are commonly thought, all shall be set right at the final distribution of 
things.”233 Later, he says, “Conscience and self-love, if we understand our true happiness, 
always lead us the same way. Duty and interest are perfectly coincident; for the most 
part in this world.”234 In both these lines, Butler claims, loudly and straightforwardly, 
that the conclusion of his argument is that virtue and interest coincide, which is just as 
Shaftesbury would have it. But even as he claims this important connection, he admits 
that it has real exceptions. This is not an oversight, but intentional rhetoric. Recall that 
Butler’s Sermons are in fact sermons. He highlights and strategically overstates the 
strength of his conclusion in favor of the obligation to virtue because, after all, he is 
trying to exhort his congregation to virtue. At the same time, he doesn’t ignore or deny 
                                         
233 Sermons III.7 
234 Sermons III.8 
  
148 
the existence of exceptions to his claims: the perfect coincidence is ‘for the most part’ 
and ‘in general,’ and has ‘fewer’ exceptions ‘than are commonly thought.’ Butler is at 
once a preacher and a philosopher, highlighting the positives of his claims, while 
nonetheless carefully qualifying them. And despite his argument that self-love cannot 
provide the proper basis for the obligation to virtue, and his later arguments that 
conscience is superior to self-love, Butler never stops using arguments from self-love to 
support his claims about virtue. This is another way in which we can see how Butler’s 
arguments are appeals to his congregation: good enough to demonstrate the basis of 
moral obligation independent of interest, but all the better to point out how often 
interest coincides with that obligation.235 
But we might yet wonder what Butler’s actually shown, then, given that in his 
discussion of Shaftesbury, he’d claimed that the possibility of exceptions to the 
coincidence of virtue and interest was fatal to eudaimonistic arguments. What his 
analogical argument has shown is that we are as well, or as naturally, or as directly 
fitted for virtue as we are for happiness. So if there is in fact conflict between virtue and 
happiness, there is, as yet, no natural answer as to which we should prefer. For all that’s 
been said in this argument, we have as much obligation to look after ourselves as we 
have to look after others. This does not provide us with an absolute obligation to virtue; 
but just as well, it doesn’t provide us with an absolute obligation to our own good. So 
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Butler has taken two important steps towards defeating the moral obligation skeptic and 
persuading us to trust our conscience. Contra the moral obligation skeptic, who claims 
that only self-interest provides obligation, he has shown that virtue and self-interest are 
at least on the same level obligation-wise. And, by means of his qualified eudaimonistic 
argument, he has shown us that the fact that virtue is not particularly self-regarding 
does not mean we should expect that the demands of virtue will cut against our own 
interests. We do not have good self-regarding grounds for suspicion of virtue or its voice, 
conscience.236 But Butler has more to do to show that we ought to trust conscience. 
 
§3: The Phenomenological Argument 
 As I said earlier, Butler claims that our faculty of moral judgment, the conscience, 
is an authoritative principle. The conscience, like any other principle, has motivational 
force. That means that if we judge, via a claim of the conscience, that we ought to act in 
a certain way, we are necessarily motivated to act that way. Butler is, then, a 
motivational internalist. But, at least at first, he doesn’t claim that there’s anything 
especially motivating about moral judgments, since he has characterized our principles in 
general as both rational and sentimental, both judgmental and passionate. Moral 
judgments are issuances of the principle of conscience just as hunger judgments are 
issuances of the principle of hunger. 
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 But sometimes, even though I’m hungry, I keep working. In such cases, the most 
straightforward reading is that my interest in working is currently stronger than my 
hunger. Similarly, my desire for shiny things might be stronger than my conscience-
desire, in which case, I’ll seek the former at the expense of doing the right thing. Butler 
wants to argue that my conscience is naturally authoritative over my particular passions. 
So even though it might not create stronger motive in me than some particular passion 
that it opposes, I nonetheless ought to follow conscience. The claim that conscience is 
authoritative is thus equivalent to the claim that following it is obligatory.  
Butler offers three main strands of argument in favor of the claim that conscience 
is authoritative, or that following it is obligatory. I call them the Phenomenological 
Argument, the Teleological Argument, and the Agential Argument. Most commentators 
recognize all three arguments, though they differ in which they claim most important or 
convincing. Stephen Darwall is the primary defender of the Agential Argument. The 
Teleological Argument is, justly, the most popular; T.H. Irwin, David McNaughton, and 
Ralph Wedgwood are its primary current defenders, following Terence Penelhum. The 
Phenomenological Argument, on the other hand, has no serious partisans, though 
Wendell O’Brien has argued somewhat on its behalf, and Irwin, Penelhum, and 
Wedgwood all seem to regard it as preparatory for the Teleological Argument.  
It’s not such a surprise that the Phenomenological Argument fails to drum up 
much interest. It’s stated in what I regard as its most direct form in the Preface: “one of 
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these principles of action, conscience or reflection, compared with the rest as they all 
stand together in the nature of man, plainly bears upon it marks of authority over all 
the rest, and claims the absolute direction of them all.”237 The idea is that conscience 
immediately feels authoritative, even if it doesn’t feel particularly strong. The principle 
“plainly bears upon it marks of authority,” which is to say, again, that the experience of 
responding to conscience is an experience of responding to an authoritative principle: the 
marks of authority are upon it, and they are plain, not hard to uncover. Butler later 
insists that conscience “has manifest authority,”238  and is “manifestly superior.”239  His 
insistence here is on the manifest nature of the authoritativeness, its plainness and 
immediacy. He goes somewhat further, announcing that this authority is “implied in the 
idea of reflex approbation or disapprobation,”240 and that conscience’s manifest authority 
is “from its very nature . . . insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, 
conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency.”241 What it is to 
recognize a voice within you as conscience is, at least in part, to recognize a voice as 
authoritative. 
Looking at those latter quotations, it’s clear why Nicholas Sturgeon calls this an 
analytic argument. Butler seems to be saying that the very idea of conscience involves 
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supremacy and authoritativeness. I’ve been focusing the phenomenological aspects, that 
the experience of hearing the voice of conscience is an experience of authoritativeness, 
but I don’t think the arguments should be understood as distinct. And it’s no surprise 
that Sturgeon is not very impressed with this argument. He refers to it as Butler’s 
‘favorite,’ but says that it is “hardly compelling,” since “it does not follow from the 
definition that conscience has the authority it assumes or claims.”242 Darwall points out 
that “conscience is the only faculty that represents itself as superintendent,”243 but is 
similarly unimpressed: “from the fact that conscience must claim its own authority it 
does not follow that it has that authority in fact.” 244  These responses are utterly 
reasonable: there is a big difference between merely claiming authority and justly having 
it, and all the Phenomenological Argument says is that conscience claims it. 
But there’s a little more to be said for this argument if we analyze the claim of 
conscience a little further, if we “unfold that inward conviction, and lay it open in a 
more explicit manner.”245 Butler repeatedly identifies the conscience as the ‘principle of 
reflection.’246 By reflection he means reflectiveness, observation of self, of one’s other 
internal principles and one’s own actions. He also refers to its judgments as ‘reflex 
judgment,’ by which he does not mean an automatic and involuntary judgment (‘reflex’ 
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didn’t even have that meaning at that time); he means a reflexive judgment, a judgment 
of oneself. Butler clarifies in the ‘Dissertation on Virtue’: “it ought to be observed, that 
the object of this faculty is actions, comprehending under that name active or practical 
principles; those principles from which men would act, if occasions and circumstances 
gave them power; and which, when fixed and habitual in any person, we call, his 
character.”247 So actions one has or might have performed, and one’s principles of action, 
including such things as particular passions, are naturally judged of by the conscience, or 
principle of reflection. Furthermore, they are all it judges: “they are the object, and the 
only one, of the approving and disapproving faculty.”248 The conscience is essentially a 
second-order and reflective principle: it makes judgments of first-order principles just as 
first-order principles make judgments of the world.249 So the experience of hearing the 
voice of conscience is an experience of making a judgment about your other principles of 
action. 
That analysis of the content of conscience clarifies Butler’s claim of its natural 
supremacy over the particular principles. If the conscience just is that by which we judge 
our own principles, then, clearly, the conscience is naturally superintendent over them. 
The content of the particular principles is stuff like, “eat that tomato,” “kick that cat,” 
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and so on. The content of the conscience is, accordingly, stuff like, “eating that tomato is 
unobjectionable,” “kicking that cat would be wrong,” and so on. Just as first-order 
judgments are naturally taken as authoritative over situations, because they are of or 
about those situations, so second-order judgments are naturally taken as authoritative 
over first-order judgments, because they are of or about those judgments.250  
This is certainly not to say that it is part of the very experience of conscience, or 
its very concept, that it is always right. Butler compares the conscience or principle of 
reflection to the external senses, and the comparison is apt in more than one way. The 
sense of sight is “given to [us] to guide [our] steps.”251 Sight helps us guide our steps by 
helping us judge of what’s in front of us. In the same way, the conscience is for the sake 
of guiding our actions. It helps us guide our actions by helping us judge of our particular 
principles of action. The external senses are reliable, but that reliability is consistent 
with fallibility. In the same way, the conscience is reliable. Butler allows the analogy to 
be slightly strained at this point, admitting that conscience is “to a certain degree liable 
to greater mistakes than the [senses].”252 And, though Butler does not explain it, this 
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reliability of the senses means that it’s reasonable to trust them in general. In the 
absence of any good reason to doubt our senses we do trust them; it would be 
unreasonable not to. So it should be with conscience: we trust it in the absence of any 
good reason to doubt it. And, since the objects of which it judges are our other internal 
principles, to trust it is to grant it authority in general over them, since what it does is 
express approval or disapproval of them. 
Of course, this claim of analogy between the conscience and senses is not fully 
supported. Perhaps, unlike the senses, the conscience is unreliable or superfluous. If it’s 
unreliable, that would mean that reflecting on whether or not what we’re about to do is 
right is a bad way to act rightly. In that case, we might be better off just acting 
according to our strongest current desire. Perhaps we, or at least some of us, are 
constituted such that our immediate principles tend to lead us pretty well, and our 
reflection doesn’t. Butler is certainly amenable to the idea that, if we’re well-educated 
(or lucky), our particular principles will tend us towards good. Or perhaps conscience, 
even if not unreliable, is superfluous: perhaps reflective approval just doesn’t add 
anything. We get along as moral agents just as well without conscientious reflection as 
we do with it, in which case its claim to authority or superintendency is just mistaken. 
As we will see in the next two sections, Butler’s Teleological and Agential 
Arguments can be well understood as ways of answering this challenge. They are ways of 
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defending the claim that conscience is as it seems: authoritative. The Teleological 
Argument will do so by arguing that we have good reason to believe ourselves to be the 
sorts of things that have a constitutional order. It appears to us that we have an order, 
since conscience appears, by its very nature, to be authoritative over the particular 
principles. And so it is, says the Teleological Argument: conscience should be trusted 
and relied upon because we should recognize ourselves as the sorts of things that have 
principles with a natural ordering. 
The Agential Argument will claim more directly that conscience is not 
superfluous. It will do so by arguing that what it is to be an agent is to give reflective or 
conscientious approval to one’s motivating principles, for it to be the case that the 
“principles, propensions, or instincts which lead him to do good, are approved of by a 
certain faculty within, quite distinct from these propensions themselves.” 253  If such 
approval is necessary for full agency, then the possession and activity of the conscience is 
what makes us agents at all. This is what Darwall calls ‘a normative theory of the 
will.’254 
So both the Teleological and the Agential Argument actually center on the same 
fact about Butlerian conscience, the fact that’s uncovered by the Phenomenological 
Argument: that it is a reflective judging faculty that takes as its objects one’s affections 
and actions rather than external objects or states of the world. 
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§4: The Teleological Argument 
 Conscience makes a claim to authority or superintendency over the particular 
principles. This means, at least, that we ought to follow it, if it conflicts with any other 
principle. But why should we believe it? After all, my oyster-love claims that I ought to 
eat more oysters. But surely if my oyster-love conflicts with other principles in me, in 
which case part of me wants to eat more oysters, while part of me wants to do 
something else, the mere fact that my oyster-love claims that I should keep eating 
oysters doesn’t imply that I should. My oyster-love, just by virtue of what it is, claims 
that I should keep eating oysters, but that certainly doesn’t imply that I really should 
keep eating oysters! Perhaps my conscience is the same way: it makes claims, but those 
claims are just to be balanced against the other claims of my other principles, rather 
than treated as somehow absolute or authoritative over them. 
Before we go any farther, one clarification should be made. Despite the fact that 
Butler claims that the authority of conscience is ‘manifest,’ or right on the face of it, and 
that the idea of conscience includes the idea of superintendency, a claim of authority is 
not part of the content of a claim or judgment of conscience. It isn’t the case that 
conscience makes judgments of the form: “kicking that cat would be wrong, and that’s 
authoritative.” A judgment or issue of conscience is merely of the form, “kicking that cat 
would be wrong.” Its content is only approval or disapproval of some action or principle 
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of action. The point of the analysis of the immediate or manifest authority of conscience 
in the last section is that a claim of the form, “kicking that cat would be wrong” implies 
the claimant’s authority over action. If the claimant doesn’t have such authority, it 
means they simply don’t have the right to make such a claim, but it would be a mistake 
to think that the claim of its own authority is a part of the content of the claim of 
conscience. 
I think a mistake of just that kind drives Sturgeon’s argument that Butler’s 
conscience is superfluous. Butler says that virtue consists in ‘following nature,’255 and 
that the conscience makes judgments of virtue. Sturgeon takes this to mean that 
judgments of virtue are judgments of naturalness, and so that what conscience claims 
when it makes a judgment is that a given action or principle is natural or unnatural. But 
Butler does not in fact treat naturalness as part of the content of claims of conscience. A 
claim that x would be virtuous is not a claim that it would be natural to x. Rather, 
Butler argues that it is natural for us to act according to virtue, or to follow conscience. 
Sturgeon’s argument for the superfluity of conscience depends on treating as part of the 
content of a claim of conscience something that is merely a fact about claims of 
conscience.256 
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So the judgments of conscience imply conscience’s authority over action. The 
situation is just the same, though, in the case of external senses. Butler says that our 
vision is given to us to guide our steps.257 Our vision warns us, for instance, of quagmires 
ahead that we might rather not step into. Visual judgments of the form, “I see a 
quagmire ahead” imply the claimant’s authority over the contents of the world in that 
direction—bracketing skeptical possibilities of quagmire facades and so forth. One 
plausible way to argue for the justness of vision’s authority over the contents of the 
world in front of us might be to argue that we are a teleologically-oriented system, and 
that the natural end of vision is to tell us what’s in front of us. “The due and proper use 
of any natural faculty or power, is to be judged of by the end and design for which it 
was given us.”258 We can regard a principle within us as authoritative over the objects it 
judges if it exists for the sake of judging over those objects. And so one plausible way to 
argue for the justness of conscience’s authority over our action is to argue that we are a 
teleologically-oriented system, and that the natural end of the conscience is to guide and 
regulate our behavior. Conscience is “the guide of life.”259  As Butler puts it, “Your 
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obligation to obey this law, is its being the law of your nature.”260 This is what the 
Teleological Argument is all about. 
Butler’s central Teleological Argument aims at the conclusion that regarding 
conscience as an authoritative principle, following it, and acting virtuously, are natural 
to us. But first he offers a preparatory argument, arguing that there must be such a 
thing as a superior principle, since it is unnatural to “rush into [certain ruin] for the sake 
of a present gratification.”261  
He supposes a man who acts “according to that principle or inclination which for 
the present happens to be strongest.”262 That is, his particular passion, for whatever the 
object may have been, was simply much stronger than his recognition that attaining that 
object would likely ruin his life. This is certainly a plausible example; it happens every 
day. A particular passion outweighed “the principle of reasonable and cool self-love.”263 
Ignoring the particular “nature of the agent,”264 there’s nothing unnatural about this: two 
principles within a man conflicted, such that neither could be attained without sacrifice 
of the other, and the (presently) weaker one was sacrificed for the (presently) stronger 
one. But considering the nature of a person, it sounds utterly unnatural, Butler claims, 
for a person to act so unreasonably. Rather, it’s proper to our nature to consider 
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consequences, and, in the end, to prefer “to deny a present appetite, from foresight that 
the gratification of it would end in immediate ruin or extreme misery.”265 So, Butler 
claims, “if passion prevails over self-love, the consequent action is unnatural; but if self-
love prevails over passion, the action is natural: it is manifest that self-love is in human 
nature a superior principle to passion.”266  
Butler is not arguing that self-destructive passions are unnatural. Indeed, he has 
allowed that they are quite natural. What he’s argued is that gratifying such passions 
with conscious awareness of their self-destructiveness is unnatural.267 It’s unnatural to let 
particular passions rule over self-love, so self-love is naturally authoritative over 
particular passions: “if we will act conformably to the economy of man’s nature, 
reasonable self-love must govern.”268 
This is a mere preparatory argument for Butler because its goal is to show that 
“without particular consideration of conscience, we may have a clear conception of the 
superior nature of one inward principle to another.”269 There is “a difference in nature 
and in kind”270  between our internal principles, not just a difference in object and 
strength: some principles are superior to others. It is in conformity to our nature to act 
according to superior principles, if there’s a conflict between them. Particular principles 
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are not superior principles: it is natural to gratify my oyster-love in preference to my 
clam-love if my oyster-love is (presently) stronger. But my love of self, for example, 
differs in kind from my oyster-love, not merely in degree.  
At the end of the same Sermon, Butler gives a further argument, a reductio ad 
absurdum on the denial of the “natural supremacy of conscience.”271 Darwall takes it to 
be quite central, but I believe it may be best read more modestly, as a second 
preparatory Teleological Argument.272 
 Butler argues that if we deny the natural supremacy of conscience, we will be 
forced to “make no distinction”273 between an act of parricide and an act of filial duty. 
He does not, of course, mean that we won’t be able to tell the difference between the two, 
though that would be an excellently absurd consequence. He means that, if we deny the 
natural supremacy of conscience, we will be forced, “in our coolest hours [to] approve or 
disapprove them equally: than which nothing can be reduced to a greater absurdity.”274 
The idea is that, if there is no natural supremacy of conscience, there’s no important 
sense in which we ought to act in accord with it. So if at one time, your anger at your 
father and greed for his house are stronger than your contrary principles, including your 
conscientious judgment that parricide is wrong, you will, in conformity with your nature, 
kill your father. If at another time—presumably a prior time—your kindly and dutiful 
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principles lead you to care for your father in his time of illness, that action of filial duty, 
too, will be in conformity with your nature. At two different times you will act in accord 
with filial duty, and so conscience, and in the most flagrant opposition to filial duty and 
conscience. Both actions will be equally natural. 
This alone might be all the absurdity Butler really intends or needs: that it is 
absurd to claim that an act of parricide and an act of filial duty are equally natural, 
which we must do if we deny the supremacy of conscience. It would be an extremely 
similar argument to the previous preparatory argument. In the previous argument, 
Butler considered a case in which particular passions conflict with and overpower self-
love, and claimed that such a situation is not in conformity with our nature. From that 
claim, it follows that self-love is a superior principle to particular passions. In this 
argument, Butler considers a case in which particular passions conflict with and 
overpower conscience, and claims that such a situation is not in conformity with our 
nature. Parricidal passions are not necessary unnatural, but gratifying them in the face 
of conscientious disapproval is. From that claim, it follows that conscience is a superior 
principle to particular passions. He has not, at this point, given his full argument for the 
importance of the supremacy of conscience to a proper understanding of human nature, 
but he has, at least, shown that conscience, as well as self-love, are superior principles, 
with proper authority over particular principles. 
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But Butler doesn’t stop with that conclusion. He goes further than the claim that, 
if conscience had no natural supremacy, then acts of parricide and acts of filial duty 
would be equally natural. He concludes that, if conscience had no natural supremacy, 
then we would have to “approve or disapprove them equally.”275 This is a puzzling claim: 
couldn’t we conscientiously disapprove of parricide just as well whether we regarded our 
conscience as authoritative or not? We would just admit that that approval carried no 
more meaning or authority than did our gustatory approval of oysters. As I suggested 
earlier, I’m inclined to regard this part of Butler’s argument as an overreach, and limit 
his argument to the claim that conscience is a superior principle because it’s unnatural 
to favor a particular principle over it. 
That said, Butler does seem to want to go farther, and other readings of the 
argument are available. Sturgeon gives an appealing explanation, though it coheres with 
a reading of Butler that I claimed above must be mistaken. If what conscience judges of 
is the naturalness of a principle, and if there is no natural supremacy among principles, 
then conscience will have no choice but to approve any principle we act upon, since that 
action is in accord with our nature. This reading makes sense of Butler’s strong 
conclusion. But it doesn’t seem to me that conscience’s claim is that self-destructive or 
even parricidal principles are themselves unnatural. It rather claims that acting on such 




principles is wrong. Butler, not conscience, asserts that it is unnatural to do what you 
know is wrong.276 
Penelhum and, following him, Akhtar, Darwall, and McNaughton, points out 
that Butler doesn’t merely claim that, if there are no superior principles, then we cannot 
morally distinguish between actions of parricide and filial duty, and must “approve or 
disapprove them equally.”277 Rather, he says that we must do so, “considered as the 
actions of such a creature.”278  Insofar as a man doesn’t have a superior faculty of 
conscience, we should regard him as acting naturally when he acts on his strongest 
present desire. Someone like that just isn’t a proper object of moral judgment according 
to Butler, because he isn’t an agent.279 So we do in fact retain the ability to judge 
actions in themselves as wrong in the absence of conscience as a superior principle. What 
we lose is the ability to judge agents, perhaps because we lose agents. This idea will be 
expanded on in the following section on the Agential Argument. 
With those arguments in hand, Butler can proceed to his main Teleological 
Argument. It of course makes claims similar to the preparatory arguments, with the 
difference only that it considers a broad “view of the nature of man,”280 as “a system, 
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economy, or constitution.”281 A pile of watch parts does not make a watch. No matter 
how well we observe and understand the different parts of a watch, we don’t understand 
it unless we “form a notion of the relations which those several parts have to each 
other—all conducive in their respective ways to this purpose, shewing the hour of the 
day.”282 So, in addition to the knowledge and understanding of the parts of a thing, in 
order to understand it as a whole, we need to understand two further things: one, the 
proper relations between the parts, and two, the end or goal of the thing as a whole.283 
Butler’s central argument from the Preface is so clear and well-stated that I will quote it 
in its entirety: 
Thus it is with regard to the inward frame of man. Appetites, passions, affections, 
and the principle of reflection, considered merely as the several parts of our 
inward nature, do not at all give us an idea of the system or constitution of this 
nature; because the constitution is formed by somewhat not yet taken into 
consideration, namely, by the relations which these several parts have to each 
other; the chief of which is the authority of reflection or conscience. It is from 
considering the relations which the several appetites and passions in the inward 
frame have to each other, and, above all, the supremacy of reflection or 
conscience, that we get the idea of the system or constitution of human nature. 
And from the idea itself it will as fully appear, that this our nature, i.e. 
constitution, is adapted to virtue, and from the idea of a watch it appears, that 
its nature, i.e. constitution or system, is adapted to measure time.284  
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When we properly understand human beings, we understand not just our various 
passions and affections and so on, we understand that there are relations, in particular, 
hierarchical relations among those principles, and we know what those are. Namely, we 
recognize that humans are only systems, constitutions, or, in a real sense, functional 
wholes, when we treat our principle of reflection or conscience as authoritative over our 
particular principles. Without that, we are merely a bundle of passions: “to let 
[conscience] govern and guide only occasionally in common with the rest, as its turn 
happens to come, from the temper and circumstances one happens to be in; this is not to 
act conformably to the constitution of man.”285 This is Butler’s most central version of 
the Teleological Argument, and most central argument in favor of the obligation to 
virtue: that we are only systems, constitutions, or functional wholes in virtue of the 
hierarchical relations between our principles, with reflective conscience filling the 
supervisory role. 
 Butler insists that we can consider human nature in exclusion of the hierarchical 
relations between our principles, and, in particular, in exclusion of the authoritative 
nature of conscience. His reason for this insistence is that, in his view, that’s exactly 
what philosophers like Hobbes, who don’t recognize anything like the authority of 
conscience, do: they give partial, rather than complete, considerations of human nature. 
Such considerations are partial, and not merely false, because “every bias, instinct, 
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propension within, is a real part of our nature, but not the whole: add to these the 
superior faculty, whose office it is to adjust, manage, and preside over them, and take in 
this its natural superiority, and you complete the idea of human nature.”286  
 At this point we can see how the Teleological Argument builds off of the 
Phenomenological Argument: it means to show that the apparent and manifest 
authoritativeness of conscience is not merely apparent, but is true, and is essential to 
what we as humans are. The Phenomenological Argument pointed out that the function 
of conscience, if it was admitted to be functional at all, and not unreliable or superfluous, 
was to stand over and judge of the other principles within us. The Teleological 
Argument claims that that superintendence of conscience is an essential part of human 
constitution, since it is in virtue of that superintendence that humans can be said to 
have the constitution that we do. 
 Rousing as Butler’s argument is, it’s easy to find it unconvincing. I see two major 
concerns. The first concern is that we might wonder just how central and absolute the 
natural supremacy of conscience has been shown to be. Couldn’t everything we’ve 
argued so far on behalf of conscience work just as well on behalf of self-love, our other 
authoritative principle? If so, then, though we have shown conscience to be a naturally 
authoritative principle, we certainly have not shown that virtue is equally natural, even 
on the assumption that the principle of conscience is fully determined by, and makes its 
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judgments on the basis of, virtue. If self-love and moral conscience are in the end equally 
authoritative, then it wouldn’t appear any kind of unnatural to act in favor of 
reasonable, coolly-regarded self-interest when it conflicts with conscience. This is, of 
course, Sidgwick’s reading of Butler: ‘the Dualism of Practical Reason.’287 Now, most 
commentators have disagreed with Sidgwick, and, I think, rightly so. But even if Butler 
doesn’t really think that self-love and conscience are co-ordinate principles, with equal 
claims to authority, what are his grounds for that denial? 
 Irwin offers the best defense of Butler on this point, claiming that if conscience is 
the supreme authoritative principle, its judgments must include consideration of all 
lesser principles. So when Butler claims that conscience is authoritative over self-love, 
that means, in part, that judgments of conscience always consider “the legitimate claims 
of self-interest,”288 weighing them alongside moral and any other relevant considerations. 
Conscience “estimates all the relevant considerations at their proper value,” whereas self-
love only “concentrates on a proper subset of the considerations that matter.”289 This also 
means that there is no possible conflict between conscience and self-love at all, since the 
judgments of conscience already include due recognition of the claims of self-love. 
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Some of Irwin’s evidence for this reading is dubious. In particular, he quotes 
Butler’s argument that, contra Shaftesbury, if there is a conflict between the obligations 
created by conscience and by self-interest, “the obligation on the side of interest really 
does not remain. For the natural authority of the principle of reflection is an obligation 
the most near and intimate, the most certain and known: whereas the contrary 
obligation can at the utmost appear no more than probable; since no man can be certain 
in any circumstances that vice is his interest.”290 It’s difficult to see how this counts as 
an argument that judgments of conscience include within them considerations of self-love, 
but Irwin presents it as such without comment. The natural reading is that Butler is 
arguing that a claim by self-love that, for example, I ought to steal that fishmonger’s 
crate of oysters because doing so will conduce to my overall happiness can only ever be 
probable, since I do not know for certain that the theft will work out in my favor in the 
end. On the other hand, the countervailing moral claim by conscience that it would be 
wrong to steal that poor man’s livelihood, just because I want a load of free oysters is a 
certain one, “and thus the certain obligation would entirely supersede and destroy the 
uncertain one; which yet would have been of real force without the former.”291 Whether 
we find this argument convincing or not, it’s hard to see how it could mean what Irwin 
seems to think it does. 
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 Even so, I think Irwin is correct to read Butler as regarding conscience as 
including self-love within it. Consider, for example, Butler’s claim that virtue requires a 
“due proportion” between benevolence and self-love.292 That means that if the judgments 
of conscience are judgments of what virtue requires, then the judgments of conscience 
include due recognition of the claims of self-love.  
But the concern still remains. All Butler has really shown is that if conscience is 
authoritative over self-love, then the claims of conscience include due consideration of 
the claims of self-love. Equally, though, if self-love is authoritative over conscience, then 
the claims of self-love include due consideration of the claims of conscience. Butler 
certainly thinks that conscience, rather than self-love, is the naturally central 
authoritative principle, including all others within its purview, but he has not fully 
shown it. Ultimately, Irwin even agrees, saying that “Butler moves more quickly than he 
should in claiming that conscience, as he conceives it, prescribes natural action,” and 
that his own work “might compensate for [Butler’s] over-hasty argument by explaining 
how morality fulfills human nature.”293 
 The second concern is that it just isn’t certain that teleological claims of the kind 
Butler makes here are plausible. We know that watches are designed for telling time 
because we designed them to tell time. We do not, on the other hand, know that people 
were designed for virtue, because we did not design them. Further, we know that 
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watches have proper functions because we know they are designed, whereas we don’t 
know that people are designed at all. McNaughton accepts this concern, arguing that 
Butler’s Teleological Argument relies for its plausibility on acceptance of the existence of 
a good creator god.294 Certainly Butler did accept the existence of such a being, and 
makes frequent reference to it throughout the Sermons, so the expectation that his 
teleology might depend on the existence of such a being is not an unreasonable one. But 
he also insisted on the empirical basis of his arguments, particularly in the first three 
Sermons.295  
Wedgwood, on the other hand, argues that Butler’s Teleological Argument works 
without any assumptions about a creator.296 We can discover the proper constitution and 
workings of a watch just by carefully observing its parts in action, regardless of any 
assumptions we make about the intentions of its creator. Similarly, we can discover 
probable evidence for the proper constitution and arrangement of a human’s principles, 
just by carefully observing humans in action. This is not an implausible claim about 
teleology in general. Furthermore, it can at least give us a hint as to what Butler’s 
grounds could be for claiming that moral conscience is necessarily superior in authority 
to self-love: careful observation of humans in action.  
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But, as I analyzed Butler above, he seems to think that, in order to properly 
understand a thing, beyond understanding its individual parts, we need to understand 
both how its parts fit and work together as a system and the goal or aim of that system. 
Wedgwood’s picture seems to provide the former, but not the latter. 
Butler’s third main argument in favor of the authority of conscience, the Agential 
Argument, speaks to both of these basic concerns about the Teleological Argument. The 
first concern is that it has not proven that virtue is our aim because it has not given us 
good reason to think conscience is a higher principle than self-love; it speaks to that 
concern by only being an argument for the supremacy of conscience and not of self-love. 
The second concern is that it is ungrounded without reference to a good creator god; it 
speaks to that concern by claiming grounding in the fact that “we are agents.”297 
 
§5: The Agential Argument 
 In the previous section, I mentioned that some commentators take Butler’s 
reductio argument in favor of the superiority of conscience as a principle as more central 
than I’ve claimed it to be. Sturgeon, as discussed in the previous section, is one of those, 
regarding it as one of the main passages in defense of his reading of conscience as making 
judgments of naturalness. Darwall also takes this argument as a central piece of evidence 
in favor of his much different reading. He points out that what Butler aims that 
                                         
297 Sermons P.14 
  
174 
argument against is the assumption that “there was no such thing at all as this natural 
supremacy of conscience; that there was no distinction to be made between one inward 
principle and another.”298 As Darwall puts it, “Butler here appears to treat the natural 
supremacy of conscience and the existence of any relations of natural superiority as 
equivalent. . . the reductio depends on treating the natural superiority of any principles 
to any other as entailing the supreme authority of conscience.”299 I think Darwall may be 
stretching a bit here in reading Butler as claiming that the existence of any natural 
superiority of principles entails the supreme authority of conscience. The more natural 
reading of the passage and argument as a whole, I think, is merely that the former is 
necessary for the latter. But putting that disagreement aside, this reading of Butler’s 
argument already gives us significant insight into what the Agential Argument means to 
claim: that it is only by means of having an authoritative reflective conscience that 
anything could be an agent, or act for reasons, at all. 
 That argument, if successful, would clearly dispel the two worries I claimed were 
left standing by the Teleological Argument. The worry that Butler relies on the 
existence of a good creator god to ground his teleological claims is dispelled if we can 
explain them on the mere basis of an analysis of agency. And the worry that we might 
not be fitted for virtue, because self-interest might be a co-ordinate principle to 
conscience, is dispelled if the supremacy of conscience, and not the existence of some 
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supreme principle/s or other, is shown to be essential to our constitution. Notice also 
that what the Agential Argument does is not, or at least need not be considered, 
independent of the Teleological Argument. I say this despite the fact that Darwall, in 
arguing for the centrality of the Agential Argument, denies the value of the Teleological 
Argument, and that McNaughton and Wedgwood, in arguing for the centrality of the 
Teleological Argument, deny the existence of the Agential Argument. As I’m conceiving 
it, the Agential Argument provides a more solid basis for the analysis of human nature 
at the heart of the Teleological Argument which, recall, provided a more solid basis for 
the analysis of the experience of conscience at the heart of the Phenomenological 
Argument. Mine is an ecumenical reading of Butler. 
 In the discussion of the Teleological Argument in the last section, I discussed the 
possibility that a person without an authoritative conscience could not be judged morally 
at all, because such a person simply would not be an agent. At one point, Butler claims 
this explicitly, saying “It is by this faculty [conscience], natural to man, that he is a 
moral agent.”300 This is the conclusion the Agential Argument is working towards. 
 Each of Butler’s Sermons begins with and purportedly discusses a line of 
scripture, as sermons generally do. Sermons II and III, in which he gives his most direct 
argument for the authoritativeness of conscience, both begin with Paul’s Letter to the 
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Romans, in which Paul says that “the Gentiles . . . are a law unto themselves.”301 In case 
we forget the specificity of his subject, Butler says that “the real question of this 
discourse is . . . that every man is naturally a law to himself, that every one may find 
within himself the rule of right, and obligations to follow it.”302 To be a law to oneself is 
to be a moral agent, and it is in virtue of the possession of an authoritative reflective 
conscience that we are laws to ourselves. A law over something gives authoritative 
approval or disapproval of it: recall the discussions of Locke and Hobbes in Chapter 2. 
And what the conscience does is “surveys, approves or disapproves the several affections 
of our mind and actions of our lives.”303 So we are not merely ‘brutes,’ or mere objects of 
passions, and are rather laws unto ourselves, and so agents, because we reflect upon and 
pronounce judgment over ourselves. 
 This argument of Butler’s may dispel the worry that the Teleological Argument 
was illegitimately grounded in the existence of a good creator god, since it grounds a 
claim about what we are, agents, on a claim about what kind of activity we engage in, 
reflective judgment. It makes no apparent reference to anything outside that activity. 
But the worry that we might yet not be naturally fitted for virtue remains, unless it can 
be shown that Butler denies that self-love is an authoritative, reflective principle. Self-
love is obviously, as Butler has argued, an authoritative principle, since it’s his first 
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example of one. Conscience, as shown in the Phenomenological Argument, is a second-
order principle, a principle that takes other principles as its objects, rather than 
situations or physical objects or states of the world. That is what it means for conscience 
to be a reflective principle. Is self-love a reflective principle in the same way? If it is, 
that means we can be laws to ourselves, and so agents, just in virtue of having a 
principle of self-love, since our principle of self-love surveys and authoritatively judges 
our other principles.  
 One initial bit of evidence that self-love isn’t a reflective principle is that Butler 
never calls it one. Butler commonly uses ‘conscience’ and ‘principle of reflection’ 
synonymously, but never directly refers to self-love as a principle of reflection. We might, 
on the other hand, suspect some second-order nature for self-love when we consider two 
facts about it. The first fact is that, as discussed earlier, it is empty without particular 
principles, since it is just a desire for one’s own good or happiness, while what 
constitutes that good or happiness is the satisfaction of the particular passions. The 
second fact is simply that self-love is claimed to be authoritative. The Phenomenological 
Argument claims that the authoritativeness of conscience immediately arises from its 
content, that it’s authoritative over particular passions just because it is a principle that 
approves and disapproves particular passions. Why would self-love be authoritative, then, 
unless it’s a reflective principle? Darwall argues that self-love’s authority derives from 
the general approval it receives from conscience. Conscience is what judges that, in any 
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conflict between a particular passion and self-love, the particular passion should give 
way. Acting according to self-love “is virtue, and the contrary behavior faulty and 
blamable; since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first, and condemn 
the other conduct.”304 This is a somewhat curious view, given that, as discussed in the 
last section, Butler argues that self-love is naturally authoritative over particular 
principles “without particular consideration of conscience,”305 so as to show what it would 
mean for a principle to be authoritative, and thus pave the way for his argument that 
conscience is itself authoritative. But that argument, as Darwall says, does not commit 
Butler to denying that, in the end, self-love’s authority is derived from the positive 
judgment of conscience. In any case, it certainly doesn’t appear to be Butler’s view that 
self-love is a reflective principle, on the same level of authority as conscience. 
But we can sharpen the challenge by looking at it from the other side: conscience 
is not just a principle of reflective judgment, or judgment of other principles, it’s also a 
principle of moral judgment. Is there any reason for Butler to assert that reflective 
judgment should be identified with moral judgment, rather than the prudential 
judgment of self-love? My first version of the problem was: can a not-necessarily moral 
principle like self-love be a reflective principle like conscience? My second version of it is: 
can a reflective principle be non-moral? Could self-interest, rather than moral reasons, 
govern the reflective judgments of conscience? If so, then showing that we are only 
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proper agents in virtue of having a reflective judging capacity like conscience does not 
amount to showing that we are moral agents. In that case, Butler’s Agential Argument 
would leave us in a similar difficulty to his Teleological Argument, convinced of our 
obligations to conscience, but uncertain that those obligations must be to virtue. Darwall 
doesn’t think Butler has given us sufficient resources to answer this challenge. He says 
that, for Butler, “the coincidence between moral laws and laws of practical judgment [i.e., 
conscience,] will seem to be accomplished by a Deus ex machina.”306 Butler gives no 
particular reason, within the Agential Argument, to expect that that in virtue of which 
we are a law to ourselves is also a moral law. The Agential Argument, interesting as it is, 
has only limited success at securing an absolute obligation to virtue. 
This failure to prove that the obligation to virtue is absolute, that it necessarily 
trumps the real obligations of self-love, brings us back to the Eudaimonistic Argument 
and my reading of it as helping to secure self-trust in the case of conscience. Even if 
Butler hasn’t demonstrated our absolute obligation, he has at least shown us, via the 
Phenomenological Argument, that our reflective conscience, if it means anything at all, 
should direct and order our other principles. He has shown us, via the Teleological 
Argument, that admitting this role to conscience permits us to make sense of ourselves 
as self-organizing, functional wholes, as constitutions rather than mere heaps of desires. 
And he has shown us, via the Agential Argument, that admitting this role to conscience 
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appears necessary to being agents, laws unto ourselves, and not merely followers of 
nature. Those, combined with his Eudaimonistic Argument that there should be no 
general expectation that virtue and self-love will conflict, that conscience even approves 
self-love, that some measure of self-love is a part of virtue, makes a fairly convincing case 
that we ought to trust our conscience, rather than be suspicious of it.  
 
§6: Moral Motivation and Self-Deception 
 So with that long account of Butler’s arguments for trusting conscience in hand, 
what can we say about his view of moral motivation? Given how much space he spends 
arguing that we have an obligation to act according to conscience, combined with the 
fact that he does regard conscience as intrinsically motivational, it might appear that 
Butler holds that conscientious motivation comprises moral motivation. The proper way 
to be motivated just is to be motivated by conscience. This would make Butler’s account 
a sort of hybrid of Hutcheson’s and Reid’s: Reidian insofar as it begins with a reflective 
faculty of moral judgment, Hutchesonian insofar as that faculty motivates immediately, 
rather than through a self-directed emotion like pride or shame. 
 But recall that the conscience is a reflective faculty, giving approving or 
disapproving judgments of other principles and proposed or completed actions. It doesn’t 
propose actions; it merely evaluates them.307 So, though conscience is “the guide of 
                                         
307 Penelhum claims the same of conscience, Butler, p. 70. 
  
181 
life,”308 and it’s always appropriate to be motivated by your conscience, it cannot be the 
whole of moral motivation. Actions, or, more to the point here, particular passions, 
whether they be oyster-love or benevolence,309 are deemed appropriate to a particular 
situation by means of conscientious approval. So Butler is a pluralist about moral 
motivation, holding that any motive approved by conscience is, thereby, a moral 
motivation. So on the question of moral motivation, Butler is much more similar to 
Smith than he is to Reid or Hutcheson: there are lots of motives in us, some of which 
will be properly certified as moral motives by the approval of our process of moral 
judgment. 
Benevolence, or the desire for the happiness of others, will very often be an 
approved motive. Indeed, it will be appropriate to be benevolently motivated far more 
often than we actually do tend to be. But, as discussed above, conscience won’t approve 
benevolence over self-love unrestrictedly. It can even be vicious: “Benevolence towards 
particular persons may be to a degree of weakness, and so be blamable,” (Sermons P.39). 
So not even benevolence, that most seemingly virtuous of motives, is approvable as such. 
It, like any principle beneath conscience in our constitutional hierarchy, is approvable 
only, if I can permit an Aristotelian flourish, “at the right times, about the right things, 
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toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way.”310 For Butler, “any 
disposition, prevailing beyond a certain degree, becomes somewhat wrong.”311 In short, 
all conscientious approval of motives or actions is situational. 
So Butler’s basic pluralistic account of moral motivation would appear to hold 
that conscience itself is the only principle that, always and as such, is a moral 
motivation. But it is not the whole of moral motivation, because the motives that it 
approves as situationally appropriate are, in their proper field, moral motives as well. 
Butler affirms the moral value of those particular passions, saying, “it would be found of 
as bad consequence to eradicate all natural affections, as to be entirely governed by them. 
This would almost sink us to the condition of brutes; and that would leave us without a 
sufficient principle of action. Reason alone, whatever any one may wish, is not in reality 
a sufficient motive of virtue in such a creature as man; but this reason joined with those 
affections.”312  
Indeed, that mix of motivation, including both motivation by particular 
principles and by conscience, is even at work in Butler’s description of love of and caring 
for one’s children: “Thus a parent has the affection of love to his children: this leads him 
to take care of, to educate, to make due provision for them; the natural affection leads to 
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this: but the reflection that it is his proper business, what belongs to him, that it is right 
and commendable so to do; this added to the affection becomes a much more settled 
principle.”313 It clearly is not the case here that Butler thinks we ought to care for our 
children just because of conscience, or some sort of regard for duty. Conscience approves 
the affection of love for children, so that affection is a moral motivation. But conscience, 
or some sort of regard for duty, comes in as an additional, and itself approvable motive, 
and furthers and ‘settles’ this principle of care for one’s children.  
In this way, there’s a natural fortifying regress of positive affections: we have a 
given passion, so it motivates us. We approve it, and so add further motivation to it, 
since conscience itself motivates. Plausibly, we will further approve our approval of it, 
thus motivating it even more, and so on. We might call this a virtuous regress. As 
Butler puts it, “Human nature is so constituted, that every good affection implies the 
love of itself; i.e. becomes the object of a new affection in the same person,”314 and “To 
be a just, a good, a righteous man, plainly carries with it a peculiar affection to or love 
of justice, goodness, righteousness, when those principles are the objects of 
contemplation.”315  
 Butler rightly thinks that this virtuous regress is a good thing, and contributes to 
our motives to virtue, since it means that the more we recognize virtue, the more 
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motivated we are to pursue it.316  But even with all that, we do not always have 
sufficient motive to act according to virtue. Most commonly, though, as Butler has 
argued, unnaturally, we can be so strongly motivated by particular passions that they 
overwhelm everything else. What would have been on its own sufficient motive to act 
according to virtue can nonetheless fail because of stronger motives, because “the 
influence which [any principle] has upon our actions, and how far it goes towards 
forming our character, is not determined by the degree itself of this principle in our 
mind; but by the proportion it has to . . . other principles.”317 So we might fail to act 
according to virtue not because our motive towards it is too weak, but because our 
passions are too strong, are “some kind of brute force within.”318 But it can also of course 
be the case that our motive towards virtue is too weak. Plausibly it could simply be that 
someone has such weak motives to benevolence, or to justice, that he just wouldn’t ever 
act virtuously. But that isn’t the case that Butler intends to address with his Sermons. 
Rather, Butler addresses the person whose motive to virtue is too weak because of some 
doubt about virtue. Butler’s arguments towards recognizing the authoritative nature of 
conscience, his arguments in favor of trusting one’s conscientious responses, are meant to 
provide the doubter with reasons and with motivation to act better. Recall the point 
                                         
316 For discussion of, and similar claims about, such a virtuous regress, see Thomas 
Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and Value. Hurka calls it a “recursive characterization of good,” p. 
11. 
317 Sermons XII.12 
318 Sermons VII.10 
  
185 
made earlier that these are not merely philosophical essays, but hortatory sermons 
urging a congregation to virtue. In broad strokes, Butler is trying to induce, through 
rhetoric and reason, a desire to be virtuous. 
 As I claimed earlier, Butler’s Teleological Argument is the most central part of 
his case for virtue. He tells his congregation that they are only systems, constitutions, or 
functional wholes, that they only fulfill their natural ends, in virtue of the hierarchical 
relation between their internal principles, with reflective conscience filling the 
supervisory role. The desire Butler adverts to with this argument is, in brief, the desire 
to be whole. Butler talks about our partial, fallen, and ignorant nature at many points. 
But, in this argument at least, he talks about how we can be whole, and fulfill our 
natural ends: by following conscience. That desire to be whole, or natural, or what you 
really are, need not have been a strong or self-consciously held prior motive of Butler’s 
audience. It’s perfectly sensible to think that Butler, through his sermonizing, means to 
induce it. But the point is, that desire is a moral motivation in Butler’s view: we ought 
to be driven to act according to nature. 
 So, though he does not state so directly, a centrally important moral motivation 
for Butler is the desire to be virtuous, or, in more teleological terms, a desire to be whole 
by acting according to our nature. It’s a bit difficult initially to characterize this desire 
as either Immediate or Mediated, unless we keep in mind that what you do to act 
according to nature is to follow conscience, and that what conscience does is approve or 
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disapprove actions and principles. That means Butler’s conception of acting according to 
our nature, and his conception of being virtuous, centers on self-approving reflective 
judgments: a Mediated Internal moral motivation. So this piece of his account of moral 
motivation is liable to the Self-Deception Problem, insofar as it’s possible to satisfy one’s 
conscience without actually doing what conscience dictates. 
 Butler clearly recognized the liability of this element of moral motivation to the 
Self-Deception Problem. Of course, he wrote two of his Fifteen Sermons about self-
deception.319 More pointedly, he recognizes that Mediated accounts of moral motivation 
have the Self-Deception Problem in a way that Immediate ones don’t, in just the way 
I’ve argued. He argues that one of the reasons it’s important to cultivate benevolence, an 
Immediate moral motivation, is that if we are benevolent we “get our heart and temper 
formed to a love and liking of what is good,”320 and so become less liable to equivocations, 
“evasions and excuses.”321 The idea is that if we merely act towards our fellows out of a 
sense and awareness of duty, or a desire to be virtuous, we may end up not “performing 
the several office of kindness we owe to our fellow-creatures,”322 but deceiving ourselves 
instead. But insofar as we act from direct benevolence, as, of course, Hutcheson would 
have us do, we are not liable to that particular failing. This is Butler recognizing my 
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central contention: that Mediated Internal accounts of moral motivation are subject to 
the Self-Deception Problem, and that Immediate accounts are not. 
 Butler is aware of the difficulty of making sense of self-deception, calling it 
“surprising and unaccountable,” 323  “amazing,” 324  “incredible,” 325  “astonishing,” 326  and “a 
paradox . . . indeed a contradiction in terms.”327 He does not attempt to explain it, or 
even to unfold its unaccountable or paradoxical nature. And yet Butler claims that it’s 
real, and extremely common, that “those who have never had any suspicion of, who have 
never made allowances for, this weakness in themselves, who have never . . . caught 
themselves in it, may almost take for grated that they have been very much misled by 
it.”328  Furthermore, he thinks that he can explain what motivates it, and can offer 
several strategies for working through it.  
 
§7: Self-Deception 
 Butler’s two sermons directly on self-deception focus on two different moments of 
self-deception, with two subtly different motives. Yet, as we will see, despite the subtlety 
of their difference, Butler thinks they require almost directly opposite responses. The 
self-deception of Sermon X comes about because we do not pay enough attention to 
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conscience, so working through instances of it requires thinking more carefully about 
what we’re doing or reflecting more. On the other hand, the self-deception of Sermon VII 
comes about for people who do pay enough attention to conscience; working through 
instances of it requires thinking less carefully about what we’re doing or reflecting less. 
Self-deception in Sermon X involves only a weak version the Self-Deception Problem, 
whereas self-deception in Sermon VII involves a very pointed version of it. Self-deception 
in Sermon VII is motivated by the desire for virtue or naturalness or wholeness that I 
claimed in the last section is so important for Butler. 
 There’s a sense in which all moral self-deception implies acceptance of the 
importance of virtue, and the obligations of conscience. We might adapt the La 
Rochefoucauld maxim and say: self-deception is the homage vice pays to virtue.329 If we 
regarded virtue as unimportant, conscience as non-obligating, we wouldn’t feel the need 
to deceive ourselves about what unsavory acts we’re performing. We could simply “be 
wicked . . . from the common vicious passions without such refinements,” 330  as 
equivocations, excuses, subterfuges, and cavils. Something like this idea is behind my 
claim at the end of the Chapter 1 that an account of moral motivation that has the Self-
Deception Problem may in fact be preferable to one that doesn’t. Self-deception by 
which we try to absolve ourselves to ourselves implies that we judge ourselves in moral 
terms, that we have Mediated Internal motivations about morality.  
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 It is only in this thin sense that the self-deception that Butler discusses in 
Sermon X counts as an example of the Self-Deception Problem. There he discusses two 
basic ways that self-deception is motivated: by “that overfondness for ourselves, which 
we are all so liable to; and also being under the power of any particular passion or 
appetite.”331 It’s not surprising that the excessive strength of a particular passion might 
lead us into any kind of wrongness; Butler talks about that possibility at every turn. 
More interesting is the former case, when unreasonable self-partiality “reaches to the 
understanding, and influences the very judgment.”332 What it leads us to do through that 
corrupted understanding and judgment is primarily to look away from, or ignore, our 
own actions, since “Though a man hath the best eyes in the world, he cannot see any 
way but that which he turns them.”333 We look away either from our own judgments of 
our actions, or actions like the ones we’ve committed, when we fail to judge ourselves for 
them. But we can go further when, for instance, our crimes are “manifestly of the 
grossest kind,”334 and fail even to recognize what actions we’ve performed. 
 The example of this self-deception that Butler starts from is the story of King 
David and Bathsheba, in which David, taking a liking to his neighbor and lieutenant 
Uriah’s wife, sends him to the front lines of battle to be killed so that he can take her for 
himself. This is, as Butler calls it, a wrong that is manifestly of the grossest kind. When 
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the prophet Nathan comes to David and tells him his own story, in the form of a parable 
about a rich man who takes a poor man’s lamb, David is filled with righteous 
indignation at the rich man. “And Nathan said to David, Thou art the man.”335 David 
recognizes his crime, and recognizes his own sin. Butler refuses to speculate on what 
means David might have used to contrive his self-deception. But what’s clear is that 
David’s self-deception has been to not see himself, or what he’s done, for what they are. 
 David’s story is, Butler thinks, an extreme example that shows us how “many 
men seem perfect strangers to their own characters.”336 The trouble is that “There is 
plainly, in the generality of mankind, an absence of doubt or distrust, in a very great 
measure, as to their moral character and behavior; and likewise a disposition to take for 
granted, that all is right and well with them in these respects. The former is owing to 
their not reflecting, not exercising their judgment upon themselves; the latter, to self-
love.”337 So most people do not have “any suspicion . . . with respect to that self we are 
all so fond of.”338 There is a “general want of distrust and diffidence concerning our own 
character.”339 Butler claims that we go too easy on ourselves, that we fail to reflect, 
especially when we have “a suspicion, that all is not right.”340  
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Just as Butler argued that we should trust our conscience, here he’s arguing that 
we should be suspicious of ourselves. The best way, of course, to combat our tendency to 
suppress reflection is to insist on reflection: “There is one easy and almost sure way to 
avoid being misled by this self-partiality, and to get acquainted with our real character: 
to have regard to the suspicious part of it, and keep a steady eye over ourselves in that 
respect.” 341  Butler has been arguing that David-style self-deception is a matter of 
suppressing reflection. Since conscience just is the principle of reflection, David-style self-
deception just is suppression of conscience. This is why I said above that this particular 
moment of self-deception doesn’t provide a pointed example of a Butlerian Self-
Deception Problem, since it’s primarily a matter of suppressing or avoiding conscience 
rather than falsely satisfying it. 
A more pointed example of the Self-Deception Problem is presented in Sermon 
VII with Balaam-style self-deception. Balaam, “an extraordinary person, whose blessing 
or curse was thought to be always effectual,”342 is offered many gifts by Balak, king of 
the Moabites, to curse the children of Israel. Balaam convenes with God, and is told that 
the Israelites are righteous, and beloved of God, and so not to be cursed. Balaam, who 
wishes “to die the death of the righteous,”343 will not act against God’s decree. But Balak 
offers Balaam more gifts, and despite the unambiguous nature of God’s first response, 
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Balaam goes back and asks God again because he wants what Balak is offering him, “the 
wages of unrighteousness.”344 Three times Balaam goes back, and three times he gets the 
same answer. Balaam “wanted to do what he knew to be very wicked, and contrary to 
the express command of God; he had inward checks and restraints, which he could not 
entirely get over; he therefore casts about for ways to reconcile this wickedness with his 
duty.”345 Eventually he hits on a plan, which turns out to be successful, to lure the 
Israelites out of righteousness and thereby bring down God’s curse upon them. 
In the story of Balaam, God takes the place of the conscience. It delivers its 
negative verdict on something we have strong desire to do. We find a way to do that 
thing anyway, consistent with the conscientious verdict against it. Balaam “could not 
forego the rewards of unrighteousness: he therefore . . . sins against the whole meaning, 
end, and design of the prohibition, which no consideration in the world could prevail 
with him to go against the letter of.”346 This looks more like bad casuistry than merely 
being lost in vice.347 This “was not unthinking carelessness, by which he run on headlong 
in vice and folly, without ever making a stand to ask himself what he was doing: no; he 
acted upon the cool motives of interest and advantage.”348  
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Balaam desires to be virtuous. He wants to die the death of the righteous. He 
knows that to be virtuous requires acting according to conscience. But he also wants to 
win the wages of unrighteousness. So he ‘casts about’ for a way to win those wages while 
satisfying himself that he is acting according to conscience. Whereas David-style self-
deception is a case of suppressing conscience, Balaam-style self-deception is a case of 
subverting conscience, finding a way to make it consistent with vice rather than directly 
opposed to it, as it naturally is. Thus, Balaam-style self-deception is Butler’s more 
pointed case of the Self-Deception Problem, because it’s a way of self-deceit that doesn’t 
rely on forgetting, ignoring, or suppressing conscience and thoughts of virtue, but that 
rather works through constant awareness of conscience and recognition of its 
authoritative role. So Butler’s centrally important moral motivation, the desire to be 
virtuous, or to be whole by acting according to our nature, which amounts to following 
conscience, is not just a motive that’s still active in Balaam-style self-deception: it’s the 
motive that drives it. If Balaam could suppress conscience, he could engage in David-
style self-deception, but because he can’t, because he’s driven by Butler’s most central 
kind of moral motivation, he instead engages in the sort of self-deception that he does.  
In Chapter 2, I showed how awareness of the Self-Deception Problem shapes Reid 
and Smith’s discussions of self-deception in general, as well as how awareness of a more 
simple Deception Problem shapes Hobbes’s discussion of the fool. But none of those 
philosophers has described with as much awareness or immediacy the problem that the 
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Self-Deception Problem creates as Butler does in Sermon VII. Insofar as we respect our 
conscience, care about morality, insist on righteousness, and seek virtue, we are liable to 
Balaam-style self-deception, since it is that very respect, care, insistence, and seeking of 
the good that motivates it. It is, then, for Butler as well as for all of us, of paramount 
moral importance to find a way to recognize and overcome Balaam-style self-deception. 
Accordingly, Butler offers, and highlights, a strategy for the overcoming of 
Balaam-style self-deception. It is to cut off moral consideration, since “That which is 
called considering what is our duty in a particular case, is very often nothing but 
endeavouring to explain it away.”349 We can cut off moral consideration because we trust 
our conscience: “In all common ordinary cases we see intuitively at first view what is our 
duty, what is the honest part. This is the ground of the observation, that the first 
thought is often the best. In these cases doubt and deliberation is itself dishonesty.”350 
What we need to be suspicious of is not our pre-conscientious self, but our post-
conscientious self, that isn’t failing to look, but that is rather “looking about to see 
whether we may not possibly forsake [duty] with impunity.”351  
So we can trust our conscience, but it can be difficult to know if we’re really 
listening to it. Acting virtuously then, acting according to our nature, requires proper 
modulation of self-trust and self-suspicion. We must learn to trust ourselves to follow our 
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conscience, to be suspicious of ourselves insofar as we know the many ways we draw 
ourselves astray from it. As discussed above, virtue has the excellent and pleasurable 
characteristic of creating a virtuous regress, where the more we reflect upon an action or 
principle, the more satisfaction it brings us. Vice, on the other hand, is less psychically 
rewarding, so we engage in self-deception so that we can “go on thus with a sort of 
tranquility and quiet of mind.”352 How to see through these self-deceptions? If we’re 
reflecting too little, not considering enough, we might be engaging in David-style self-
deception and actually suppressing conscience. If we’re reflecting too much, considering 
too much, we might be engaging in Balaam-style self-deception and subverting it. If 
there were a rule as to how much reflection was the right amount, it might be easy to 
know. But there is no such rule.  
Similarly, if there were known rules of right action that we could thoughtlessly 
follow, the proposal of which is Smith’s response to the Self-Deception Problem, we 
might be able to get around both David-style and Balaam-style self-deception—though 
Butler probably wouldn’t even think it’s that easy. In any case, there is, according to 
Butler, no such rule of right, since “a great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the 
intercourse amongst mankind, cannot be reduced to fixed determinate rules.”353 Because 
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there are not rigid rules, “there is great latitude left, for every one to determine for, and 
consequently to deceive himself.”354 That is the virtue and vice of autonomy. 
  





Self-Deception Is Not Just a Thing of the Past 
 
§1: Autonomous Motivation 
I concluded Chapter 4 by claiming, following Butler, that the virtue and vice of 
autonomy is that “there is great latitude left, for every one to determine for, and 
consequently to deceive himself.”355 This goes as much for autonomous motivation as it 
does for autonomous judgment. I’ve talked a lot about moral motivation throughout, but 
not previously used the term ‘autonomous motivation.’ My claim here is that I have in 
fact been talking about it all along: Mediated Internal moral motivation is autonomous 
moral motivation.  
In Chapter 2, §2 I outlined a brief history of the rise of Mediated Internal moral 
motivation; that history closely parallels the history of the rise of autonomy as a general 
moral and agential ideal. The nearness of the two is not merely coincidental. An 
autonomous agent is one who gives laws to herself; she is understood as obligated to 
those laws because she has given them to herself. If we are to actually realize ourselves 
as autonomous agents, and fulfill that obligation, we must not merely give ourselves laws, 
we must actually be motivated by, and so have some tendency to follow, those laws. So 
though not every philosopher of moral autonomy talks about moral motivation, or offers 
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an account of it, there is yet a kind of moral motivation characteristic of autonomy, 
namely, Mediated Internal moral motivation. 
The Self-Deception Problem, as I’ve been describing it, is a situation in which the 
very thing that is supposed to provide moral motivation also provides motivation to self-
deceive. Mediated Internal accounts of moral motivation, that is, accounts according to 
which the incentive object is (or is represented as being) inside or a part of the agent are, 
I argued, liable to the Self-Deception Problem. If the search for self-approval is supposed 
to motivate you to act, then, since self-approval can sometimes be gained through self-
deception, you are motivated to self-deceive. So if Mediated Internal accounts of moral 
motivation are, as I’m claiming, the characteristic accounts for autonomy-based ethics, 
then, insofar as we are convinced by it, autonomy-based ethics makes self-deceivers of us. 
By why exactly should we regard Mediated Internal accounts of moral 
motivation as being characteristic of, or naturally connected to, autonomy-based ethics? 
If I give moral laws to myself, as Kant would have it that we do, then I become, as Kant 
also puts it, both legislator and subject, both enforcer of an obligation and under that 
obligation. Insofar as I’m legislator, I rule on what kind of things I ought and ought not 
do. Insofar as I’m subject, I act in a way limited and governed by those rulings. So 
insofar as I’m both legislator and subject, I at once act and choose, and submit my 
actions and my choices to my own judgment. If that judgment actually governs me in 
any effective way, if there’s any sense in which I act as my own moral legislator or guide, 
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it’s because I’m motivated, in one way or another, through that judgment. So insofar as 
I’m an autonomous being, I judge of myself, and am motivated by those reflexive 
judgments to act and choose in accord with them. A motivation to conform to reflexive, 
or self-directed judgments just is a Mediated Internal motivation. So if we believe that 
we ought to act as autonomous beings, then it would be natural for us to claim that we 
ought to be driven by Mediated Internal motivations, and so we would hold a Mediated 
Internal account of moral motivation. Another way of putting it is to say that it’s 
natural to represent the source of obligation, the self and its judgments, as identical with 
the source of motivation, the self and its reflexive judgments. So an autonomist account 
of moral obligation fits well with a Mediated Internal account of moral motivation. 
That is not to say that, if we hold that moral obligation is grounded in autonomy, 
we must hold that moral motivation is Mediated and Internal. Neither position implies 
the other, so far as I can see. But they fit together fairly readily, which is why I’ve been 
claiming only that a Mediated Internal account of moral motivation is characteristic of 
autonomy-based ethics.  
We can see even better how well Mediated Internal accounts of moral motivation 
fit with autonomy-based ethics by considering the alternatives. Consider first how 
awkwardly a Mediated External account of moral motivation would sit with an 
autonomous account of moral obligation. Suppose that I regard myself, and my own 
reason, as the source of my obligation to the right, but that I hold that the right way to 
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be motivated to act is not by means of my own moral judgment, but rather by my desire 
to satisfy the demands of my community. That is, moral obligation is internally 
grounded, but moral motivation is externally grounded. Questions arise: first, must we 
presume agreement between what I judge I ought to do and what my community will 
demand I do? If not, then how could we claim that it’s right to be motivated to act 
according to the demands of the community even if the demands of the community are 
not right? And if so, if we must presume agreement between my judgment and the 
community’s judgment for me, then my own judgment, which supposedly grounds my 
obligation to right and wrong, appears to be superfluous, since the community’s 
judgment is, by hypothesis, adequate.  
Locke’s account, described in Chapter 2, §6, faces a weaker form of this dilemma, 
since he holds that morality is a set of rationally-discoverable natural laws, but that 
human motivation is egoistic and hedonistic. Locke holds that we can rationally know 
our duty, but that we are only motivated to do our duty because we believe that God 
will reward us if we do, and punish us if we don’t.356 That rational knowledge of right 
and wrong does not itself obligate us, for Locke, in part because it can’t motivate us. If 
God’s laws have been well-promulgated, so that we can be told what our duty is, our 
rational judgment seems to become superfluous. What role does it even play? 
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Locke has an answer available. First, our rational judgment is superfluous only if 
we have other means of knowing our duty; the fact that our duty is rationally 
discoverable means that it doesn’t need to be taught to us in order for us to know it.357 
Second, and more importantly, right and wrong are still grounded in God’s rational 
nature, so, in an important sense, the source of right and wrong is the same as the 
source of obligation, is the same as the proper source of moral motivation.  
That latter point is exactly what isn’t available to an ethical autonomist who 
holds a Mediated External account of moral motivation since, by hypothesis, she holds 
that the source of obligation is different from the source of moral motivation. This is, of 
course, a perfectly possible position, but it’s quite awkward: why locate the source of 
obligation within if the spur to right and wrong is without? Much more natural would be 
to connect a Mediated External account of moral motivation with an external account of 
moral obligation in the way Locke does, where the source of obligation and the object 
that provides the incentive for moral motivation are represented as being identical.  
Consider next how awkwardly an Immediate account of moral motivation fits 
with an autonomist account of moral obligation. Suppose that I regard myself, and my 
own reason, as the source of my obligation to act a certain way towards people and 
situations, but that I hold that the right way to be motivated is by immediate and direct 
appreciation of those people and situations. That is, moral obligation is mediately 
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grounded, but moral motivation is immediately grounded. Different questions arise. If 
direct appreciation of the situation, or the people involved in it, gives immediate rise to 
the proper motive to action, why doesn’t it also give rise to an obligation to act 
according to that motive? Why should obligation depend on reflectiveness if moral 
motivation doesn’t? If we hold an Immediate account of moral motivation, we might 
insist that, following Hume, “the first virtuous motive, which bestows a merit on any 
action, can never be a regard to the virtue of that action, but must be some other 
natural motive or principle.”358 Regard to the virtue of an action couldn’t bestow merit 
because an action would already have to be a virtuous one to be the proper object of 
that regard. In that case, we might similarly argue that that which bestows obligation on 
an action cannot be regard to its obligatoriness, since the action would already have to 
be obligatory to be the proper subject of that regard. 
This is not to say that a reflective or autonomistic account of obligation is 
circular. It’s rather to say that, if we hold that only Immediate motivations are proper, 
it might be because we think they ground out in the right thing: the object of moral 
treatment. At that point, it becomes tempting to treat obligation the same way. Again, 
it’s natural to represent the source of obligation as identical with the source of 
motivation. 
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Now, there are certainly reasons one might hold an autonomist view about moral 
obligation but an Immediate account of moral motivation. It might be thought that 
Immediate motivations are more lively and motivating than Mediated ones, and so the 
former are simply a better place to hang our motivational hat than the latter. It might 
at the same time be thought that only self-binding creates proper obligation, so only an 
autonomist view of the ground of moral obligation could be sufficient. Both of these are 
plausible views. Indeed, we might simply deny that there’s any important connection 
between motivation and obligation, so the naturalness of locating the bases for both in 
the same thing is an illusory theoretical virtue. 
But there is an important connection between motivation and obligation, and 
that connection is what makes sense of the idea that it’s at least natural to ground moral 
motivation in the same thing as moral obligation. If that’s right, then my argument that 
Mediated Internal moral motivation is characteristic of autonomistic morals holds up. In 
Chapter 3, §4 I claimed that my account of conscience helped make plausible 
Motivational Judgment Externalism, the denial that there’s any necessary or rational 
connection between moral judgments and motivation. But if there’s anything plausible 
about Motivational Judgment Internalism, the assertion of a necessary or rational 
connection between moral judgments and motivation, it’s because, as Michael Smith 
argues, it helps make sense of the reliable connection between the two. There would 
seem to be a similarly reliable connection between obligation and motivation, such that 
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recognition of an obligation has a strong tendency to give rise to a motivation to act in 
accord with that obligation. If that’s right, it’s natural to seek accounts of both that 
make sense of that tendency. And if our accounts of both obligation and motivation are 
grounded in the same thing, recognition of obligation will at least tend to go together 
with motivation. So my discussion of Mediated Internal moral motivation is well 
understood as a discussion of a part of the idea of autonomy in morals. So that 
discussion does indeed show the way autonomy-based morals makes self-deceivers of us 
all. 
 
§2: Augusto Blasi 
 In the preceding discussion, I used my taxonomy of accounts of moral motivation 
in the course of arguing that one kind of account fits better with the autonomy tradition 
in morals than others. Though I made reference to Hume, Kant, and Locke, I did not 
make a historical but rather a conceptual argument. If I can use my taxonomy for 
general and informative conceptual arguments about the relations between moral 
motivation and the rest of moral theory, it must itself be sufficiently general and 
informative to apply across the board, not just to understanding seventeenth and 
eighteenth century British moral thought. In Chapter 1, I claimed that this taxonomy 
was both flexible enough to be general, and informative enough to explain what kind of 
accounts of moral motivation would have the Self-Deception Problem, and which 
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wouldn’t. In Chapters 2 and 4, I illustrated that claim by using my taxonomy to make 
sense of Reid, Smith, Hobbes, Locke, Hutcheson, and finally Butler, showing how to 
categorize their various accounts of moral motivation and how those accounts 
accordingly did or did not lead them to concern with self-deception. But if the taxonomy 
is as general as I’ve claimed, and as the argument of the prior section assumes, it should 
also be applicable to other accounts of moral motivation. 
 I believe it is so general. To illustrate its generality and usefulness, and to point a 
way for my future work, I’ll briefly discuss two contemporary thinkers’ accounts of 
moral motivation, one from psychology, the other from philosophy. They’ll both turn out 
to be Mediated Internal accounts of moral motivation, and so, for both, the Self-
Deception Problem will be shown to lurk, though neither thinker has to my knowledge 
treated self-deception in any sustained way. If my discussions are plausible, they show 
that my framework is indeed predictive: these thinkers, as they extend their accounts, 
can be expected to show concern with the problem of self-deception, even if they haven’t 
yet.  
 First I’ll discuss the moral psychologist Augusto Blasi’s influential Self Model of 
moral motivation. Blasi’s Self Model is as straightforwardly a Mediated Internal account 
as could be, and is, accordingly, subject to the Self-Deception Problem. Then I’ll discuss 
Christine Korsgaard’s even more influential account of normativity. Insofar as she 
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regards her picture of normativity as properly motivating, Korsgaard offers an account 
all but identical to Blasi’s, and so liable to the same difficulties. 
 Before discussing Blasi’s particular view in any detail, it’s important to clarify 
what he means when he writes about moral motivation. Generally, psychologists might 
be expected to engage only in description, and not prescription, so that when they offer 
an account of something like moral motivation, they offer only a description of a certain 
way or set of ways in which humans are motivated, but make no claim as to whether 
those motivations are good, right, approvable, virtuous, and so on. In that case, Blasi 
couldn’t be offering anything like what I mean by moral motivation, namely, the right or 
virtuous way to be motivated. But things are not quite that simple. Blasi’s self-
consciously Aristotelian goal is to understand moral functioning in mature and morally-
serious adults.359 This ultimate goal is one of numerous ways in which he follows and 
builds on Lawrence Kohlberg’s model of moral development.360 One of the peculiarities of 
Kohlberg’s concept of developmental psychology—and one of its Aristotelian qualities—
is a strong insistence on there being a particular way a properly-functioning adult 
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morally reasons.361 So Blasi, like Kohlberg, describes what he takes to be the proper way 
to be motivated, not just a way people are sometimes motivated. 
 But there’s another sense in which Blasi means something slightly different by 
‘moral motivation’ than I do. I’ve been using that term as a virtue term: moral 
motivations are the right kind of motivations, motivations that merit normative approval. 
It might be that the motive of duty is a moral motivation, at least in some 
circumstances, while anger is, too, in other circumstances. In Chapter 1, §2 I 
distinguished this sense of ‘moral motivation’ from the primary sense in which it’s used 
in metaethical discussion. There, it’s the motive that follows from moral judgments to 
act in accord with them. Blasi understands it much in the latter sense, asking why our 
moral judgments are motivationally affective.362 But, again, all we have to do is point 
out that he regards it as a fairly obvious virtue, not to mention usual in properly 
developed adults, for moral judgments to have considerable motivational force. At that 
point, we recognize that ‘moral motivation’ in the metaethical sense is, at least for Blasi, 
a proper part of ‘moral motivation’ in my virtue sense. 
 So what is Blasi’s Self Model of moral motivation? He regards there to be a gap, 
at least possible in principle, between moral judgment and moral motivation, that it is 
at least possible in principle for us to make a cognitive judgment about what would be 
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right to do, but not yet be motivated to do it. If that’s possible, and indeed it is not only 
possible but common, we have to ask where the additional motive to act comes from, 
when it exists at all. This looks very much like the situation in Motivational Judgment 
Externalism, in which non-cognitive motives fill that gap. But what, then, has become of 
the idea that we act for moral reasons at all? As Blasi puts it, “The problem can be 
stated as follows: If, at least in some instances, moral judgment, derived from cognitive 
criteria and other cognitive considerations, is not sufficient to motivate moral action, but 
requires motives originating from within one’s identity, what becomes of the cognitive 
basis of moral action?”363 
 The answer is to focus on exactly what kinds of motives ‘originating from within 
one’s identity’ do the work to fill that motivational gap. Blasi claims that “Each 
individual, beginning relatively early in development, has an image, a perception, a 
scheme, or a theory of himself or herself (all these terms are awkward; none captures 
precisely the type of reality to be conveyed), being at the same time a principle of 
cognitive organization and the source of a special class of motives, the self motives.”364 
We become attached to those conceptions of ourselves, and as we come to regard that 
image, perception, scheme, or theory of ourselves as central to who we are, indeed as 
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constituting who we are, it becomes what Blasi calls a “self identity.”365  With the 
appearance of that strong self identity, “new and important motives appear: the desire, 
indeed the need, to maintain one’s identity, to exist as the person one feels to be at the 
core; and also the desire or the need to maintain its unity, to be internally consistent.”366 
So when we regard something as so important, so central to who we are that it 
constitutes our self identity, we have strong motives to act in certain ways towards it. 
We have those strong motives because of a desire, or even a need, for consistency. We 
need to be able to continue seeing ourselves as what we identify ourselves as being. 
 Now, “Initially, being and wanting to be a good moral person is one self-concept 
among many others, and perhaps it is not more important for the sense of self than 
many other self-concepts.”367 But things do not just stay that way: “At some point and 
in some people, a selection takes place: Certain aspects of oneself are considered to be 
more “true and real” than many others from the perspective of the sense of self.”368 
Morality, and moral value, and “being a good person, being fair and just in a general 
sense, may be, but need not be, a part of an individual’s essential self.”369 If they are, 
and they often are, then, “moral identity is directly related to moral action, providing 
                                         
365 Augusto Blasi, “Moral Functioning: Moral Understanding and Personality,” p. 342 – 
343. 
366 “Moral Functioning,” p. 343. 
367 “Moral Functioning,” p. 342. 
368 ibid. 
369 Blasi, “Moral Identity,” p. 132. 
  
210 
one of its truly moral motives.”370 So Blasi’s account of moral motivation is quite simple: 
if we develop a self identity according to which we regard ourselves as good people, then 
we are motivated to act according to our moral judgments in order to maintain that 
good view of ourselves. 
 He insists that this is not the whole story of moral motivation, saying that “One 
continues to behave morally because moral norms and ideals are good and desirable; but, 
in addition, because acting against one’s core commitments would be a self-betrayal and 
damaging to one’s sense of self.”371 It is not that this Self Model constitutes our entire 
moral motivation, but rather that it “lends possibly weak moral desires the weight, 
power, and authority of the agentic subject.”372  So Blasi is a pluralist about moral 
motivation, since he clearly regards those ‘weak moral desires’ as multiple, as worthy, 
and as distinct from, or at least as in principle distinguishable from, the Self Model’s 
motivation.  
Nonetheless, the Self Model is clearly his central explanation for how the 
motivational gap between judgment and action is bridged. And, as should be obvious, 
the Self Model is a Mediated Internal account of moral motivation. What drives us to 
act morally on Blasi’s model is not merely immediate appreciation of persons or 
situations, but rather the recognition that in morally freighted situations, how we 
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understand ourselves is at stake. According to the Self Model, we are motivated by the 
desire or need for internal consistency, and our decisions of how to act are mediated 
through our judgments of what would and wouldn’t count as internal consistency for us. 
It should be equally obvious that Blasi’s Self Model of moral motivation is liable 
to the Self-Deception Problem. Surely the desire or need for internal consistency, 
combined with a tendency to do or want all sorts of things that are not necessarily 
consistent with my view of myself, can lead me to rationalize. I self-deceive, finding a 
way to regard actions that I ought to judge as inconsistent with my moral personality as 
either being consistent with it, not attributable to myself at all, meaningless aberrations, 
and so on. And, clearly, I self-deceive in cases like that not despite but because of my 
Self Model-based moral motivations. 
It is not clear that Blasi recognizes this problem; at least, he doesn’t try to treat 
it. He does refer to and admit the possibility that the reasons people give for their 
actions can be mere rationalizations,373 so, perhaps unlike Reid, Blasi does not think that 
we can rely on self-transparency to get us around the motive to self-deceive. Since Blasi 
allow that we are often rationalizers, he allows that we are not entirely self-transparent, 
and so capable of self-deception; and we certainly have the motivation. I am not the first 
to point out this difficulty that arises form the Self Model. In a volume of responses to 
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Blasi’s work, David Moshman argues for the possibility of a ‘false moral identity.’ He 
points out, much like I’ve argued, that  
If my behavior falsifies a theory of self to which I am strongly committed, I can 
make the theory true by acting in accord with it, thus becoming the person I 
theorized myself to be. But note that I can also maintain my subjective 
equilibrium, without modifying either my theory or my behavior, by not 
attending to my behavior or by adjusting my perceptions and/or inferences to fit 
with my theory of myself. Thus, false identities may be maintained through self-
serving manipulations of evidence about one’s behavior.374 
 
Moshman gives in support of this claim a harrowing case study of the El Mozote 
massacre in El Salvador in 1981, as well as the American government’s reaction to it. He 
first discusses Colonel Monterrosa, commander of the battalion that carried out the 
massacre. As Moshman puts it, it’s plausible to understand Monterrosa as having “a 
strong moral identity—that he genuinely saw himself as a person fundamentally 
committed to acting on the basis of respect or concern for the rights or welfare of 
others.”375 It was indeed because of that moral identity that, rather than adverting to, 
say, realism in war, he unreasonably “deemed the policy of massacres to be morally 
justified”376 because of the great danger posed by the Communist rebels. 
The U.S. government, on the other hand, was not prepared to “justify abuses of 
this nature and scope,”377 since, “whatever the menace of Communism, to acknowledge 
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the full extent of the massacres and other human rights violations of the government the 
U.S. was supporting in El Salvador would have jeopardized the administration’s sense of 
itself as a fundamentally moral agent.”378 So a self-serving, self-deceptive moral calculus 
was not available. Rather, “denial was necessary to maintain an adequate level of 
consistency between the administration’s moral self-conception and its support of the 
Salvadoran government,” since “by not knowing the terrible things for which one does 
not want to be responsible, one need not lie, to others and perhaps to oneself, about 
one’s responsibility.”379 
What’s so interesting about Moshman’s discussion is that he points out how the 
same basic thing, the desire to regard oneself as, and to be regarded by others as moral, 
drives both Monterrosa’s self-deceptive moral calculations and the Reagan 
administration’s self-deceptive denial. So, depending on what sorts of stories the self will 
and won’t buy, different strategies of self-deception are taken, even while the same basic 
motive drives them all. Unfortunately, Blasi does not refer to Moshman’s essay in his 
reply to critics piece at the end of the volume. But I think it’s clear that both 
Monterrosa and the Reagan administration, on Moshman’s description, are engaging in 
just the same kind of self-deception as Balaam and David, respectively. As Butler 
describes Balaam, he subverts his conscience, just as Monterrosa subverts his moral 
judgment. And as Butler describes David, he suppresses conscience, just as the Reagan 





administration suppressed awareness of Monterrosa’s campaign of massacres. So Blasi’s 
account requires the very same concern with self-deception as Butler’s does, even if Blasi 
is less enthusiastic than Butler about engaging with it. 
 
§3: Christine Korsgaard 
 In the previous section, I made the perhaps surprising claim that Christine 
Korsgaard’s account of moral motivation from The Sources of Normativity turns out to 
be ‘all but identical’ to Blasi’s. Before clarifying Korsgaard’s particular account, at 
which point the similarity will be obvious, I should explain what I mean by even 
claiming that Korsgaard has an account of moral motivation. She does not particularly 
claim to be offering one. Rather, what she’s trying to account for is moral obligation: 
why we ought to be moral, or what justifies the claim that moral reasons must be our 
reasons. There is no necessity that an account of obligation must connect in any way 
with motivation, let alone with an account of what the right sorts of motivations are. 
Korsgaard, though, thinks that a proper account of morality ought to explain not just 
what things are right and wrong and why, but why people “regulate their actions, love, 
hate, live, kill, and die . . . for moral truths,”380 that is, why morality motivates. So a 
good account of moral reasons and moral obligation, for Korsgaard, ought, at least, to 
have a strong connection with motivation. Further, she endorses Motivational Judgment 
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Internalism, 381  though she says that she prefers “to avoid these terms.” 382  That 
internalism implies that there are direct motivational counterparts to our moral 
judgments. As she puts it, practical reasons “are motivating in virtue of their 
normativity, that is, people are inspired to do things by the normativity of the reasons 
they have for doing them, by their awareness that some consideration makes a claim on 
them.”383 So when Korsgaard explains the basis on which moral obligation stands, she’s 
explaining the basis on which a moral motivation stands, too. 
 So what is her account of moral obligation? She refers to “a description under 
which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living 
and your actions to be worth undertaking” as “your practical identity.”384 This identity 
gives “rise to reasons and obligations.”385 The idea is that, because you identify as, say, a 
sailor, you have reasons to do what sailors do, and obligations to refrain from what no 
sailor can do and yet call himself a sailor. Further, “It is the conceptions of ourselves 
that are most important to us that give rise to unconditional obligations. For to violate 
them is to lose your integrity and so your identity, and to no longer be who you are. 
That is, it is to no longer be able to think of yourself under the description under which 
you value yourself and find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth 
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undertaking.”386 So the more important or central a particular practical identity is to 
one’s identity, the more clearly unconditional are the obligations it creates. We relate 
that practical identity to our particular desires in a straightforward way: we test our 
particular desires, or the thought of particular actions, for consistency with our practical 
identity. As Korsgaard puts it, “We endorse or reject our impulses by determining 
whether they are consistent with the ways in which we identify ourselves.”387  
She argues that that reflective endorsement test, in which we endorse or reject 
our desires by means of checking their consistency with our practical identity, just is the 
basis of rational agency, and that, further, it is motivational: “To be motivated ‘by 
reason’ is normally to be motivated by one’s reflective endorsement of incentives and 
impulses, including affections, which arise in a natural way.” 388  Notice that she’s 
referring to the endorsement itself as motivating, not just the incentives and impulses 
that garner that endorsement. It should be clear that that motivation, motivation by 
reason, motivation by what Korsgaard treats as the center of her account of reason and 
obligation, is a Mediated Internal moral motivation. It’s Mediated because it’s a motive 
that runs through reflection, and Internal because it’s self-reflection. Through a drive or 
need for self-consistency, or, in more Korsgaardian terms, a sense of knowing who we are, 
we submit our desires to comparison with our practical identity, and we are then 
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motivated to continue with a particular desire only if we deem it consistent with that 
identity. 
There are two further points, important to Korsgaard, since she’s interested in 
demonstrating the universally binding nature of morality, though somewhat less 
important here, since I’m not. The first is that it’s a simple fact about being human that 
we cannot get along without a practical identity: “It is necessary to have some 
conception of your practical identity, for without it you cannot have reasons to act.”389 
The second is that it is not contingent whether or not a person has a moral identity: 
“Not every form of practical identity is contingent or relative after all: moral identity is 
necessary.”390 
The latter point contrasts sharply with Blasi who, recall, claimed that a moral 
identity “may be, but need not be, a part of an individual’s essential self.”391 But up until 
that point, it’s difficult to see any substantial way in which Korsgaard’s and Blasi’s 
accounts differ. Both depend on the idea that we make sense of who we are by means of 
attachment to some identity. Both then assert that a moral identity is a central form of 
identity to which we might be so attached. Both point out that we have certain desires 
already in line with morality that might already motivate us, but that we garner 
additional motivation to act on them by noticing that they cohere with our moral 
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identities. Both also point out that we might have certain desires opposed to morality, 
and that we gather motivational strength to resist them by noticing that they conflict 
with our moral identities. And both think that this is as it should be, that a failure to 
recognize the reality and centrality of this Mediated Internal moral motivation counts as 
a failure “of explanatory adequacy,”392 in theorizing about human morality. 
Accordingly, Korsgaard’s account of moral motivation appears to be liable to the 
Self-Deception Problem in just the same way as Blasi’s. It’s important to me to maintain 
my moral identity, but I have particular desires, the acting upon of which would, if 
judged impartially, conflict with that identity. So if ever I act on such desires, it 
becomes important to me to find a way to avoid recognition that I have done something 
which conflicts with my moral identity. So I’m motivated to deceive myself by and 
because of the very motive that Korsgaard has identified as moral, so Korsgaard’s 
account is liable to the Self-Deception Problem. 
Indeed, it appears that, if anything, her account is a little more liable to this 
problem than Blasi’s, because of the necessity and centrality that she affords the moral 
identity. Blasi has it that many of us come to understand ourselves most of all as moral 
people; insofar as we have and have a need to maintain that identity, we have 
motivation to deceive ourselves rather than recognize our deviations from it. Korsgaard 
has it that all of us must understand ourselves as having a moral identity just because of 
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our humanity.393 It would appear then that, insofar as we sometimes act immorally, our 
very identity as persons is threatened. All the more important, then, that we prevent 
recognition of that immorality. If the recognition of what we have done, and what we 
want to do, puts our very humanity at stake, we should be expected to evade that 
recognition by any means necessary. 
Interestingly, however, Korsgaard does not seem to think that our sense of our 
own humanity is always so threatened by violations of the obligations it creates. She 
says, “you can stop being yourself for a bit and still get back home . . . you may know 
that if you always did this sort of thing your identity would disintegrate, . . . but you 
also know that you can do it just this once without any such result.”394 This, she says, is 
a problem, and that problem “does not come from the fragility of identity, but rather 
from its stability. It can take a few knocks, and we know it.”395 It isn’t clear to me that 
Korsgaard recognizes just how wide a door that opens for us. As any experienced 
rationalizer or self-deceiver ought to know, ‘just this once’ is iterable. Both because of 
and in order to maintain the stability of our identities, we can deceive ourselves into 
“making an exception of the moment or the case,” 396  or even leaving aside clear 
recognition of the moment or the case at all, again and again. So the Korsgaardian agent 
has a clear and present practical need to recognize and respond to its self-deceptive 
                                         
393 Sources of Normativity, pp. 122 – 123. 
394 Sources of Normativity, p. 102. 




tendencies. So, though she hasn’t written about self-deception in any sustained way to 
this point, I think Korsgaard has reason to be interested in it, since on her account, as 
on Butler’s, self-deception “undermines the whole principle of good . . . and corrupts 
conscience, which is the guide of life.”397 
 
§4: Conclusion 
This dissertation offers a lot of things. It provides a novel and simple taxonomy 
of accounts of moral motivation that has the particular virtue of giving an explanation 
why some philosophers regard self-deception as a centrally important moral problem, 
while others don’t. It offers a new account of the conscience, free of theological baggage, 
aimed at integration into a more general pluralistic account of moral motivation, and of 
use in a longstanding debate in metaethics. It makes an important contribution to Butler 
studies, first, of course, by offering a proper understanding of Butler’s much-discussed 
arguments for the authority of conscience, but also by bringing to light the subtle but 
important differences between the two major examples of self-deception Butler offers—
the Balaam example and the David example—which I do not believe has previously been 
appreciated. But I am also telling a bigger story here.  
Triumphalist histories—primarily J.B. Schneewind’s The Invention of Autonomy, 
but also Stephen Darwall’s The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’ and, in a 
                                         
397 Sermons X.16 
  
221 
slightly different way, A.O. Lovejoy’s Reflections on Human Nature—have presented the 
emergence of Kant’s ideas as the apotheosis of modern moral philosophy. The idea that 
the basis of morals is within us, that we are autonomous agents, that our oughts and our 
motivations are derived solely from the rational nature within us is, not without reason, 
treated as the major advance in moral philosophy from pre-modernity into modernity. 
But I believe I have shown that that advance came with a peculiar cost. The more we 
understand moral virtue as something that is not merely incumbent upon us, but as 
something we attach ourselves to, care about, commit ourselves to, define and 
understand ourselves through, the more prone we become to self-deception about moral 
matters.  
If, to take up Kant and Butler’s juridical metaphor, we give the law to ourselves, 
we are equally, and at once, legislators and subjects, rulers and ruled. That we, rather 
than our cities or our gods, are our own rulers is the triumph of the autonomist tradition 
in morals. But we cannot forget that this also makes us our own subjects. We prove to 
be unruly, even under our own rule. And we remain just as eager as ever before to evade 
the heavy hand of the law, even when we are its executioner. 
In pointing out the strangeness and discomfort of that situation, I mean to make 
a modest contribution to the counter tradition of Enlightenment and autonomy critics 
such as, in their different ways, Nietzsche and Alasdair MacIntyre. I certainly am not 
attempting, as they did, to utterly undermine or show the rotten or confused foundations 
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of the modern tradition of autonomy in ethics. I am merely pointing out a particular 
way in which that tradition makes us houses divided against ourselves. And a house 
divided against itself may have trouble standing. 
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